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# **JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS**



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TORONTO**

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# JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS

BY

K. K. KAWAKAMI

AUTHOR OF "AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS,"  
"ASIA AT THE DOOR," ETC.

New York  
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY  
1917

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US 1650.46.10

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**TO MY  
BELOVED CHILDREN  
YURI ALBERTA  
HIROSHI CLARKE  
MARCIA KIYO**

**May They Prove Each a New Link  
in the Chain of Friendship that  
has Bound America and Japan for  
Half a Century! May They, as  
They Go Forth into the World,  
Strive Nobly and Valiantly for  
that End, to the Furthering of  
Which Their Father, Conscious  
of the Utter Inadequacy of His  
Resources and Abilities, has  
Struggled to Contribute  
his Mite!**



## PREFACE

I started my modest career in Japan twenty years ago as a social reformer—a dreamer of dreams, if you will. I was fresh from college, care-free, buoyant of spirit, full of the optimism of youth and the ardor of the reformer. I dedicated myself, or rather fancied I did, to the great task of social uplift. I had read quite a number of English books on socialism and on the labor movement in Europe and America. I had become so enamoured of socialistic ideas that I adopted the Christian name of the immortal author of *Das Kapital*. Imagine a Japanese boy, who had never been abroad, going under a foreign name, and a German name at that! You may be sure I shocked my family, my relatives, my friends,—everybody.

I had no desire to make myself unduly notorious. I was sincere and was animated with the aspiration to do for Japan what Karl Marx did for Germany. The idea was childish, ridiculous. Need I say I had none of the qualities which made the German exponent of socialism great and immortal? But I had the enthusiasm of a pioneer, and thought that I could serve my country, as a herald, at least, of the Western masters of Socialism. That my country

wanted none of such radicalism seemed to me sufficient reason why I should preach it.

With hope blazing the path before me I entered upon a new career. First I wrote a few books on Socialism. Then I appeared upon the platform, urging the organization of labor as the first step towards Socialism. Soon there appeared the Social Democratic Party, of which I was one of the organizers. In the meantime the efforts of such men as Sen Katayama and Professor Abe resulted in the organization of a number of labor unions. The new movement seemed well under way.

Then I left for the United States for education and to broaden my observation. That was in 1901, when I was twenty-five years old. I had hoped that my sojourn in the land of freedom would strengthen my socialistic convictions and my belief in trade unionism. I had almost idealized the labor movement in America, forgetting that their leaders were after all human, full of frailties and weaknesses. To me trade unionism was of value only as a stepping stone to a socialistic society, and I had fancied that the labor leaders of America were of the same opinion. To me, moreover, Socialism was nothing if it was not internationalism. To my thinking Socialism was not merely an economic theory, but a theory for social reconstruction based upon new moral ideals. It advocated, among other things, I thought, the untrammelled intercourse of peoples, and held that the bigger and richer nations should assist in

the economic salvation of smaller and poorer nations, even when it was not quite ready to accept the broader principles of universal brotherhood. To be frank, I did not understand all the intricate economic theories of Socialism, neither did I reason out to my satisfaction the final form of society which I wished to see established in our midst. Only in its broad outlines did I think of Socialism, and, considered in broad outlines, Socialism seemed to offer a panacea for the ills of the world.

With such fancies I came to America. My observations and experiences since then have conspired to disillusion me. I have discovered that the American labor unions in reality, are not the labor unions I had pictured in my youthful mind. Neither are their leaders men of knightly qualities, championing the cause of the weak against the oppression of the powerful. To add to my disappointment, even the Socialists here were not true to their professed internationalism. With great reluctance I drifted away from Socialism and trade unionism, enthusiasm for which was primarily responsible for my coming to this country.

I need not dwell here upon incidents and events which carried me away from Socialism. I shall only say that I have gradually come to the conclusion that the age of Socialism has not yet dawned upon the world. We live

"Between two worlds—one dead,  
The other powerless to be born."

That it is our duty to assist in the birth of the new world goes without saying, but in order to hasten the dawn of the new age—the age of International Socialism—certain conditions must first be altered or removed.

The foremost of such conditions is found in the attitude of the advanced, powerful peoples of the West towards the backward and weaker peoples of the East, whose rehabilitation and amelioration need sympathetic assistance. I use the term “peoples” advisedly, for the readjustment of the relationship between East and West is of much broader and deeper significance than that between the Governments concerned. Unless the peoples of the West learn to view their relations with the East in a new light, it is futile to expect their governments to deviate from the path they have been following. What, then, is the West thinking of the East?

Speaking in general terms and disregarding exceptions, the West, the powerful, imperialistic West, looks upon the feeble, resigning East as an entirely different world which must occupy an inferior position in the scale of world communities. To extend a helping hand to the East, to guide its unsteady steps into the paths of progress and civilization, to lift it from sloughs of despondency and accord it a place of equality—such a task is not given to the West to undertake. Look at India and China, and all the rest of Asia, with the lone exception of Japan.

Here you have a concrete example of the Occident's attitude towards the Orient. Japan has saved herself from the common fate of her unhappy neighbors because she was quick enough to see that the only way to win the respect of the aggressive Occident was to "beat it at its own game."

Here is a chasm which must be bridged before we can honestly advocate Socialism, with its corollary of Internationalism and Pacifism. Before it Socialism and Pacifism are a mockery. When Socialists in Europe and America pledge themselves to internationalism they are thinking only of Europe and America, forgetting that across the oceans teeming millions are crying for greater fields of activity and for redemption from bondage to Western capital. When the trade unionists of Europe and America speak of the brotherhood of workers, they are thinking only of their own race. When the pacifists of Europe and America advocate world peace, they seem to mean maintenance of peace by sustaining the *status quo* of the relations of the East and West—by permitting the West not only to continue its occupation, in all parts of the world, of more territory than it is justly entitled to possess, but to exclude from such territories all dark-skinned races whose overcrowded home lands not only offer scant opportunity to their natives but are themselves subject to untrammelled exploitation at the hands of the West. Even Christianity has abruptly stopped and struck its standard before the racial wall, and



has no courage to advance. A Western nation may declare a Monroe Doctrine, but is reluctant to accord an Asiatic nation a similar privilege. The West expects the East to open its doors to the exploitation of the white race, but reserves the right to slam its own doors in the faces of Orientals.

It all comes to this, that to the Western mind, the East is a negligible quantity to be dealt with as whim or fancy may direct. In Shanghai there is a "foreign" park at the entrance to which is posted the sign: "Chinese and Dogs not Allowed." Up to only a decade or so ago similar signs were posted at the "foreign" park in Yokohama, the sight of which rasped the nerves of the patriots of Nippon. When, at last, the Japanese, by dint of their achievements in the arts of peace and, alas! of warfare, compelled the removal of those shameful signs, you may be sure the foreigners were generous in cursing their "cockiness." These little incidents are in themselves of no importance, but as an indication of the feeling and attitude of the whole West towards the whole East, they are of great value and significance.

In the concourse of nations the attitude of the powerful towards the powerless is much the same as the attitude of capital towards labor in the community of individuals. Even as capital thinks, or used to think, that it is to its advantage that labor should be kept ignorant and down-trodden, so the great colonial Powers of the West apparently think

with reference to continued submission on the part of the weak Orient. So long as capital ignores the obvious principles of social justice in dealing with labor, there must always exist potential causes of conflict. Does this not furnish food for reflection on the part of the great Occidental Powers which regard Asia as their "happy hunting ground," while denying to the Asiatics the freedom of entry into their own territory? When Western entrepreneurs and capitalists enter into Asiatic fields of exploitation, their home Governments are ready to back them with the might of their armies and navies, which are expected sooner or later to reduce the unhappy countries of Asia to a state of bondage. When the masses of the East, crowded out of their own countries, seek breathing room in the yet undeveloped countries of the West, the West is ready to expel them even at the point of the bayonet. Try however hard you may, you cannot escape the logical conclusion which must inevitably be drawn from the existing state of relations between the East and West. One of two things must eventually be done—either the freedom of migration of all peoples from one country to another must be recognized, or the great colonial Powers, holding vast territories, rich with resources yet sparsely populated, must give up some of their holdings in favor of land-hungry peoples, choked and smothered in their native countries. Without dispelling the potential cause of conflict it is futile to speak of disarmament,

or permanent peace. The dove of peace builds its nest only in the haunts of justice.

If the East still silently acquiesces in the present order of things it is simply because the East is powerless to assert its rights. Most of us hesitate to look this question squarely in the face, because its magnitude, with all its portentous possibilities, appals us. Yet it is a question which must be met honestly and courageously, if we are to avoid a world catastrophe mightier than the upheaval which is now shaking Europe from its foundations.

“How will the future reckon with this man?  
How answer this brute question in that hour  
When whirlwinds of rebellion shake the world?”

The East is not yet ready to ask the “brute question.” Will it ever be ready? No one can tell. This much is certain, that the East will not be ready for the task for many generations, perhaps for many centuries, to come. In writing the above passages, therefore, I am thinking not in terms of years or decades, but in terms of centuries. My words should not be construed as the prophecy of an immediate or even an approaching conflict between the Eastern and the Western worlds. If I look only upon the horizon that opens immediately before me, I can be supremely optimistic. To be sure, we shall be spared the pangs of seeing such a holocaust. Even our children and grandchildren may not live to witness the appalling spectacle. It is only when I gaze

into the distant future that I begin to realize the ominous nature of the situation.

Mr. Hearst's industrious warning against the coming war between the white and the yellow races is not without certain elements of truth, but he makes himself absurd when he tries to make it appear that the danger is imminent, arguing that it can be averted if America will only build dreadnoughts and organize a powerful army without delay. He does not see, or pretends not to see, the obvious fact that such a world conflict as he predicts will never come until the whole of Asia is resuscitated and invigorated, and is made as efficient as the most advanced peoples of the West. Before that time dawns upon the world, such guns and dreadnoughts as America may build at Mr. Hearst's instance will have gone to the scrap heap. Asia's deliverance from the Occident lies in the employment of much the same method as has been employed by labor in its deliverance from its bondage to capital. That method is collective bargaining. How can Asia, in its present decrepit state, resort to collective bargaining? With the solitary exception of Japan there are no forces which Asia can bring together for the purpose. The general awakening of Asia is to-day as far away as it has ever been. It is idle to think that Japan will, single-handed, champion the cause of Asia and throw a challenge to the mighty array of Western Powers. So far from dreaming of such a Quixotic task, Japan, an

essentially practical nation, is impelled by the instinct of self-preservation to cast her lot with the West. Her danger to-day lies rather in her inclination to employ the characteristic Western methods in dealing with her fellow-countries of the Asian continent.

It pains me that I cannot be a firmer believer in pacifism. Temperamentally, I am a lover of peace. I do not gloat over force. Providence denied me the qualities of militancy. And yet I see but little justice in maintaining peace on the basis of a *status quo* of world conditions which is not based upon justice. Still I may call myself a pacifist in so far as I am interested in any movement calculated to defer the final clash of the two worlds so long as possible, hoping that in the meantime the peoples will come to a keener appreciation of justice and will accord, without bloodshed, such rights as would seem to belong to the peoples of the hitherto mute Orient. Let us hope that a day of peace prolonged is a day gained for saner thinking. No doubt this is a temporizing attitude, a policy of expediency, a biding of time, perhaps unworthy of men of courage, and yet I prefer it to war. With special reference to American-Japanese relations, supreme efforts must certainly be made for the maintenance of peace.

In my previous two books, *American-Japanese Relations* and *Asia at the Door*, as in the present volume, I have elected to appeal especially to the

American people, because I have great confidence in their innate sense of justice. Of all nations, the United States alone has not joined the universal scramble for territories and concessions in the Orient. Both abroad and at home this country has achieved many deeds which bespeak her generosity and love of fair play. Let us hope that America will once again set the noble example before the world of doing for the peoples of Asia what other powerful nations are as yet unwilling to do.

In writing *Asia at the Door* I referred to America and the Americans in the first person plural. In this book I follow the same method. In reviewing the previous volume a writer in a prominent New York journal queried, "Why, 'we' when Mr. Kawakami knows that he cannot be naturalized?" Why not? That I happened to be born and reared on a little island called Nippon is merely incidental. That the laws of the United States do not permit me to become a citizen is no impediment to my converting myself morally and mentally into an American citizen. My home is wherever I have come to stay and wherever I have become most deeply attached to my surroundings and associations. One may fulfill all the legal qualifications for citizenship, and yet remain morally unfit to be called an American. If I have at times seemed critical towards America it is simply because I would see a more perfect America, a nobler America, and not because I cherish contempt or enmity

towards the people among whom I live. Would that my American friends could read my contributions to newspapers in Japan defending the cause of America.

The rôle which I have essayed to play is far from enviable, winning the sympathy of neither Japanese nor Americans. Yet I am convinced of the wisdom of it. There are Americans a plenty who excel in the art of fault-finding with regard to Japan: it is, therefore, my self-imposed duty to present to the American public the brighter side of my native country. And the Americans accuse me of subserviency to the cause of Japan. There are enough Japanese censoriously inclined towards America:—to them I consider it my privilege, no less than my duty, to present the best side of my adopted country. And the Japanese denounce me as slavish to a country whose citizenship I have not been permitted to acquire. The truth is that I have no intention exclusively to serve either Japan or America; it is my desire to serve both, and all mankind by removing some of the misunderstandings now casting a dark shadow upon the relationship of the two nations.

It is regrettable that circumstances impel me to write such a book. Neither in this, nor in the previous volumes, is discernible any trace of my socialistic beliefs. On the contrary they contain many a passage which may easily be interpreted as imperialistic. The thought of it saddens me. Yet I have come to the conclusion that socialism can-

not be achieved until the relations between the East and the West are radically changed. In my name I retain the initial borrowed from the author of *Das Kapital*, a perpetual rebuke to my apparent recession from the position taken twenty years ago.

Most of the chapters of this book were originally published as separate articles in the *North American Review*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, the *Century Magazine*, the *American Review of Reviews*, the *Forum*, the *New York Evening Post*, and *Pearson's Magazine*. Acknowledgment is due to the editors of these publications for permission to use in this volume those articles with the necessary revisions and elaborations.

I cannot conclude this preface without acknowledging my indebtedness to Mr. D. S. Richardson, of Berkeley, California, who has taken sympathetic interest in the purpose for which this book has been written, and who has read the manuscript, offering valuable criticisms and suggestions. Due to my absence from America when the manuscript went to press, the uninteresting task of proof reading devolved upon my loyal friend Frank Putnam, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude.

K. K. KAWAKAMI.

PEKING, CHINA, 1917.





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# **JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS**



# JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS

## CHAPTER I

### THE JAPANESE INSTINCT OF SELF-PRESERVATION

American-Japanese estrangement, a tragedy in history—Fundamental reason for American misunderstanding—American failure to appreciate the Japanese instinct of self-preservation—How the fear of Western powers was instilled in the Japanese bosom—The song of the Black Ships—Commodore Perry's squadron—Western encroachments upon Japan—The Chinese menace in Korea—Russian aggression—The German menace—Japan seeking in vain for a "place in the sun."

One of the saddest events in the history of the world is the estrangement of Japan and the United States. For half a century, up to the end of the Russo-Japanese war, Japan proudly regarded herself as a *protégé* of America, while the latter cherished fond admiration for the achievements of the youthful nation for whom she had stood sponsor at its début into the dazzling society of the Powers. With Japan reaching mature estate at the termination of the Manchurian struggle, this long and tried friendship began to cool. Was it due to fault on the part of Japan or does the responsibility rest with America?

To-day we can no longer speak, without a sense of grief, of the "traditional" cordiality between the two nations. No longer can we point to the impressive statue of Commodore Perry erected by Japanese on the pine-clad beach where the American sailor first set foot upon Nippon's soil, without a keen realization of the fact that the monument has ceased to be a symbol of unalloyed friendship and a guaranty of everlasting peace between the Republic and the Empire. In those happy days of our cordial relations with Japan we used to speak of Japan's modest achievements as versatile, brilliant and wonderful; now we are prone to condemn the Japanese as imitative and superficial, as aggressive and "cocky."

For this sudden revulsion of sentiment on the part of the American people many factors are responsible. But the fundamental cause lies undoubtedly in American fear of what appears to the people of this country aggressive imperialistic designs on the part of Japan. They fail to see that Japan's policy has essentially been one of self-preservation; that whatever move she has made abroad has been animated by the instinctive feeling that the status of her small archipelago, overcrowded yet endowed with scant resources, was menaced both from within and from without. To the American people, occupying a vast empire and virtually immune from foreign encroachment, this is a condition hard to realize. Their failure or inability to appreciate the Japanese

instinct of self-preservation is, to my mind, the fundamental cause of the misunderstandings which have brought the two nations to the verge of enmity. To drive this home to the reader a brief survey of Japan's foreign relations during the past three score years seems necessary.

Up to the early part of the past century Japan had enjoyed Arcadian peace for more than two hundred years. She had issued an edict not only forbidding foreigners from entering her territory but restraining her subjects from going abroad. She had been convinced that the European priests and traders who came were the forerunners of *conquistadores*, and was anxious to keep herself free from the dire effects bound to follow the sinister politico-religious designs harbored by them. Self-sufficient and self-satisfied, she saw no reason why she should have anything to do with the dangerous aliens.

Fortunately for her no foreign power had appeared, strong enough to force open the gate behind which she held the latchstring. Towards the middle of the past century, however, clouds began to gather over the calm horizon. Warships, those formidable heralds of Western civilization, began to appear off and on near the coasts of the archipelago. Confronted by these marauders the islanders found themselves helpless, for they had tied their own hands by prohibiting the construction of seagoing ships. Soon the alarming news spread into the remotest corners of the land, for it was carried on the

winged words of the "Song of the Black Ship," which Dr. Inazo Nitobe translates as follows:

"Through a black night of cloud and rain,  
The Black Ship plies her way—  
An alien thing of evil mien—  
Across the waters gray.

"Down in her hold, there labour men  
Of jet black visage dread;  
While fair of face stand by her guns  
Grim hundreds clad in red.

"With cheeks half hid in shaggy beards,  
Their glance fixed on the wave,  
They seek our sun-land at the word  
Of captain owlish-grave.

"While loud they come—the boom of drums  
And songs in strange uproar;  
And now with flesh and herb in store,  
Their powers turn toward the western shore.

"And slowly floating onward go  
These Black Ships, wave-tossed to and fro."

The vague fear inspired by the Song soon grew into terror when in 1837 an American warship startled the little village of Uraga, not far from the Shogun's capital, with the booming of cannon. It seemed as though the "foreign devils" "with cheeks half hid in shaggy beards" had determined to break open the doors of Nippon. The prompt departure of the Americans did not in the least relieve the Japanese, for they left word that a more formidable

American expedition would soon be forthcoming. The Shogun, the military magistrate, lost no time in issuing edicts, urging the lords and barons to strengthen the defenses of the "sacred land." But how could they strengthen the defenses? There were no guns, no warships—not even a fort to defend the coast. The country was helpless.

Amidst the tumult and excitement into which the country was thrown by the visit of the first American warship, Commodore Perry's magnificent squadron announced, with the roar of guns, its appearance in Yedo Bay, never before plowed by a Western vessel. It was a foreign invasion! The daring Americans seemed determined to land troops right under the nose of the august ruler of Nippon. The million inhabitants of the capital were soon thrown into consternation. "In all directions were seen mothers flying with children in their arms, and men with mothers on their backs. Rumors of immediate action, exaggerated each time they were communicated from mouth to mouth, added horror to the horror stricken. The tramp of war horses, the clatter of armed warriors, the noise of carts, the parade of firemen, the incessant tolling of bells, the shrieks of women, the cries of children, dinning through all the streets of a city of more than a million souls, made confusion worse confounded."

That was in 1853. Commodore Perry unmistakably intimated that the broadsides of his men-of-war would promptly be put to use once Japan de-



clined to accede to his demands. To make the situation more difficult for the Japanese, the country was immediately divided into various factions over the burning issue of foreign relations. To open or not to open the doors of the "sacred land" to foreign intruders was the question upon which Japan was thrown into a hopeless state of internal dissension. The inconsiderate foreigners, of course, gave the Japanese no time to argue out the problem among themselves. Their mandate was imperious. Only at the risk of ruthless bombardment of her coast could Japan dare refuse it or even delay her obedience.

And so Japan, willy-nilly, signed the treaty of 1854 with the American envoy, soon to be followed by many another. Looking at the situation through the perspective of the years that have since gone by, there is no doubt that Japan acted wisely in accepting the foreign mandate. Nor can it be doubted that the United States, in urging the opening of Japan, acted with the best of intentions. But the Japanese, in those days of anxiety and excitement, could not see the situation so clearly. The fact remains that they were compelled to accept the treaties simply because the menacing muzzles of the hideous guns protruding from the monstrous "Black Ships" had struck terror into their hearts.

The conclusion of the treaties seemed to aggravate, for the time being at any rate, the chaos which seized the country upon the advent of the Black Ships. The anti-foreign factions, reluctant to see

the "Land of the Gods" defiled by the presence of evil aliens, took measures that ran counter to the policy decided upon by the Shogun Government. The result was the bombardment of the city of Kagoshima by a British squadron in 1863, and the bombardment in the same year of the coasts of Chosiu by the allied fleets of England, France, America and Holland. In both cases Japan had to pay heavy indemnities, though America later (in 1883) relinquished her claim to her share therein, and returned to Japan \$750,000 with interest of \$30,000 added to the original sum. This was one of the many magnanimous deeds which placed America, in the eyes of the Japanese, apart from the unenviable group of Western Powers which treated Japan with undue severity.

Thus from the very beginning of Japan's foreign intercourse the feeling of self-preservation was deeply instilled in her bosom. She was made to feel that from four corners of the earth enemies were pressing forward against her. She was at their mercy and had to act at their beck and call. She was deprived of the autonomy of the tariff, denied judicial authority over foreign residents, and compelled to acquiesce in the *imperium in imperio* which the foreigners set up within her own borders in the form of settlements from which Japanese laws and administration were excluded. The arrogance and imperiousness of foreigners caused the blood of the Japanese to boil.

Japan was disgraced, but helpless. And as she looked out of the windows she had just opened into the world about her, she saw a spectacle which offered no consolation to her. She saw most of the Asiatic countries under the European yoke. She saw her immediate neighbor, China, shorn of her outlying territories by the wiles or arms of one Power or another. Would not the fate of these unfortunate neighbors be eventually her own? The danger was at her door. How was she to escape it?

This awakening consciousness of imminent national calamity welded the country into a homogeneous unit. It was no use lamenting and fretting under alien domination. Only by adopting the enemy's weapons could Japan hope to face the enemy. Spurred by dictates of self-preservation, she made feverish efforts to study and adopt the sciences and the arts of peace and war which she believed to be the sources of Western prowess. All this while she made repeated attempts to persuade Europe and America to relinquish the extraterritorial rights they had established in Japan. But her achievements in the arts of peace furnished no convincing argument for the reversal of Western policy, and it remained for her victories in warfare to attain the coveted goal, for extraterritorial jurisdiction was abolished in 1899, four years after the war with China, while tariff autonomy was restored to Japan only in 1911.

Japan's first necessity of speaking in the language

of powder and ball came with China's obvious intention to annex Korea. Though her prestige had been badly shaken at the hands of European Powers, China was, nevertheless, still regarded as the slumbering giant of the East, infinitely more powerful than Japan. China herself looked contemptuously upon her island neighbor as a sort of mimicking pigmy, small both in stature and in intellect. When Japan told the Chinese that the independence of Korea was essential to her own safety and existence, their reply was a rebuff and threat. Utterly regardless of the repeated Japanese protests, they proceeded with their own sinister design to absorb Korea. The islands of Nippon, fearful of the potential prowess, not yet exploded, of the huge Chinese empire of 400,000,000 people and 4,000,000 square miles, could not sit quiet under the impending prospect of having so formidable a power as her neighbor across narrow straits. To them the absorption of Korea by China meant the destruction of their own national existence. Again it was the instinct of self-preservation, inherent in a small nation, that persuaded the Japanese to prevent, even at the point of the sword, the Chinese annexation of Korea.

When Japan drew the sword against China in 1894 she had no idea of playing the part of a King Stork superseding a King Log. Her idea was to insure Korea's independence so that no third Power could use it as a vantage ground from which to swoop down upon her own fair islands. For more than

fifteen years she had, at no small sacrifice of lives and treasure, made earnest efforts to put the Korean house in order, but in vain. Hopelessly wayward, Korea had fallen victim to China's scheme of annexation, compelling Japan to resort to arms for the sake of Korean independence.

After the war with China Japan resumed and continued for another decade her struggle to reform Korea. Korea was unresponsive. Life had faded out of her decadent constitution, and she was doomed. Yet the Japanese struggled on in the vain hope of regenerating her, when a third Power, far more formidable than China had ever been, stretched out a grasping hand across Manchuria and into the peninsula of Korea. This was Russia.

Russia had been looming ominously upon the Far Eastern horizon ever since the Chino-Japanese war at the end of which she, in unison with Germany and France, deprived Japan of the chief spoils of her victory, for no other purpose than to purloin them herself at the first convenient moment. Scarcely was the ink dry upon the treaty which ended the war with China when Russia, in 1898, appropriated the Liaotung peninsula, the very territory from which she had ousted Japan in the name of peace. In the vast empire scheme of the Russia of that time the occupation of the Liaotung peninsula was but a prelude to the wholesale seizure of Manchuria and Korea as well as the greater part of China proper. How could Japan

view with equanimity such ruthless advance of the Muscovite? She could not. The result was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, Japan's second war of self-preservation.

After two costly wars, fought for self-preservation, Japan's position may be said to have become fairly secure. Yet the instinct of self-preservation, engendered by the terror struck into Japanese hearts by the Black Ships and all that came in their train, still persists and manifests itself in her activities in China. Of this the Japanese campaign against Kiau-chow, in the early stage of the European war, is a notable example. Next to Russia, Germany was the country which Japan had dreaded most. When the Kaiser, with the Czar and the French President, resolved to prevent the Japanese occupation of the Liaotung peninsula at the end of the Chinese war, the German minister at Tokio presented himself at the Foreign Office and handed to the Mikado's Minister of Foreign Affairs a written "advice," part of which read in substance:—"Germany is strong, Japan is weak; what may follow your refusal of this advice is not difficult to foretell." When, therefore, the Kaiser upon a flimsy pretext occupied Kiau-chow and converted the whole province of Shantung into a German sphere of influence, Japan was scared, and asked herself if Germany and Russia were going to dismember China, ultimately to deal with her own archipelago in the same way. It would have been surprising had not the

Japanese seized upon the first legitimate opportunity to dislodge Germany from China.

For many years to come Japan's efforts will be concentrated upon the solution of the Chinese question. Whether or not she is equal to the task, she must here make supreme efforts, for her place in world politics primarily lies in the molding of Asia's destiny. She will be spurred on to play the leading rôle in the disposition of the Chinese situation, not from any motives of empire building but from the necessity of self-preservation. 'Open the map of China, and mark out the territories staked out by various European Powers as their spheres of influence. Then you will begin to realize why the Japanese, deep in their hearts, still cherish the fear of the Occident.'

In spite of Russia's defeat in the Manchurian war of 1904, her position in the Far East has been strengthened rather than weakened. Since the war she has doubled the tracks of her strategical railways in Siberia and Manchuria, and is in a position to pour troops into China in much larger numbers than in 1904. She controls by far the largest portion of Manchuria, and has, in addition, established a suzerainty over the vast territory of Mongolia. Japan knows that her resources are too limited to undertake the destruction of Russian domination in those countries. Her bitter experiences on the battle fields of Manchuria a decade ago convinced her of the futility of engaging such a formidable foe as

Russia single-handed. By dint of pluck and audacity she scored victory after victory over the Northern Colossus, but she could not help feeling, even while she was dealing unerring blows upon the enemy, that in time Russia would overcome her by the sheer weight of numbers. Once more the instinct of self-preservation asserted itself, and counselled her to befriend Russia. The *entente cordiale* recently entered into between Petrograd and Tokio is the outcome of Japan's endeavor for *rapprochement*. Will the pact prove effective to prevent Russia's further advance towards Peking? Japan is skeptical.

Cast your glance further south on the map. Here you see England intrenched in Tibet and the vast Yangtse valley. The "valley," measuring some 580,000 square miles, is commercially the most important section of China. Compared with it Manchuria and north China sink into insignificance as a field for commerce. Yet in that vast territory England seems determined to exclude enterprises of other nations, most of all those of Japan.

Still further south France claims Yuannan and Kwansi as her sphere of influence. How can the conflicting interests represented by the various spheres of influences be harmonized? To argue against the establishment of such spheres is too late, though Japan's ideals should be their ultimate abolition. We must face facts as they are and seek the best solution for China and the outside Powers concerned. And in seeking the solution Japan, I



am inclined to believe, thinks rightly that she must herself strengthen her position in China so that her voice will not be ignored in the councils of the Powers interested in that unhappy country.

The feeling of self-preservation, which may well be regarded as the guiding factor in Japan's foreign policy, is something which the American people cannot easily understand. Here are two countries almost so widely different, in point of size and potential strength, as to permit of no comparison. With unlimited resources at her disposal, with financial strength great enough to meet any emergency that may arise, with the Monroe Doctrine effectively forestalling foreign encroachments upon her neighbors, America's citizens, in spite of the present agitation for preparedness, feel deep in their hearts that their country is as secure from invasion as any country can possibly be. Enjoying such an advantageous position, the American cannot readily put himself in Japan's place and look at the problems, which Japan is called upon to solve, as the Japanese would look at them. He has no common feeling, no sympathy with the Japanese, because he cannot realize the intensity of the feeling of self-preservation uppermost in the mind of the islanders, potentially weak, ridden with debts, groaning under heavy taxes, forbidden to seek opportunity in the lands of the Caucasian race, constantly feeling the pressure brought to bear upon them by aggressive Powers ever since

their first contact, and yet impelled to shoulder the burden of the yellow race, and especially of the Chinese, a task imposed upon them by their instinct of self-preservation.

One often hears of Germany's necessity to seek a place in the sun. In a sense, Germany has always had a place in the sun everywhere in the world. She has been free to send her sons and daughters into any country to settle and colonize, or to exploit trade and resources there. How different Japan's case is! Here we have a people whose need of a place in the sun is not imaginary but decidedly real. The Caucasian Powers have appropriated by far the largest part of the world's habitable surface, and have erected around it an insurmountable wall barring out all dark-skinned races. Where is Japan to find a place in the sun? Urged by the instinct of self-preservation, she is making serious efforts to seek a solution for this question. She has not yet succeeded. Will she ever succeed?

## CHAPTER II

### AMERICA'S ISSUES WITH JAPAN

Japan amazed at our preparedness propaganda—Conjuring up the Japanese bogie—Was Japan anti-American before America was anti-Japanese?—America's assistance in concluding the Portsmouth Peace Treaty—Tokyo riot of 1905 not anti-American—Three issues between Japan and America—Are they likely to lead to war?—The Pacific Coast the danger spot—Clouding the real issues—American charges against Japan—The press censorship in Japan.

When the "preparedness" propaganda was launched in this country two years ago Japan was amazed. Not that the Japanese were reluctant to see America increase her armament. Of America's just and legitimate desire to establish an army and a navy adequate to safeguard her vast empire, they had, of course, no reason to complain. What grieved them was not the stupendous programme of armament proposed for adoption, but the stentorian pronouncements, uttered by so many Americans of prominence, that this country must prepare against an approaching conflict with Japan. Could it be, they wondered, that the United States, their teacher and guardian of yesterday, had so completely changed her attitude and made up her mind to contest with the Japanese in the arena of battle for the "mastery of the Pacific"?

I need not present here the galaxy of distinguished publicists and editors who have diligently been painting, to the mingled amazement and indignation of the gullible public, the frightful pictures of the Mikado as the inevitable enemy of America. But I cannot refrain from noting the fact that in some public schools on the Pacific Coast even teachers have been poisoning the youthful minds of their pupils, telling in the classrooms that war with Japan is certain to come. Is it any wonder that the Japanese have been frightened? They had hoped that if America felt the need of a larger armament for self-defense, she would go about the task in the right spirit, and attain the end without injecting into the matter the bogie of Japanese designs which have in reality never existed. Their hopes have been sadly blighted by the persistent cry raised in this country of the Japanese menace on the Pacific Coast, in Mexico, in China, in the South Seas, in the Philippines,—everywhere.

Apologists for America, who are peculiarly anti-Japanese, have recently invented or discovered a fact which they are exploiting to the utmost for the purpose of proving that before the American people ceased to be amiable to Japan, the Japanese had virtually launched an anti-American propaganda in their own country. They tell us that when the peace treaty of Portsmouth was signed between the Mikado's envoy and the Czar's with no indemnity offered to Japan, mobs broke loose in Tokyo

and attempted to attack the American embassy to give vent to their dissatisfaction over Mr. Roosevelt's failure to secure a peace treaty more favorable to Japan. From that moment, they say, the Mikado's subjects completely changed their attitude towards America, while the Japanese Government, perhaps intentionally, connived at the popular agitation against America and failed to tell the public the true story of the peace conference with special reference to the valuable part played by Mr. Roosevelt.

To the open-minded this contention would appear to be a quibble unworthy of any man with self-respect. If these apologists expected the Japanese Government, as they obviously did, to proclaim to its subjects and to the world that it had asked the American President to mediate between it and the Russian Government, and that it had no alternative to accepting peace without indemnity, because its resources had been taxed almost to the limit in the titanic struggle on the Manchurian fields of war—if they expected Japan to make such extraordinary confessions to exonerate America and Mr. Roosevelt, they certainly expected the performance of a feat which no Government, as such, would stoop to perform. Under similar circumstances all that a Government could do would be to assure the populace of the wisdom of accepting the peace terms, and endeavor, through unofficial channels and by indirect means, to free of all charges the

foreign Power which had employed its good offices for the termination of the war. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what the Japanese statesmen did. To condemn them for their failure to go further is to impose upon them an impossible task.

Apart from such consideration we must remember that the riot which occurred in Tokyo upon the conclusion of the Portsmouth treaty was, to all intents and purposes, a demonstration against the Japanese Government. For almost two years the Japanese had been living under the severest mental and physical strain, struggling to win the greatest war they had ever waged. Thanks to their self-sacrifice and their unwavering devotion to the state, they had scored brilliant victories both on land and on sea. It was, therefore, but natural that they should expect their leaders in diplomacy to secure peace terms which would assist in lightening the taxation they had loyally shouldered to carry the war to a victorious end. When the news was flashed from Portsmouth, announcing Komura's failure to win indemnity from Witte, their disappointment was unspeakable, and the disappointment soon grew into a frenzy of indignation, condemning everybody connected with the conclusion of the peace treaty. They attacked the offices of the newspapers which supported the Government, and made a violent demonstration before the Foreign Department. A section of the mob made towards the American embassy, but was happily intercepted

by the police. There was, of course, no excuse for dragging Mr. Roosevelt and the American embassy into the demonstration which was essentially directed against the Japanese Government; but considering the strenuous condition under which the Japanese had been living for two years, can we not sympathize with them in their temporary loss of the faculty of reasoning at an instant of stunning disappointment? Their lapse was, to say the most, only momentary. But for the anti-Japanese agitation which broke out on this side of the water in 1906 and which has ever since been kept alive, the Japanese not only would have quickly forgotten the unfortunate incident, but would have sincerely repented their guilt in forgetting, even for a moment, the kind assistance America had rendered in securing the best peace terms obtainable under the circumstances. To utilize that incident as an excuse for the persistent, insidious anti-Japanese agitation in this country is, I repeat, a contemptible quibble.

I have dwelt upon the Tokyo incident of August, 1905, not because I attach any importance to it, but because many prominent American writers of late have shown a disposition to exploit it. It is more essential to deal with the problems now at issue between the two nations, and threatening to wax into burning intensity. America's relations with Japan must be adjusted, not by cherishing unpleasant memories of past events, but by weigh-

ing the problems that are of direct concern to the present and future of the two nations.

Broadly speaking there are three problems, and only three, which threaten the friendship between Japan and the United States. They are the immigration question, the recrudescence of anti-Japanese agitation or legislation on the Pacific Coast, and the Chinese question. Before entering into the details of these questions, we may at once set down our conclusions.

It may be safely asserted that America will not hesitate to go to war if Japan insists upon free immigration, or upon the immediate removal of the "gentlemen's agreement" which has placed a ban upon Japanese immigration. On the other hand, Japan will resist, if need be, even at the point of the sword, any American attempt to interfere with what she considers to be her justifiable activities in China.

Fortunately the truth is that Japan would not fight for the purpose of securing unrestricted emigration. Her statesmen, her publicists, her thinkers all realize the certain outcome of such a futile attempt. To attain that purpose by war Japan must be so powerful and so successful in her military operations that she could conquer and permanently hold at least the territory west of the Rockies. Unless the Japanese are incurable lunatics they would not entertain so impossible a dream. Should the Mikado fail, as he certainly would, to secure



permanent occupation of the Pacific Coast, and be compelled to accept American terms of peace, he would not only have to abandon all hopes of sending any fresh emigrant to these shores, but to remove even the sixty thousand Japanese who are now settled in this country. This the Japanese statesmen clearly foresee, and their vision is a safeguard against war on the score of emigration.

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- 1st  
- 2nd* Turning to the Chinese question it seems unthinkable that America would ever be so near-sighted as to go to war on account of the "open door" doctrine, much talked about but little understood, especially when Japan has done and will do nothing to hurt American interests in the Far East. The overwhelming majority of the American people neither know nor care to know what the "open door" means.

But there is the third question,—the spasmodic agitation against the Japanese in the Western States of the Union. How long will Japan be patient under the pin-pricking attitude of those States? Will she sit eternally unruffled under the rebuffs accorded to her in the shape of discriminatory laws restricting the rights of her nationals residing in the West? I have not sufficient confidence in Japan's equanimity to hazard the prediction that, whatever the Western States may do against her nationals, Japan will never go to the length of appealing to the tribunal of arms. Sad to say, I am inclined to think that unless the Government at Washington and the far-

seeing leaders of the American people make earnest efforts to find means to safeguard the rights and privileges of the Japanese who are lawfully here, the time may eventually come when the situation will assume a most critical aspect. Here again I think that it would be the height of folly on the part of Japan to go to war on such issues, but she is a nation whose sense of calculation is not yet so fully developed as to consider every national question in the light of material gain or loss. Fortunately or unfortunately, she is one of those old-fashioned nations which still believes that there is, even in this commercial age of ours, such a thing as national honor to be defended regardless of cost.

Lest I may be misunderstood, let me emphasize that Japan will have come to such a supreme resolve only when she has exhausted all the peaceful means available to terminate the provocative policy of the Western States. Remember that this question, the attitude of the West towards the Japanese, is totally different from the question of Japanese immigration; for the Mikado's Government has, as I have already emphatically stated, no intention to embarrass America by sending emigrants of the laboring class to this country. Rightly or wrongly, Japan thinks that inasmuch as she has shown herself conciliatory and accommodating in the matter of immigration, it should be the duty of the authorities and leaders at Washington to make at least honest efforts to extend citizenship to the Japanese now

here and thus shield them from the whimsical legislation of the various States.

Viewed in its broad outlines the situation before us seems clear and simple. Its real nature and scope have been somewhat obscured, its contour, so to say, somewhat blurred, by the injection of absurd fancies and irrelevant contentions, born and nurtured in the editorial sanctums on both sides, but especially on this side, of the Pacific. The nature of such fancies and contentions has already been indicated in the story of the Tokyo riot just told. Mr. George Kennan gives us in a paragraph a list of imaginary incidents charged against Japan's account since 1906. "Beginning with the San Francisco public school troubles," he says, "the Japanese have been accused of preparing for war with us by buying 750,000 rifles from the Crucible Steel Company (1908); of plotting against us in Hawaii and the Philippines (1909); of excluding Americans from the Manchurian mining field (1909); of discriminating against our commerce by means of transportation rebates on the Manchurian railways (1909); of seeking to monopolize the truck-farming lands in California (1909); of sinking the dry-dock Dewey in Manila Bay (1910); of planting mines in that same bay (1910); of taking soundings and making charts of Californian harbors (1910); of secretly conspiring with Mexico against us (1911); of attempting to secure Magdalena Bay, in Lower California, for a naval base

(1911); of secretly taking photographs and making maps on the coasts of Alaska (1911); of trying to get supreme control in Manchuria under pretense of fighting the bubonic plague (1911); of conspiring with Mexican insurgents against us (1912); of persecuting American missionaries in Korea and trying to abolish Christianity there (1912); of conspiring with Germany to overthrow the Monroe Doctrine (1912); of attacking the American Consul in New-chang (1912); of forming an alliance with our west coast Indians against us (1912); of threatening to attack Java, and thus compelling the Dutch to seek our support (1912); of trying to buy Lower California from Huerta (1914); of attempting to get spies into the fortifications of the Panama Canal (1915); of seeking to secure a foothold in Lower California by running a vessel ashore there and sending warships to assist in salvage operations (1916); of conspiring with Germany to get control of the San Blas Indian lands in Panama (1916)."

Add to the list the wild stories of two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers in Mexico; of Japanese firing at the American troops at Mazatlan; of Japan scheming to make Mexico her ally; of Japanese diplomats guiding Carranza's hand in writing protests against America's "punitive" expedition into Mexico; of the Japanese in California urging the Carranza Government to declare war upon the United States, and so on and so forth, and you can understand how, in the mind of the public,

Japan's complaints against America seemed to wax larger and larger until their *sine qua non* has been lost.

Not content with telling their home folk such wonderful tales of the gathering storm over American-Japanese relations, some Americans had the kindness to cross the Pacific a few years ago and scare the credulous subjects of the Mikado with the frightful story of America's warlike preparations against Japan. One of these crafty tattlers published in a number of Tokyo newspapers a self-manufactured interview in which the paymaster of a certain American cruiser at Manila (giving the specific names of both the man and the vessel) was made to state that America was making feverish haste to complete preparations for the war which she was to declare upon Japan within a very short time. This same gentleman contributed to Mr. William Randolph Hearst's enterprising newspapers an article, asserting that the National Defense Council of Japan, of which ex-Premier Marquis Okuma and other foremost publicists were members, had published a book on the coming war with America, while the truth was that the book was but a flimsy fiction written by an unknown scribe. As I pen these words a number of newspapers, the foremost of the American press, are disseminating the news that Japan has served an ultimatum upon China, demanding the immediate severance of her diplomatic relations with Germany! And yet Japan's critics tell us

that the Japanese press are more anti-American than the American press are anti-Japanese!

In speaking of the attitude of the Japanese press towards the United States, it seems pertinent to note the censorship in Japan, for it has become something of an established belief among American writers that the Japanese press is so strictly censored that the real opinions and sentiments of the Japanese people are practically withheld from the outside world. This generalization often leads to the sinister inference that the Japanese Government and people, hiding themselves behind the screen of censorship, are secretly propagating anti-American ideas and are engaged in warlike preparations against this country.

True it is that the Japanese Government still clings to the old-fashioned idea of censorship. Fortunately it is equally true that the censorship is more of a formality than a reality—a stupid piece of red tape maintained by force of habit on the part of officialdom. Its absurdity and futility are obvious when we remember that by the time the censor returns a verdict on the contents of a newspaper or a periodical most, if not all, copies of such a publication have already been delivered to its readers. A great annoyance to the publishers, the censorship is, nevertheless, no small joke among them. As a matter of fact, the censor, except in times of war, is not vigilant. And in times of peace his attention is directed mostly to items affecting public morals.

If a newspaper is inclined to indulge in "realism" in describing, let us say, a matrimonial scandal or a sexual crime, the censor is likely to take notice and employ the "black brush," equivalent to our blue pencil. Newspapers addicted to this sort of offense are earmarked, so to speak, and are especially watched by the censor. On the other hand, the exercise of his authority over respectable publications is only nominal. In fact newspapers and periodicals which observe the common dictates of decency and public morality seldom suffer from the brush of the censor. It is seldom that news items or comments of a political nature are suppressed by the authorities. This I can emphatically say from my own experience. In the earlier days of my journalistic career in Japan I was known as an ultra-radical. I still recall, with a mingled feeling of amusement and repentance, the fervent editorials I contributed to an enterprising Tokyo daily, criticising in scathing terms the publicists and statesmen of the time. One article was entitled, "Let us Bury Marquis Ito at Once!" It was interpreted by many as a downright instigation to assassination. And yet neither the publisher nor I was molested by the authorities. I cite this instance simply as an indication of the real nature of the censorship in Japan.

The trouble with foreign critics who complain about the censorship in Japan lies in the fact that they are unable to read Japanese newspapers. If they were they would not have to complain. In

spite of the censorship, which is as stupid as it is ineffective, the Japanese press is, in every respect, a mirror of public affairs and sentiment. If foreigners cannot see much in its reflections it is not because the mirror is defective, but because their eyes are poor. I should be surprised to learn of a single newspaper in America whose editorial staff includes a man able to read the Japanese newspapers.

On the other hand, all metropolitan newspapers in Japan employ more than one writer well versed in foreign languages, and especially in English. In the offices of such newspapers American newspapers and magazines are extensively read. And yet Japanese editors are far from having an accurate estimate of American opinion and sentiment with regard to Japan. How much more difficult for their American brothers of the fourth estate, who do not read Japanese newspapers, to acquire correct knowledge of Japanese affairs! Let us, then, be lenient even towards such men as Mr. Hearst and his highly inventive lieutenants!

Only a few words more before concluding this chapter. Mr. J. B. Millet, a Boston publisher, spent five months last year in Japan. He had thrice visited Japan and was well acquainted with Japanese affairs. While in that country last year he made an effort to ascertain the real Japanese sentiment towards America. The result of that effort is described by him in the *New York Times* in these words:



“In order to get at the situation, I arranged to have clippings of editorials or communications from writers of authority antagonistic to the United States of America cut from leading vernacular papers. I fully expected a fair crop, but from May 1 to the middle of August I obtained none, after which date the Japanese press began to answer some of the attacks made in the press of our country. But even then nothing appeared that was unjustified or could be called belligerent.”

Is it not time that American critics should stop complaining about Japanese hostility towards their country?

## CHAPTER III

### IS AMERICA PREPARING AGAINST JAPAN?

Japan's present naval strength—America's present naval strength—Statistical table of the two navies—Analysis of the same—The American navy three times as powerful as the Japanese navy—The Tokyo Jiji-Shimpo on Japan's inadequate naval programme—Japan's new five-year building programme—America's new three-year building programme—Relative strength of the American and Japanese navies in 1918—The British navy no aid to Japan in American-Japanese war—Germany and Japan—Physical impossibility of Japanese invasion of America.

We have seen how the apostles of preparedness have been harping upon the string of a Japanese menace. Whether they are sincere in playing the role of alarmists we need not determine. The significant point is that these patriots show little disposition to study our troubles with Japan or to make any sincere efforts to remove them in accordance with the principles of justice. Apparently they believe that these troubles would vanish as if by magic, if we only had a powerful army and a formidable navy.

Presuming, for argument's sake, that peace between the two countries might be maintained by augmenting American armament, how large should the navy of this country be? Is the existing American fleet inadequate to cope with the existing squad-

ron of Japan? And how does Japan's building programme compare with the plan we have recently adopted? We may leave out of consideration the relative strength of the armies of the two countries, for in a conflict between two such nations separated by an ocean almost 6,000 miles wide, the army, on either side, however powerful, could not carry war into the other's country, unless it were backed by a tremendous navy. In the case of an American-Japanese war, therefore, it is the navy that would count.

Speaking in broad terms, Japan's existing fighting fleet, including craft now under construction, consists of seven dreadnoughts (total tonnage 214,200) including three now under construction; four battle-cruisers (total tonnage 110,000); eleven battleships of the old type (total tonnage 169,166); three armored cruisers (total tonnage 42,950); fifty-two destroyers (total tonnage 36,118), and seventeen submarines. All in all, Japan's fighting craft aggregate 572,434 tons.

As against this strength, the existing American navy, including ships now under construction, consists of nineteen dreadnoughts (total tonnage 503,703); twenty-four battleships (total tonnage 320,906); ten armored cruisers (total tonnage 140,180); fifty-six destroyers (total tonnage 73,097); fifty-one submarines and twenty-two colliers (total tonnage 236,401). This makes a grand total of 1,274,287 tons, i. e., 701,853 tons more than the

Japanese fleet. To show the relative strength of the two Navies at a glance I present the following table:

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE NAVIES  
IN 1916

AMERICAN NAVY		JAPANESE NAVY	
<i>Constructed</i>		<i>Constructed</i>	
Oklahoma, ten 14-in. guns.....	27,500	Kawachi, twelve 12-in. guns. ...	30,600
Nevada, " " " " .....	27,500	Settsu, " " " " .....	30,600
New York, " " " " .....	27,000	Fuso, " 14 " " .....	30,600
Texas, " " " " .....	27,000		
Arkansas, twelve 12-in. guns....	27,243		
Wyoming, " " " " .....	27,243		
Florida, ten 12-in. guns.....	21,825		
Utah, " " " " .....	21,825		
North Dakota, ten 12-in. guns..	20,000		
Delaware, " " " " .....	20,000		
So. Carolina, eight 12-in. guns..	16,000		
Michigan, " " " " .....	16,000		

<i>Under Construction</i>		<i>Under Construction</i>	
Pennsylvania, twelve 14-in. guns	32,567	Yamashiro, twelve 14-in. guns. .	30,600
Arizona, " " " " .....	32,000	Ise, " " " " .....	30,600
California, " " " " .....	32,000	Hiuga, " " " " .....	30,600
Mississippi, " " " " .....	32,000	No. A. " " " " .....	30,600
Idaho, " " " " .....	32,000		
No. 43, " " " " .....	32,000		
No. 44, " " " " .....	32,000		
Total Tonnage.....	503,703	Total Tonnage.....	214,200

BATTLE-CRUISERS	
Kongo, eight 14-in. guns.....	27,500
Hiyei, " " " " .....	27,500
Harura (under construction) eight 14-in. guns...	27,500
Kirishima (under construction) eight 14-in. guns	27,500
Total Tonnage.....	110,000

NONE.

BATTLESHIPS OF OLD TYPE

FOR FIRST LINE		FOR FIRST LINE	
New Hampshire,	Vermont,	Satsuma,	Aki.
Kansas,	Minnesota,		
Louisiana,	Connecticut.		
Total, 6 ships, tonnage 96,000		Total, 2 ships, tonnage 39,150	

FOR SECOND LINE			FOR SECOND LINE	
New Jersey,	Virginia,	Nebraska,	Kashima,	Katori,
Rhode Island,	Georgia,	Maine,	Mikusa,	Asahi,
Missouri,	Ohio,	Kentucky,	Shikishima,	Suwo,
Wisconsin,	Illinois,	Iowa,	Hizen,	Iwami,
Kearsage,	Kansas,	Alabama,	Fuji.	
Indiana,	Massachusetts,	Oregon.		
Total, 18 ships, tonnage 224,906.			Total, 9 ships, tonnage 130,016	

## CRUISERS

Montana,	North Carolina,	Tennessee,	Ibuki,	Kurama,	Ikoma.
Washington,	Colorado,	Maryland,			
Pittsburgh,	San Diego,	No. Dakota,			
West Virginia.					

Total, 10 ships, tonnage 140,180      Total, 3 ships, tonnage 42,950

## DESTROYERS

14 ships over 1,000 tons	2 ships over 1,000 tons
26 ships 600-1,000 "	4 ships 600-1,000 "
16 ships 400-600 "	46 ships under 400 "
Total, 56 ships, tonnage 73,097	Total, 52 ships, tonnage 36,118

total tons - 1,214,297

## SUBMARINES

512,434

Even a cursory survey of the figures given above convinces us that the Mikado's fighting fleet is far inferior to the American fleet. But when we scrutinize more carefully the character and equipments of the ships on both sides, the discrepancy becomes more obvious. In the first place, the American dreadnoughts are much larger than the Japanese. Of the American fleet the seven largest dreadnoughts have each a displacement of 32,500 tons, while the Japanese dreadnoughts are of a displacement of

30,600 tons each. Again, as against six American dreadnoughts of 27,500 tons each, Japan has only four battle-cruisers of the same size. The two battleships of Japan are of a displacement of 20,800 tons each, whereas the United States has two dreadnoughts of 27,243 tons each, two of 21,825 tons each, two of 20,000 tons each, two of 16,000 tons each, and six battleships of 16,000 tons each. In modern naval warfare the dreadnought is the cornerstone of a fighting fleet. In spite of the increasing efficiency of the submarine, this theory has not been altered. Not only in point of numbers but also in the size of each vessel, the American fleet of dreadnoughts is far superior to the Japanese.

I am fully aware that the tonnage of a warship is not the only, or even the most important, criterion of efficiency. Much of the fighting power of a man-of-war depends upon the kind of guns with which she is armed. How does the American Navy stand in this respect?

Of nineteen dreadnoughts of the American Navy, five are equipped with twelve 14-inch guns, four with ten 14-inch guns, two with twelve 12-inch guns, four with ten 12-inch guns, and two with eight 12-inch guns. The remaining two dreadnoughts which are now under construction and which are not yet named will probably be of the type of the California and will be equipped with twelve 14-inch guns.

On the Japanese side there are five dreadnoughts equipped with twelve 14-inch guns, while two are

equipped with twelve 12-inch guns. The Japanese battle-cruisers, four in all, have each only eight 14-inch guns.

It is obvious that the fighting power of a navy cannot be estimated by the number of the ships of which it is composed. Much depends upon the number and the kind of guns with which each vessel is equipped. In point of numbers the American dreadnoughts are almost twice as powerful as the Japanese dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers combined, but when the power of the guns on both sides is taken into consideration, the American dreadnoughts are almost three times as powerful as the Japanese.

Let us turn our attention to the battleships of the predreadnought period. I have said that Japan has eleven of such ships, aggregating 169,166 tons, as against America's twenty-four with a total displacement of 320,906 tons. In the face of these figures the superiority of the American fleet of battleships cannot be disputed. Yet when it is known that only two of eleven Japanese battleships are fit to stand in the first line of battle as against six of the American fleet, the inferiority of the Japanese navy becomes the more obvious.

On the American side there are fifty-six destroyers, and fifty-two on the Japanese side. Here the discrepancy is not, *prima facie*, very great. But we must remember that the majority of American destroyers are seagoing, having a displacement

greater than 800 tons each, while the Mikado's Navy has only six destroyers above 800 tons. Thus fifty-six American destroyers have a total displacement of 73,097 tons, which is more than twice the total tonnage of Japan's fifty-two.

As most of the Japanese destroyers are for the purpose of coast defense, so are the Japanese submarines, of which there are only seventeen as against America's fifty-one. While the Japanese submarines are mostly not seagoing, the majority of the American submarines are of a large type and therefore seagoing.

Last but not least, we must remember that the American navy has 22 colliers aggregating 236,401 tons, while Japan has none. In a naval expedition to distant waters the collier is as important as the fighting ship, for without fuel no warship can move. The Japanese Navy, being intended to protect Japanese and Chinese waters and not to carry war to distant lands, is not provided with attendant coaling-ships. In case of emergency the Japanese Navy requisitions merchant ships for colliers, a use for which they are of course decidedly unsatisfactory.

So much for the existing naval strength of Japan as compared with that of the United States. We have seen how insignificant the Japanese fleet is beside the American Armada. And yet this is the fleet which has constantly been held up by the yellow journals and demagogues as the force which



the Mikado will one fine morning send across the Pacific to attack the fair coast of California!

But the Japanese, we are told, are feverishly engaged in building new warships. The fact is that Japan's building programme has never been unnecessarily great. True, measured by her financial strength she may have seemed extravagant. But viewed in the light of the great dangers she has had to face and of the tremendous rate at which Western powers have been arming themselves, her naval programme has been characterized by moderation. Has it ever dawned upon the average American that as early as 1907 the American Navy was twice as powerful as the Japanese? In the two years that followed America launched six dreadnoughts, while Japan launched only three. The result was that by 1910 the United States had a fleet of warships three times as powerful as the Mikado's fleet, and this ratio has ever since been maintained.

It is significant that while alarmists are raising hysterical cries about the alleged rapid expansion of the Japanese Navy, Japan's naval critics are deeply deploring the utterly "unprepared" condition of their country. As an instance of their lamentations I quote the following passage from a series of ten articles written by the naval expert of the *Jiji-shimpo*, assuredly the most reliable newspaper in Japan:—

"It is regrettable that while other Powers have each been pursuing a definite naval policy, our

Navy should be permitted to drift with no preconceived plan. The United States adopted as early as October 19, 1903, the principle which is in reality the foundation of the stupendous naval programme formulated by Secretary Daniels. According to the programme of 1903 the United States was to build thirty-four dreadnoughts in seventeen years.

"Turning to Europe we see that Germany adopted a naval-repletion programme in 1907, Russia in 1911, France in 1912, Italy in 1910, and Austria in 1912. In the meantime we were lagging hopelessly behind these Powers. When at last we awakened to our own sluggishness and decided upon a programme last year (1915), it was only on a ridiculously small scale."

In these two paragraphs is expressed the universal feeling of uneasiness which the Japanese entertain over what they consider the aggressive naval policies of the powers of Europe and America. Let us, then, study Japan's new naval programme which the *Jiji-shimpo's* naval expert tells us is "of a ridiculously small scale," and compare it with the great programme adopted by Congress in August, 1916.

The Japanese programme, adopted in September, 1915, by the National Defense Council, calls for the construction, in the six years from 1916 to 1921, of three dreadnoughts, six cruisers, ten destroyers, and nine submarines. For the execution of this programme Japan is to expend \$85,000,000 in five yearly installments.

Beside this modest programme the American programme looms menacingly like a giant. It calls for the building of ten dreadnoughts, six battle-cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, nine ocean-going submarines, eighty-five coastwise submarines, one Neff system submarine, two gunboats, one hospital ship, two destroyer tenders, three oil supply ships, two munition supply ships, one submarine tender, one transport, and one repair ship.

In addition to this, enormous appropriations are made for speeding up the completion of the ships already under construction (\$115,000,000); for the equipment of the navy yards for ship building (\$18,000,000); for the increase of ordnance and for the fitting of merchantmen and other auxiliaries (\$57,000,000); for the enlargement of the submarine base at New London, Connecticut; for aviation (\$6,000,000); for the construction of government munition factories (\$1,500,000); for the construction of government steel plants (\$11,000,000); for the storage of ammunition and torpedoes, mines, projectiles and other materials.

All told, the Navy will have expended about two billion dollars when the three-year plan has been fully carried out.

With these figures before us let us picture the relative strength of the Japanese and American navies at the end of the fiscal year 1918 when the American programme will have been carried into execution. By that time only half of Japan's five-

year programme will have been carried out, but let us presume, for the sake of expediting comparison, that it had been completed at the same time as our three-year programme. Then the relative position of the two Navies would be as follows:—

	<i>America</i>	<i>Japan</i>
Dreadnoughts.....	27	8
Battle-cruisers.....	6	4
Battleships.....	25	13
Cruisers.....	20	9
Destroyers.....	106	60
Submarines.....	146	27
Fuel ships.....	24	0

In the foregoing table we have left out of consideration minor ships such as gunboats, hospital ships, ammunition and repair ships with which Japan is ill supplied. It must also be noted that two American ships which are at present classified as dreadnoughts and two Japanese ships likewise so designated are, in the table above, counted among battleships, because by 1921 they will have become too old and out-of-date to be called dreadnoughts.

A glance at the table shows that the American fleet will be more than twice as powerful as the Japanese. But as I have already said, the American ships are equipped with a larger number of more powerful guns than are the Japanese vessels. Then, too, the majority of American destroyers and submarines are seagoing, while the Japanese destroyers and submarines, except a few, are all intended for coast defense. Moreover, the American Navy has

the advantage over the Japanese in that its ships are equipped with the most advanced electrical devices, and also in that it has a large number of the most up-to-date auxiliary ships such as fuel-oil ships, repair ships, hospital and ammunition ships. When all these conditions are taken into consideration, it becomes evident that the American Armada, built in pursuance of the Administration programme, will be almost four times as powerful as the Japanese Navy. Heretofore, the boast of the Japanese Navy, if it really had anything to boast of, has been its battle-cruisers, combining the fighting power of the dreadnought with the swift movement of the cruiser. In fact the quick movement of Japanese battle-cruisers during the war with Russia surprised the enemy. Since then the naval Powers of Europe have followed Japan's example and have been building powerful fleets of battle-cruisers. Strange to say, America has been slow in following suit, and has been building only battleships of the dreadnought type. But now the American Navy has awakened to its deficiency in this particular respect, and, in the new programme, six battle-cruisers are provided for.

When the American naval programme was first proposed by Secretary Daniels, in 1915, its execution was to have extended over five years. Since then the rapid developments of the German situation obliged Congress and the Administration to shorten the period to three years.

We have seen that Japan's naval strength has always been much smaller than that of the United States, and that in a few years Japan will be lagging far behind America in the matter of naval preparedness. This is the "navalism" of Japan—the specter which certain publicists and editors have been studiously exploiting for the purpose of furthering the certain ends they are eager to attain.

Those who fear or pretend to fear Japan's "navalism" point to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and warn that in the event of rupture between Japan and the United States, Great Britain would throw the whole weight of her great Navy on the Japanese side of the scale. These wiseacres are ignorant that Great Britain has entered into a general arbitration treaty with this country and that the Anglo-Japanese alliance contains the following provision:

"Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force."

Even in the absence of such a clause of exemption the Japanese know that England would not unsheathe the sword to aid them in their combat with America. In another chapter I shall fully discuss Japan's relationship with England.

There are superficial observers who apprehend that Germany, America's avowed enemy to-day,

will, in the not distant future, join hands with Japan to the great danger of the United States. These men fail to see that the moment Germany becomes Japan's ally, England will become an enemy of the latter Power, and will, in the event of war between the United States on the one hand and Japan and Germany on the other, come to the assistance of this country with the prowess of her entire navy, thus making German aid to Japan in such a war virtually ineffectual. In another chapter I shall dwell at length on the future relations between Germany and Japan.

I have shown that the Mikado's Navy is far too weak to cope with the American Navy. It would be superfluous to dwell upon the geographical difficulties which Japan would have to surmount, if they are surmountable, in waging an aggressive war against America. I may, however, touch upon this particular phase of the problem by quoting a Japanese naval officer, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese war. Early in 1910, when Captain Hobson and Mr. Hearst were diligently applying themselves to the task of creating a ghost out of Japanese designs upon Magdalena Bay, I was in Washington, and talked with Commander Tokutaro Hiraga, then naval attaché of the Japanese embassy. The commander, who was usually reticent, waxed almost eloquent when our conversation turned to Mr. Hobson's prediction of a war between Japan and America, and expressed himself very freely on the im-

possibility of such a war. Emphasizing the difficulty of protecting transports on a long voyage, he said:—

“During the Russian war Japan had a fleet of warships guarding the six transports employed in carrying troops and ammunitions across the straits of Korea, only eighty miles wide. Yet two of these transports were attacked and sunk by three Russian cruisers. What would happen if we tried to convey a fleet of transports across the Pacific to a point 5,700 miles away? To transport a real army across the ocean we would have to impress every steamer afloat in our waters. Has it ever occurred to you that a steamer can carry only fifty soldiers per 100 tons of displacement? It is 3,455 miles from Japan to Hawaii, and 2,288 miles more from Hawaii to San Francisco. Even a Hercules would not be so reckless as to attempt an invasion of California with such an inadequate navy as ours.”

But why quote a Japanese, and a Japanese naval officer at that, on such a question? Have the Americans been influenced so thoroughly by the prophets of evil and the propagandists of alarm that no Japanese counsel, however sane, can hope to penetrate their ears?



## CHAPTER IV

### LAND HUNGER

### THE BACKGROUND OF THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION

Caucasian monopoly of land—Expropriation of Asiatics—Exclusive policy of the Caucasians—The Anglo-Saxon priority in the race for colonies—Colonial statistics of the Powers—Density of population of various countries—Equitable distribution of land or free migration, the logical remedy—President Wilson's world Monroe Doctrine no salvation of Asia.

Of the various questions which threaten to wax into serious issues between Japan and the United States, that of Japanese immigration to America demands our first attention. But before entering into the details of this particular question it is important to take a broad view of the background upon which it stands out conspicuously. This calls for a brief consideration of the question of "land monopoly and land hunger," or the question of the distribution of the world's habitable surface among the various nations or races.

Time was when Asia belonged to Asiatics, Europe to Europeans, and the Americas and other continents and islands to their respective natives. With the art of navigation developing into a high degree of efficiency, all this has become a thing of the past.

The more progressive and aggressive Europeans were the first to embark upon a career of exploration and conquest. The result is that to-day almost nine-tenths of the world's land area is occupied or controlled by the European or Caucasian race.

Roughly speaking, the land area of the earth measures 52,825,000 square miles supporting 1,751,700,000 inhabitants.

Of this total area the Caucasian peoples occupy or control about 46,146,084 square miles, comprising Europe (minus Turkey); North and South America; Africa (minus Liberia and Abyssinia); Australasia; and Asia (minus China, Japan, Mongolia, Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, middle and northern Manchuria, Persia, Siam, Afghanistan and other minor countries which are not yet controlled by European nations). It will be seen that the Caucasian race, having completed the occupation of Europe and the Americas, has conquered and secured control of the whole of Australasia, almost all Africa, the greater part of Asia, as well as the adjacent islands.

And the Caucasian peoples who control so vast a territory number only 623,000,000. In other words, there are 13.5 Caucasians to each square mile of land.

On the other hand, the native population of Asia number no less than 900,000,000. And yet they control only 6,679,000 square miles of territory, because Siberia and Turkestan are occupied by Russia, India by Great Britain, and Tonking and Cochin China by France, while Tibet, Chinese

Turkestan, Mongolia, and Northern Manchuria, aggregating 2,655,000 square miles are fast passing under British or Russian control. In other words, there are 134.8 Asiatics to each square mile of Asiatic land.

It may, therefore, be safely said that Asia's 900,000,000 souls have been expropriated of most of their territory and are to-day permitted to possess only 6,679,000 square miles. This, of course, does not mean that Asiatics have been evicted from the Asiatic territories controlled by Europeans, and that 900,000,000 people are actually compelled to live within the area of 6,679,000 square miles, i. e., 134.8 to the square mile.

True it is that the natives of Asia are permitted to continue their habitation in India, Cochin China, Siberia and other Asiatic territories which have passed under the European scepter. But the fact remains that Asiatic nations are, by this process of expropriation, deprived of the opportunity to utilize the vast resources lying at their very doors.

It must be remembered that the Caucasian nations are always on the alert to exclude outside enterprises, and especially those of non-Caucasian peoples, from the territories they control. Even where they profess to follow the principles of free trade, they set up a barrier against non-Caucasian immigration. Moreover, by reason of their priority and their accumulated wealth, they have so firmly intrenched themselves that outsiders, most of all

non-Caucasian outsiders, find little chance to launch new enterprises in competition with them.

It cannot be disputed that colonies, sparsely populated yet rich with resources, are valuable assets to a nation with small, over-populated territory. They relieve the mother country in two ways—they afford shelter to its surplus population, and they enable it to support its population at home more adequately by reason of the stimulation and increase which their products naturally offer to its commerce and industry.

It was the good luck of the Anglo-Saxon race to gather in its lap most of the desirable colonies in the world. Those European nations that came after it in the race for colonial expansion, have had to be contented with territories whose value is often doubtful. And the Asiatic nations, which came still later, not only cannot find any oversea territory available for colonization, but have had to offer their own lands upon the altar of Western ambition.

Let us compare the areas and populations of the territories of the various colonial nations.

	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Population Per Sq. Mile</i>
Great Britain.....	121,331	45,000,000	370.8
Colonies.....	12,624,435	392,500,000	31.0
France.....	207,054	40,000,000	193.1
Colonies.....	4,776,032	48,000,000	10.0
Russia Proper.....	1,862,524	122,550,700	65.7
Colonies.....	6,785,133	57,449,300	8.4
Italy.....	110,623	35,000,000	316.3
Colonies.....	596,000	2,000,000	3.3

	<i>Area</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Population Per Sq. Mile</i>
Belgium.....	11,373	7,500,000	659.4
Colonies.....	900,000	15,000,000	16.6
Portugal.....	35,490	6,000,000	169.0
Colonies.....	832,267	9,200,000	11.0
Germany.....	208,780	65,000,000	310.8
Colonies.....	1,027,820	14,000,000	13.6
Holland.....	12,648	6,000,000	474.3
Colonies.....	1,046,445	37,000,000	35.3
United States.....	3,027,000	92,000,000	31.0
Colonies.....	721,000	10,000,000	14.6
Spain.....	190,050	20,000,000	105.2
Colonies.....	90,561	1,000,000	11.0
Japan Proper.....	148,756	52,985,423	356.1
Colonies.....	95,700	15,100,000	187.0

Leaving colonies out of consideration, Belgium, with its 659 inhabitants to the square mile, is the most densely populated country, followed by Holland and England. Japan, Italy, Germany and France come next in the order named.

But these European countries have each extensive colonies, which either afford room for a large population to alleviate congestion at home, or store abundant natural resources to be utilized for the benefit of the home population.

Thus England, whose home territory has to support 370 people per square mile, possesses vast colonies totaling 12,624,435 square miles, from which all Asiatics are most strictly excluded, though their population number but 31 to the square mile. In addition to these enormous oversea possessions England has established vast "spheres of influence"

in Tibet (463,000 square miles) and in the Yangste valley (578,000 square miles) running through mid-China. From these spheres it is England's obvious intention and practice to bar outside enterprises.

Again Belgium, though most densely populated at home, has colonies totaling 900,000 square miles, harboring only 16 inhabitants to the square mile. Holland, the second most crowded country in the world, has greater colonies than Belgium.

On the other hand, Japan, whose home land shelters 356 people per square mile, has just recently acquired 95,700 square miles of colonial territories. But these territories are already thickly populated—having 187 inhabitants per square mile.

Germany has been clamoring for a "place in the sun," yet she had before the present war already brought under her flag more than a million square miles of colonial lands, averaging only 13 people to the square mile.

Russia, whose home land measures as much as 1,862,000 square miles, supporting only 122,550,000 people, or 65 to the square mile, has already won 6,785,000 square miles of thinly populated territories, and is still eager to expand at the expense of China and Japan. Are not Mongolia (1,368,000 square miles), Chinese Turkestan (550,000 square miles), and three-fourths of Manchuria (273,000 square miles) being gradually added to the map of Russia?

Here, in a nutshell, is a condition which should

not be ignored in any consideration of international problems affecting the peoples of Asia. It is obvious that the great Powers of the West have accumulated more land than they should rightly own—than they can hold without doing injustice to the smaller nations, which find themselves in sad plight, due to the impossibility of finding room for their surplus population. The injustice of holding such vast territories would not be so obvious, if they were to recognize, in favor of the small nations, the principle of unhindered immigration and of unrestricted enterprise within those territories. It is when they erect insurmountable walls around themselves and adopt a hidebound policy of exclusion that they become a menace to the welfare of the human race.

It seems to me apparent that any proposition for permanent peace which fails to take into consideration the present inequitable distribution of territory, cannot be carried out without trampling upon the just claims of the smaller nations. An attempt to build permanent peace upon the *status quo* of the world seems as futile as an attempt to rear a tower of Babel upon a foundation of sands.

A pacifist programme for permanent peace and disarmament must, if it is not to infringe upon justice, presuppose a radical alteration of the *status quo* of the world which we have briefly described. To permit, on the one hand, the continuation of the existing state of the distribution of territory,

and to urge, on the other hand, the adoption of the pacifist programme of disarmament, arbitration, and permanent peace, is to offer a jewel, too precious to be of any practical value, to those small nations which are crying for bread. Such a proposition will simply benefit the great Powers of the West which have built up great empires of territory and wealth partly at the expense of the weaker peoples of the East, and partly by reason of their priority in the race for colonial expansion.

And yet any proposition to alter the *status quo* along the line I have suggested would at once be condemned by the opulent, contented Powers as a disturbance of the peace. In their eyes a small nation that should dare raise a finger against the present order of things would be a disturbing element, a rebel and an outlaw. When American editors and writers censure Japan's recent activities in China they seem unwittingly to adopt the set views of the great Governments of Europe whose interests can best be served in the maintenance of the existing equilibrium in the Far East.

It is obvious that a programme to establish permanent peace with justice should contain one of two propositions, namely, a more equitable distribution of territory, or the removal of the exclusive policy adopted by Western colonial Powers against Asiatic peoples.

To the staid thinkers of the Occident this must seem a picturesque and Quixotic proposition. It



is no more picturesque than were Socialism and trade unionism at their inception. Just as the economic theories, which were, less than a century ago, denounced as visionary and perverted, have since gradually been woven into the practical policies of various nations, so the above proposition will in time be seriously considered, not only by thinkers and theorists, but by practical men of affairs in all parts of the world. Unless we make supreme efforts to realize this ideal we can take but one alternative—the perpetuation of the savage “law of the survival of the fittest,” which is equivalent to the Bismarckian axiom, “Might is right.”

It was a noble speech which President Wilson delivered to the Senate on January 22, 1917, on the outlook of peace in Europe. Among the lofty utterances, with which it is replete, the following demands our particular attention:

“I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: That no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.”

Entertaining profound respect for the courage of conviction which prompted him to utter these words, we must nevertheless confess our doubt as to whether our Chief Executive took into consideration such

urgent needs of the small nations as we have described. We fear that the adoption of a Monroe Doctrine will furnish no adequate remedy for the ills from which these nations are suffering. For such a great country as the United States which is practically self-sufficient and requires no outside field of activity, it is all very well to adopt a Monroe Doctrine and advise other nations to follow suit. But what relief does it offer to over-crowded small nations? Am I wrong in saying that the Monroe Doctrine, as advocated by American publicists of these latter days, is essentially a selfish doctrine which ignores the crying needs and the moral rights of the small countries whose teeming millions, choking from lack of land, are forbidden to seek opportunity in rich and thinly populated territories of which the world has plenty? May we not hope that President Wilson will go a step further and lay down a more fundamental proposition which will offer greater encouragement and consolation to the weaker nations not only of Europe but of Asia? Such a proposition, coming from the lips of the illustrious Executive of a great Republic, would at least have the merit of awakening the dormant conscience of the nations and of setting the minds of men thinking in the right direction, even if it should have no chance of realization in any measurable future.

## CHAPTER V

### JAPANESE IMMIGRATION TO AMERICA

How Japan will solve the population problem—Rate of increase of Japanese population—Territories available for Japanese immigration—Japan not to embarrass England and America—The “gentlemen’s agreement”—Its effect upon Japanese immigration—Reasons for recent increase of Japanese immigration—The “picture bride”—Japanese marriage custom—Statistics of “picture brides”—Japan and the new immigration law—Japan’s real contention—Has the United States the right to discriminate against the Japanese?—Hawaii and the Pacific coast—Americans in Hawaii confident of assimilating Japanese—Japanese immigration compared with Chinese immigration.

In painting, in the preceding chapter, the broad background to the outstanding question of Japanese emigration to America I have incidentally suggested what may be termed its fundamental solution—a solution applicable to all countries congested with population. I am, however, fully aware that such a solution cannot be adopted in any measurable future. Centuries, perhaps, will have elapsed before the nations are ready to give serious consideration to a plan looking toward such a radical alteration of the *status quo* as I have indicated.

The sentiments expressed in the foregoing chapter should not, therefore, be construed as a demand for an immediate accounting upon the part of the great colonial Powers. Rather, they are merely

meant to point out the obvious inequity permitted under existing world conditions, and to blaze the path along which we may march towards the goal of permanent peace.

As for Japan, she will certainly endeavor to solve her difficult problem of surplus population without submitting to her Western friends any such radical plan as I have suggested.

In striving to adjust her population problem within the limits of her own resources and without causing embarrassments to the Powers of Europe and America, Japan must follow two lines of action: first, she must exploit the resources of Hokkaido, Korea and South Manchuria, and secondly, she must develop her industry and foreign commerce as well as her ocean traffic.

During the past half century the population of Japan proper has been increasing at the rate of 400,000 per year. In other words, where there were 33,000,000 Japanese fifty years ago, there are to-day about 53,000,000.

As the total area of Japan proper measures about 148,756 square miles, the density of population is about 356 per square mile.

If we leave out of consideration Hokkaido, the northern island which is yet sparsely peopled, the density increases to 451 per square mile. In other words, 110,212 square miles of three of the four islands constituting Japan proper represent the area demanding relief from congestion.

The first available territory for the solution of the question is the island of Hokkaido just mentioned. Hokkaido is, of course, very small, measuring only 30,275 square miles. Moreover, it is traversed by mountain ranges, while its winters are severe and protracted. Making due allowance for its limitations, the territory is capable of supporting at least five times its present population, which is estimated at 2,200,000.

The second territory available for colonization is Korea. This newly annexed territory has an area of 86,000 square miles, with a population of 14,566,783. This gives a density of 169 per square mile. The country, therefore, offers no great room for Japanese settlers. With the proper development, however, it will perhaps be found capable of receiving 15,000,000 more people.

The third country to which Japan looks for relief is South Manchuria. This territory, though containing 91,000 square miles, is almost as thickly populated as Korea. Moreover, with the exception of the leased territory of the Kwantung peninsula (1,290 square miles) and a very narrow strip of land along the South Manchuria railway, the country is not under Japanese control. By the Chino-Japanese agreement of 1915, the Japanese secured the privilege of engaging in agricultural pursuits in this region, and it is hoped that it will hereafter afford more room and opportunity to Japanese settlers.

I have shown that during the past five decades

Japan's population has increased by 20,000,000. As against this increase Japan has sent but 2,690,000 emigrants to various countries as follows: Hokkaido (Northern island of Japan), 2,000,000; Formosa (Southern island of Japan), 100,000; Korea, 300,000; Manchuria, 100,000; Hawaii, 80,000; Continental United States, 70,000; China, South America and others combined, 40,000.

England, when the rate of increase in her population was highest, sent her sons and daughters abroad by the hundreds of thousands every year. So did Germany. To the United States alone the German Empire has sent many millions of emigrants. From 1881 to 1899, when the tide of German emigration was highest, Germans came to this country at the average of 124,200 per annum. In South America Brazil alone has received more than a million Germans. It may be safely stated that all European countries have alleviated the pressure of population at home by encouraging emigration. The most conspicuous example at present is Italy.

Now Japan, one of the most congested countries in the world, is compelled to solve the same question without sending emigrants to those countries which offer the greatest opportunities. With her population increasing at the rate of 400,000 every year, this is no easy task. Yet Japan, docile and courteous, is mindful of the admonition of the "big brothers" of the West, and is willing to undertake this Herculean task. In refraining from sending her emi-

grants to British colonies, and in accepting the "gentlemen's agreement" with the United States, Japan has signified her intention to dispose of the serious question of surplus population without embarrassing the Western nations. Cannot the American Government and people realize and appreciate the supreme resolve she has made in the face of this most difficult problem?

As far as the Japanese Government is concerned, then, the immigration question has ceased to be a vital issue with America, for the Government regards that issue as settled through the instrumentality of the "gentlemen's agreement."

The effect of that instrument upon Japanese immigration is briefly told. The tide of Japanese immigration reached its high watermark in 1908 when the report of the Immigration Bureau at Washington recorded the entry of 9,544 Japanese to the continental United States. Although the "gentlemen's agreement" was concluded in 1907, preparations for its enforcement required a considerable time. With that agreement working effectively in the year following, Japanese immigration to the mainland of America fell to 2,432, against which as many as 5,004 Japanese departed from these shores. Again, in 1910 only 2,598 were admitted, while 5,024 returned to Japan. In 1911 the figures increased considerably, 4,282 Japanese having been admitted to the continental United States. Nevertheless, those returning to Japan in the same year

numbered 5,869, that is, 1,587 more than were admitted. In 1912 Japanese arrivals numbered 5,358 as against 5,437 departures. In 1913 there were 6,771 arrivals against 5,647 departures; in 1914 8,462 arrivals and 6,300 departures; in 1915, 9,029 arrivals and 5,967 departures; in 1916, 9,100 arrivals and 6,922 departures.

It will be seen that in the eight years during which the gentlemen's agreement has been in force, 48,032 Japanese entered the mainland of the United States, while 46,170 left for Japan. This gives but 1,852 arrivals in excess of departures.

The anti-Japanese critics point to the steady increase of Japanese arrivals since 1912. But they overlook or ignore three vital points. In the first place, the above figures for arrivals include both laborers and non-laborers, even high officials and great financiers. In recent years a majority of the Japanese arrivals consisted of men and women of the non-laboring class—travellers, merchants, students and wives of the Japanese residing in this country. Thus in 1913, 5,400 of the total arrivals of 6,771 were not of the laboring class, but those rightfully entitled to admission. In 1914, 6,700 of 8,462 were non-laborers; in 1915 and 1916, 6,815 and 6,142, respectively, were non-laborers. The gentlemen's agreement does not, and cannot, of course, aim to exclude Japanese of the non-laboring class.

During recent years, and especially since the



opening of the European war, trade and intercourse between the two countries have been increasing phenomenally. To accelerate this tendency, the Panama Pacific International Exposition, for which Japan expended more than a million dollars, brought to San Francisco during 1914 and 1915 temporary visitors and workers in considerable numbers. Of late not a Japanese steamer arrives but that seventy or eighty first-class passengers—officials, bankers, government students, exporting and importing merchants, are on board of her. Counting all the Japanese steamers entering the harbors of San Francisco and Seattle and Tacoma, the arrivals of this class alone from Japan will aggregate five to six thousand a year. In considering the recent increase of Japanese arrivals, all these circumstances must be remembered. To sound an alarmist note over the increase of such arrivals, would be criminally stupid.

The second reason for the increase of Japanese arrivals in the past few years is found in the fact that those Japanese, who had returned to Japan in large numbers during the few years preceding, have, in accordance with the provisions of the "gentlemen's agreement," been steadily coming back to this country. They have found the economic and other conditions at home uncongenial to them, and have almost invariably availed themselves of the privilege granted in the "gentlemen's agreement."

In the third place, the same agreement permits

the Japanese residing in this country to send for their parents, wives and children with a view to making homes here. That is why, in late years, Japanese women, many of whom are the so-called "picture brides," have been coming in increasing numbers.

In the past session of Congress the "picture bride" was made a topic of discussion for the House Committee on Immigration. Congressman John L. Burnett went so far as to assert that "picture brides," with few exceptions, come here with little intention to make homes for their fiancés, and that they were in many cases brought for immoral purposes. Such a statement is wholly unwarranted.

To explain the picture bride, we must first of all explain marriage customs in Japan. In Japan when a child, whether boy or girl, reaches a marriageable age, it is the duty of the parents to find a suitable partner for him or her. Custom, however, rules that the conduct of the affair must be entrusted to a go-between, usually some discreet married friend. Having found a desirable person, the go-between arranges a meeting of the prospective bride and groom, usually chaperoned by their parents. But before this interview takes place, the parents on either side spare no pains in inquiring into the character, social standing, family relations, genealogy, health, education and what not of the young man and woman.

If, as the result of this investigation, the young

man and woman express themselves in favor of the consummation of a marriage, the parents and go-between proceed to make final arrangements for the wedding. If, on the contrary, their opinion is unfavorable, the matter is dropped.

Dr. William Elliot Griffis, one of the greatest living American authorities on Japan, finds so great a merit in this method of marriage that he calls it a real eugenic marriage.

When a man living in America desires to marry, he writes to his parents, asking them to find a suitable woman for his bride. The parents, following the usual customs and rules, fix on an eligible person. If the prospective groom were in Japan, the customary meeting with the prospective bride would follow. Living in America as he does, however, this meeting cannot take place. So he sends his photograph to the woman, and receives her photograph in exchange. If this "interview" through photographs proves satisfactory to both parties, the nuptial knot is tied at a ceremonial dinner in which the groom, living in America, is naturally absent, but which is attended by the parents and relatives of both sides. This done, the parents register the marriage with the proper authorities.

In the light of Japanese law, therefore, the so-called "picture bride" has already been legitimately married before her departure for America where she is to join the groom, and no further proceedings are necessary in order to call themselves man and wife .

before the American law. But to conform to the American custom and requirements of marriage, the couple upon the arrival of the bride, go through the proceedings required by the American law.

Like any other system of marriage, this Japanese system is not without its defects. But on the whole, the picture bride is happily united. There have been only a few instances in which such marriages have proved unsatisfactory. Indeed, it seems to be the opinion among more experienced, conservative Japanese residents in America that marriage, through the exchange of photographs, results in more felicitous unions than in the cases where the young men go over to Japan and find the brides themselves; because in the former case the precaution, wisdom, experience and good judgment of the parents are fully utilized.

The Japanese in America must marry and settle down in domestic life, if they are not to form a floating, shiftless, undesirable element of the community. Since they have shown a greater desire for home life, drinking, gambling and other evil practices among them have become much less, and the moral condition of the Japanese community has been greatly improved.

To ensure the happy marriage of the picture bride it has been the unwritten rule of the Japanese Consulate at San Francisco not to recommend to the home Government the issuance of a passport for her unless the prospective groom can prove, to

its satisfaction, that he is financially prepared to make a home.

Reports relative to picture brides, like all stories about Japanese immigration, have been greatly exaggerated. There are no comprehensive statistics available of these female immigrants from Japan. According to the California Board of Health, there were in 1912, 906 Japanese weddings in the entire State; 718 in 1913, 887 in 1914 and 915 in 1915. The record does not show how many of the brides were "picture brides." But the record of the Japanese Association at San Francisco shows that in the fiscal year 1915 there were admitted to this country at the port of San Francisco 1,722 Japanese females, of whom 826 were "picture brides," the remaining 896 consisting of the mothers, wives (not picture brides, but those who were married while their husbands were in Japan) and daughters of the Japanese residing in this country.

As far as we are able to ascertain, the Japanese Government has no intention to demand, in any measurable future, the abrogation of the "gentlemen's agreement." Japan recognizes the courtesy of the Wilson Administration in respecting her equally courteous request that the restriction of Japanese immigration be not made a provision in the statutes of the United States, but be left to the accommodating spirit on the part of Japan. In the new immigration law adopted by Congress over Mr. Wilson's veto, no clause is found, prohibiting

Japanese immigration, and the fact has been appreciated by the Japanese Government and people. Modest as its achievements are, the Mikado's Empire has been recognized as one of the foremost Powers of the world. Naturally it sees an affront to its dignity in a statutory provision of a foreign Power singling it out as an object of discriminatory treatment. Can we not sympathize with its desire to restrict the emigration of its subjects of its own accord rather than submit to an exclusion law of the United States, though the effect would be the same in either case?

Japan's attitude and policy with regard to the immigration question, then, permit of no misconstruction. She has in no uncertain terms told the United States that she would voluntarily stop the emigration of her laborers to the United States, and she has faithfully adhered to the pledge. At the same time, she has unmistakably intimated to the American Government that her subjects legitimately admitted into this country must not be discriminated against. This is a proposition just and incontrovertible. All that has to be done is to extend citizenship to the Japanese. It is absurd, as it is unjust, that ignorant immigrants from countries far more backward than Japan can be freely naturalized, while the Japanese, with all the qualifications for citizenship, are compelled to remain aliens, however devoted they may be to this country. International usage, unwritten but nevertheless

in force, rules that no nation should be discriminated against by any Power with which it is on a plane of equality. A nation, admitted by universal consent into the comity of the world's foremost Powers, has the right to demand of any foreign nation, with which it enters into intercourse, the treatment usually accorded such Powers. Now Japan is the only nation in the Orient which has attained such a position. In discussing the immigration question, therefore, Japan speaks only for herself and not as the champion of Asiatic peoples.

There is another point which Americans must bear in mind in discussing the immigration question. The pet theory of Japanese exclusionists has been that the American Government has the right to decide what people should be admitted and which should be barred out. For the sake of politeness, Japan has been willing to concede that point in favor of America. If you would allow the Japanese to be frank, however, they would confess their reluctance to accept this American theory. Immigration is simply another term for travel and trade, and the freedom of travel and trade from one country to another is explicitly guaranteed in all international treaties of amity and commerce. If Japan restricts of her own accord the immigration of her subjects to this country, it is not because she recognizes America's right to discriminate against her, but because she prefers to retain American friendship rather than create a serious issue over immigra-

tion. In other words, Japan's voluntary restriction of emigration to America is a special act of courtesy, and not an admission that America has the right of exclusion. That the restriction of immigration is one of the sovereign rights of the United States does not mean that she may arbitrarily exclude immigrants from one country and freely admit those from another. If she finds it necessary to adopt an exclusion law, such a law should be made applicable to all nations, or at any rate to those nations which have been admitted into the family of civilized Powers. If the United States may arbitrarily discriminate against one nation in the matter of immigration, may she not likewise adopt discriminatory measures in the matter of the tariff? The recognition of such rights would upset and destroy all established international usages. Will America permit any foreign Power to impose especially high duties upon her goods?

Advocates of Japanese exclusion point to Hawaii as an example of the Orientalization of American soil, and give warning that California and the Pacific Coast in general should not become a second Hawaii. These superficial observers ignore the vital difference between the situation in Hawaii and that on the mainland. The fact is that California could never become a second Hawaii, even if it were desired, because the conditions prevailing there are radically different from those in Hawaii. To arrive at this conclusion, it is only necessary to know something



of the history of the sugar industry in the islands. To begin with, Hawaii was not a white man's land; it had been inhabited by dark-skinned, semi-civilized natives. And when the white men secured the privilege to exploit its natural resources, they brought all sorts of Oriental labor by the shipload for the sugar plantations. The country had neither the white population nor "white civilization" when the planters began to import Oriental laborers.

The conditions on the Pacific Coast are totally different. Here American civilization and the Caucasian population have been so firmly established that Japanese immigration, so strictly checked by the "gentlemen's agreement," cannot possibly become a danger.

The attitude of Americans in Hawaii towards their Japanese neighbors is highly reassuring. They are confident of their ability to weld the heterogeneous population into a unit mentally and spiritually homogeneous. In the last ten years 40,000 Japanese children were born in the territory. It is only a question of time when the Japanese vote will become a powerful factor in the suffrage of the islands. How will that Power be employed by the Japanese voters? This question is answered by Mr. Nathaniel Pfeffer, in the *New York Evening Post*, as follows:

"That depends, they will tell you in Honolulu, on us here on the mainland. If we allow misunderstanding to sharpen to hostility, if we allow the race issue to become acute, then in Hawaii it will

be tragic. Left to themselves, they have full confidence that they can solve those problems that are purely local. They have a background and a long precedent of tolerance, and, even more, of association. Where children have grown up together, played together, and gone to school together, they will minimize the importance of those differences that distinguish race from race, they will be less likely to assume for one dominance, and for the other inferiority. Nowhere more earnestly than in Hawaii do they pray for the smoothing of those frictions between Japan and America that are so palpably artificial. For them the stake is not only peace, but the hope of a fine achievement."

In discussing the Japanese immigration of to-day, it is important to bear in mind the difference between it and the Chinese immigration of the latter part of the past century, when California raised the cry, "The Chinese must go!" The Chinese immigration from 1854 to 1882 totalled 139,455, the overwhelming majority of which came to and remained in California. In view of the fact that in the seventies of the past century when agitation for Chinese exclusion was begun, the state of California had a population of only 560,000, including Negroes, Indians and Chinese, ~~the~~ the apprehension that the Chinese might hinder the wholesome growth of the "white" community in the State was not without ground. But the conditions on the Pacific Coast have since radically changed, while circum-

stances attendant upon Japanese immigration are widely different from those accompanying Chinese immigration. In 1900 the white population of California increased to 1,402,727, and in 1910 to 2,259,672. It is difficult to ascertain the number of the Japanese in the State. The census of 1910 places it at 41,356. While this seems to be a conservative estimate, it is perhaps no more conservative than the number given for the white population. Perhaps the common estimate which places the number of Japanese at 60,000 is not far from the mark. This number will probably remain stationary if it does not materially decrease, because of the fact that the gap left by departing Japanese will be filled by children born of Japanese parents in the State.

With the "gentlemen's agreement" strictly enforced, with Americans flowing into California from Eastern States in ever increasing streams, with the opening of the Panama Canal stimulating European immigration, there is no reason why California should apprehend the "Orientalization" of the State.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE PACIFIC COAST AND THE JAPANESE

Anti-Japanese legislation in the West—Proposed anti-alien land bill of Idaho—California anti-alien land law—Official statistics of Japanese landholdings in California—Examples of whimsical anti-Japanese legislation—Why politicians toy with the Japanese question—Real cause of California's hostility to Japanese immigration—Japan's land laws—Rights of aliens in Japan—How Japan faced the anti-Japanese agitation here—Fairness of the California press—Changed attitude of California labor towards Japanese—San Francisco "school incident" of 1906 not a race issue—Labor's blunder in backing the anti-alien land bill—Japanese standards of living and wages—Japanese sympathy for American labor unions.

In spite of all concessions Japan has made to America in the adjustment of the immigration question the States on the Pacific Coast continue to complain about Japanese immigration, demonstrating their dissatisfaction now and then in various whimsical legislative proposals. With certain classes of people in that section the habit of grumbling has become so ingrained that they do not know how to stop it even when Japanese immigration has stopped. That these certain classes may not represent any large section of the people of the coast does not matter, for it is often a small minority that leads a nation into a serious predicament.

I have often wondered how much of the anti-

Japanese agitation in the Western States is sincere, that is, called forth by real necessity. At this writing the legislatures of Oregon and Idaho are each considering bills prohibiting Japanese ownership of land. Yet Idaho has only one thousand Japanese whose landholdings scarcely amount to five hundred acres. In Oregon there are only four thousand Japanese, holding less than a thousand acres of land.

I am informed that the real reason for the proposed Idaho law is the grudge entertained against a few Japanese by a group of real estate dealers. It will be recalled that when, in 1913, California adopted the celebrated anti-alien land law Idaho enacted a measure diametrically opposed to the California law, extending land ownership to the Japanese. It appears that the good Solons who put this liberal measure through the legislature at Boise represented a certain real estate interest which was to make a handsome profit by selling a large tract of land to Japanese. When the law was passed, however, the Japanese failed to make the deal. There had been no agreement made for the deal prior to the passage of the law, but that did not lessen the misdirected anger of the disgruntled interest. And so in this year of grace 1917, its hostility toward the Japanese manifested itself in the proposed anti-alien land law, whose passage was happily forestalled by the urgent request of the Government at Washington. Who can say that the same bill

will not again be brought forward in the coming session?

When in 1913 California created a worldwide sensation by adopting an anti-Japanese land law, Japanese landholdings in that State totaled, according to the State Board of Agriculture, only 12,726 acres, divided into 331 farms, and having an assessed value of \$478,990. In addition, the Japanese leased 282 farms, with a total acreage of 17,596.

The number of town lots held by Japanese was 218, with an assessed value of \$136,955. It is also shown that the Japanese operated 2,548 business establishments. The capital invested was in most cases very small, 68 per cent. of the whole number being less than \$1,000 for each case. The total capital invested, exclusive of that represented by banks, was \$4,075,000. The total annual business transacted by these establishments amounted to \$16,114,407, of which about 37 per cent. was with Americans. The total annual rent paid by these Japanese business houses was over \$900,000.

From these figures it would appear that the so-called Japanese peril in California is a myth—something which in reality never existed. A little figuring will show that the Japanese in California own only one acre out of every 8,000 acres in the State. Their total holdings of all sorts, including the temporary leases, constitute about one acre out of every 3,400. This estimated proportion may be somewhat smaller than the actual proportion, for the total acreage

of the State includes untillable lands. But making due allowance for this fact, and remembering that the 101,320,000 acres not owned or leased by the Japanese are in the hands of about 2,500,000 Americans or European immigrants, who are increasing at the rate of about 60 per cent. in a decade, it is hard to see how such small holdings of the Japanese should constitute a menace to the State, especially when Japanese immigration has been effectively checked by an agreement with Japan.

As I close the foregoing paragraph I recall the comical but significant story of a Western man, a railroad manager in a State under the shadow of the Sierras. Having some sort of a grudge against the Federal Government, he serves upon the unaccommodating Administration the following ultimatum:

"On account of the discrimination practiced against my railroad by the Post Office Department, I am preparing a car which will be put in service April 1, 1917, which will bear the following wording: 'THIS CAR FOR USE OF JAPANESE AND DOGS.'"

To emphasize this gracious act this gentleman threatens to put through the State legislature a bill of much the same nature as the California anti-alien land law. And this for no other purpose than to embarrass the Federal Government by seeking the questionable satisfaction of his personal grudge!

It seems to me that anti-Japanese legislation in

the West is either a disease contagious like cholera, or a fashion, like women's hats. Because a Western Commonwealth has adopted an anti-alien land law other States in the neighborhood must also have something similar. But in some cases such legislation in the West springs from motives not quite so innocent. The stories just told of the Western railroad man and of the Idaho land embroglio indicate the character of the legislation of the last-named category. Let me cite a few instances showing how the legislative mind of the West sometimes works. Japanese fishermen, let us say, incur the animosity of their rivals of other nationalities or races. Now these envious rivals may be as much aliens as the Japanese, but they enjoy the privilege of naturalization. So they rush to the legislative hall with a bill depriving "aliens ineligible to citizenship" of the fishing license. Again the "dry" campaign is looming ominously upon the horizon of a State among whose chief products are grapes and wines. To ward off this peril, the "wet" interests propose a compromise measure, apparently intended to decrease the liquor business of the State, and the first innocent victims to be sacrificed by the compromise are aliens or those "ineligible to citizenship," for it provides against the granting of liquor license to such people! A sly proposition, is it not? So are the anti-alien land laws enacted or proposed in various States. Because the laws use the general phrase "aliens ineligible to become citizens," their



proponents naïvely assert that they neither trespass upon the treaties with Japan nor are directed against the Japanese!

Now the question presents itself, why is it that politicians always seize with eagerness upon such whimsical anti-Japanese bills, if these bills have no real necessity behind them? The only answer is that the Japanese are not allowed to share the rights and duties of citizenship. Not until citizenship is extended to the Japanese will spasmodic anti-Japanese legislation on the Pacific Coast come to an end. In these days, when Japan herself is indiscriminately called the enigma, aye, the menace of the world, nothing furnishes politicians so handy a short cut to notoriety as the introduction of anti-Japanese bills. The San Francisco *Argonaut*, notwithstanding many unkind words said about it by its enemies, often speaks the truth on public questions. In a recent issue it rightly says:

“Earlier in our political history it was part of the stock in trade of every cheap politician to play upon the inherited prejudices of our people by a process known as twisting the lion’s tail. Whoever could talk loudest, most resentfully, and most vulgarly against everything and anything British had a political advantage over everybody else. Time and growth of international amity has cured that particular frenzy. The British-baiter is no longer with us. Then there came, particularly on

the Pacific Coast, the furious hater of anything and everything Chinese. There followed, nearly thirty years ago, enactment of the Chinese restriction law, and in time that particular bit of political jugglery lost its potency. The latest stunt in the Pacific Coast politician's bag of tricks is hostility to the Japanese. It is not that there is any real conflict of interest, not that anybody is suffering or in reasonable expectancy of suffering through the presence here of Japanese. It is because hostility to everything Japanese is good political stock-in-trade."

It seems to me that the intense animosity displayed in California towards the Japanese in the few years following 1906 was due not so much to Japanese immigration direct from Japan, which, after all, had never been very great, as to the unfortunate situation created by the immigration *en masse* of Japanese in Hawaii to the mainland. Demand for Japanese labor in California and other Pacific Coast States had been so great that certain interests were unscrupulous enough to charter steamers for the sole purpose of bringing in Japanese laborers from Hawaii. To the Hawaiian Japanese on their side, high wages offered on the mainland was a great temptation. Indeed many Japanese, unable to obtain passports to continental America, came to Hawaii only to make that point a stepping stone to the mainland. The Japanese Government had been exercising its influence to restrict emigra-

tion to the continental United States, but did not feel obliged to limit passports to Hawaii, knowing that Japanese labor was welcomed and was in great demand there. But the good intentions of the Government were misused by many Japanese, who secured passports to Hawaii with no intention to remain there. Nor was this surprising, considering that the wages paid to the sugar plantation laborer in Hawaii were scarcely as much as half the wages paid the farm hand in California.

This, in brief, was the main factor responsible for the anti-Japanese feeling aroused in California in 1906, leading to the conclusion of the "gentlemen's agreement" between Tokyo and Washington. It may be safely said that what animosity there is towards the Japanese on the Pacific Coast to-day is largely the legacy of those fatal days of 1906.

Of the various legislative bills frequently brought against the Japanese in the Western States, those depriving them of land ownership are of first importance. Defenders of the anti-Japanese land law point to the provisions of law in Japan regulating land ownership by foreigners in that country. Such men are ignorant of the real status of aliens in Japan with reference to land ownership.

In 1910 Japan adopted a law by virtue of which foreigners were to be permitted to own land, provided such foreigners came from a country where a similar privilege was extended to Japanese subjects. The enforcement of this law has been de-

layed for various reasons, chief of which is the difficulty of applying the reciprocal principle to such countries as the United States which has no uniform alien land ownership law.

In the meantime, foreigners in Japan are virtually allowed to enjoy all the rights in this respect enjoyed by natives. The Civil Code of Japan adopted in 1898 was drafted after the Digest or Pandect system, and in consequence has many points of similarity to the Civil Code of France and the Burgerliches Gezetzbuch of Germany. The Japanese Civil Code recognizes the rights of possession and ownership, the superficies, the emphyteusis, the servitus proediorum, the lien, the preferential right, the right of pledge, and the right of mortgage.

Of these nine rights, ownership in fee simple will not be conferred upon foreigners until the new alien ownership law mentioned above takes effect.

Of the other real rights, all of which are extended to foreigners, the superficies and the emphyteusis claim our particular attention. The superficies is a species of lease, but is not encumbered with any restriction as to its duration. It is attended with almost all the essential features of ownership.

The emphyteusis is another kind of lease the duration of which is from 25 to 50 years.

Foreigners allowed to acquire these two real rights virtually enjoy the benefits of land ownership. As a matter of fact, many aliens in Japan hold leases for

99 years with the provision that in case the new alien ownership law takes effect the lease shall be changed to fee simple ownership without additional payment. This is practically a form of land ownership and the Japanese Government so recognizes it.

A still more important privilege is extended to foreigners in Japan in the matter of land holding. The commercial law of Japan confers the right of land ownership upon corporations organized by foreigners in conformity with the requirements of Japanese laws. To enjoy this privilege corporations are not required to include any Japanese interest.

Moreover, a partnership, which enjoys the right of land ownership, may consist of any number of persons from two upwards. Suppose a partnership is composed of two persons, native or foreign. In this case one of the two may hold even as much as 99 per cent. of the whole interest.

If, therefore, an individual foreigner desires to own land under the laws now in operation, he may organize a partnership with another person, possibly one of his close friends, Japanese or foreigner, allowing the latter only one per cent. of the entire interest. In this way he would have virtual control of the land acquired by the partnership, for the interest of his partner would be but nominal.

But if the foreigner does not care to form a partnership or corporation in order to acquire land, he may either be naturalized and purchase land, or secure the virtual privileges of land ownership by

means of the superficies or emphyteusis described above.

In addition to the rights of foreigners recognized in the Civil Code of Japan we may mention the so-called "lease-in-perpetuity" which the Europeans and Americans obtained from Japan when the latter was totally inexperienced in diplomatic affairs. In every open port the Western Powers caused the Japanese Government to set apart an extensive tract of land for business and residential purposes of their citizens and subjects. This they called the "settlement," and such indeed it was, for here Japan virtually forfeited the exercise of her sovereign rights.

In the settlement the foreigners established what they called lease-in-perpetuity, paying a small rental to the Japanese Government. When the old inequitable treaties were abrogated in 1898 the settlement was abolished and foreigners were free to live wherever they chose. But the lease-in-perpetuity survived the abrogated treaties. On the land thus leased the foreigners erected residences and office buildings valued at millions of dollars, and yet they enjoy immunity from taxation on these properties!

The refusal of foreigners to pay rent upon these valuable lands and improvements is perhaps in consonance with their Western consciences. To the Japanese, however, it somehow does not seem quite fair. So the municipal government of Yoko-

hama has repeatedly asked the foreign residents to relinquish what appeared to it a questionable prerogative. But the foreigners, backed by their respective Governments, have proposed that the case be submitted to the Hague tribunal! Suppose a foreign government had the temerity to propose to our United States that such a domestic matter as the taxation of foreigners be submitted to international arbitration; I can well imagine how indignant such patriots as Mr. Roosevelt would be at such an outrageous proposal. Yet <sup>can</sup> the Japanese meekly accepted the suggestion, and at the Hague tribunal they had the first taste of Western justice meted out to Asiatics—their obviously just claim was not granted.

As a native of Japan, it is highly distasteful to me to eulogize the Japanese. At the risk of incurring the charge of bad taste, however, I may be permitted to submit that the patience and poise with which the Japanese faced the ordeal of anti-Japanese agitation on the Pacific Coast have been admirable. When in 1906 San Francisco, led by a labor administration, expelled innocent Japanese children from her public schools, Japan answered the challenge with a contribution of \$246,000, a sum larger than that contributed by any other single country, to the relief fund of the earthquake-stricken city at the Golden Gate. When in 1913 the legislature at Sacramento adopted the anti-Japanese land law, Japan's response was a most generous participation

in the Panama Pacific International Exposition at San Francisco. Let us hope that she will in the future prove herself as lenient and magnanimous as in the past.

Fairness demands that equally high tributes be paid to many Californians who have justice and fair play sincerely at heart. Especially in recent years the press of California has shown an admirable spirit of tolerance. When in 1915 a legislator at Sacramento threatened to introduce fresh anti-Japanese bills, the *Los Angeles Express*, a Progressive organ, came out with this emphatic editorial:

"It is not sufficient that the question of anti-Japanese legislation be lightly regarded because of the knowledge that no bill of an offensive character can become law. Mere reckless agitation of the matter may provoke trouble. The only safe thing to do is to suppress the agitators, and frown upon efforts to play politics with legislation that menaces the peace of the entire nation.

"Members of the legislature who imagine for a moment that they reflect public sentiment when they seek to stir up the question of anti-Japanese legislation seriously misjudge public sentiment. The people of California want none of it, as the jingoists will discover to their sorrow if legislation of this character is attempted."

To which the *Los Angeles Tribune* promptly assented in these words:

"There is danger in the mere agitation of the



question, and it is imperative that steps be taken to suppress those who, without hope of success in the enactment of jingo legislation, aspire to notoriety in connection with the introduction of bills aimed against the Japanese. Any legislator who attempts anything of the sort is an enemy not alone of the State, but of the Nation. The highest patriotism to-day is the patriotism that exerts itself in behalf of peace. Those who would seek to stir up international complications by objectionable legislation are not only unpatriotic, but are actually guilty of treason. Members of the legislature will reflect public sentiment if they will frown down the agitators of anti-Japanese legislation. California wants none of it. There is no occasion for anything of the sort, and the people throughout the length and breadth of the State have no sympathy with those who may have designs to jeopardize the national peace."

Senator James D. Phelan, a staunch defender of all that goes with the name of the Golden State, has of late made himself conspicuous by his characteristic statements concerning Japan and the Japanese. It is both befitting and significant that these statements have usually been published in the Hearst papers, for they chime in beautifully with the utterances of those "patriotic" publications. How Mr. Phelan's occasional airing of anti-Japanese views is regarded by a large section of his constituency may be judged from the following editorial

comment of the San Francisco *Bulletin*, perhaps the largest evening newspaper in California:—

“It will be unfortunate if the impression is created at Washington that Senator Works, Senator Phelan or Senator Poindexter represent anything like a majority of their constituents when they make the discussion of the immigration bill an excuse for sensational declamations against the Japanese. If Senator Phelan remarked, as he is said to have done, that ‘this government ought to be conducted from Washington, not from Tokyo,’ he showed less understanding than was to be expected of him. Such forms of argument might have represented public opinion in California ten years ago, but they do not represent it now. By her adherence to the terms of the Root-Takahira ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ Japan has earned the right to be treated with more courtesy than this, and as far as this paper is informed on the subject, most Californians are willing to grant her that right. If our representatives in Congress cannot discuss Japan in a spirit at least as courteous as that displayed on the Japanese side in the negotiations which preceded the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ it is ourselves, not the Japanese, who will appear the less civilized.”

For the sake of international peace and amity it is gratifying that the labor leaders of California have also modified their former hostile attitude towards the Japanese. When, in the summer of 1915, a Japanese labor union sent a representative

to the conventions of the California and American Federations of Labor with the request that he be admitted as a fraternal delegate, Mr. Olaf Tveitmoe, a prominent labor leader in California, said to a newspaper reporter: "I would rather sit with a Jap delegate than with a lot of other delegates."

This utterance was amazing because Mr. Tveitmoe had for almost ten years been regarded as hostile towards the Japanese. Its real significance lies in the indication it implies of the signal change that has come over the sentiments of the class of people with whom its author is identified. To-day the labor leaders of California are willing to face the Japanese question in a conciliatory spirit. Because of this new attitude on the part of California's labor, the once celebrated Japanese and Korean Exclusion League of San Francisco went out of existence in 1914. Addressing the Japanese at a recent banquet at which both Japanese and Americans were present, Mr. Walter MacArthur, a prominent Democrat and labor leader in California, made, in a humorous vein, a very clever and exceedingly pertinent observation by saying: "The more I see you, the less you look like a Jap!" The implication is obvious. If Japanese and Americans only get together and become acquainted with one another, the barrier between the two must gradually vanish.

It is a salutary tendency that California's labor leaders have come to regard the Japanese question as an economic rather than a race issue. "The

objection of the American to the Japanese," writes Mr. James W. Mullen, editor of the *Labor Clarion*, organ of the California Federation of Labor and the San Francisco Labor Council, "was not based upon racial grounds, but upon economic grounds. The racial aspect has since been injected into the issue by *designing persons*." With which Mr. Walter MacArthur, agrees by saying: "The movement for Asiatic exclusion is based chiefly upon economic grounds. . . . It was the injection of the idea of racial inferiority—an idea that had no place in the minds of any honest exclusionist—that led to misunderstanding and created a breach between the two countries."

One may think that the attempted exclusion of Japanese pupils from the San Francisco public schools was a race issue and not economic. But a close examination of the situation at the time reveals that the root of the trouble lay in the competition of Japanese with American labor. As far as Japanese children were concerned no complaint had ever been made about their presence in the schools either by the teachers or by the parents of American pupils. The real trouble was that Japanese immigrants had been coming to San Francisco in comparatively large numbers and entered into direct competition with American workingmen, most of whom were themselves immigrants from other countries. Under such circumstances California's organized labor had been clamoring for a stringent

exclusion law. Finding it impossible to move the Federal Government into immediate action, it resolved to register its protests by drastic means. The attempt to exclude innocent Japanese children from the public schools and the repeated assaults upon Japanese restaurants and bath-houses in San Francisco in 1906 and 1907, were simply labor's crude way of demonstrating its opposition to the coming in large numbers of such immigrants as would lower their wages.

The passage in 1913 of the California anti-alien land law was largely due to the vigorous backing given by organized labor. That such a step was a great economic blunder on the part of labor seems incontrovertible from the following argument by Mr. Frank Putnam, for some years editorial writer on the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*:

"The Alien Land Law of California was an economic blunder. This law, forbidding the thirty thousand to thirty-five thousand Japanese men resident in California to buy land or to lease land for more than three years, condemns them to join the large army of Americans who are landless and homeless. It condemns them to be either wage earners or land renters, competing against American wage earners and land renters for employment by the owners of California's lands and industries. Most of these Japanese men, would, if permitted, buy small tracts of farm or garden land and make permanent homes thereon. They would in this way

cease to compete against American wage earners in the labor market. They would become taxpayers, helping to support all social institutions—roads, schools, the local governments. Their increased contribution to the food supply would reduce the cost of living for all residents of the towns and cities. The Alien Land Law benefits only men who ‘buy labor.’ It is a law to benefit the rich by sharpening competition among the poor for employment by the rich. I am surprised that the labor unions of California have not denounced this law for this its most apparent injustice to their members. I suppose the unions endorsed the law, believing it would drive the Japanese out of California. They were mistaken. It will not do that. For this reason: the Japanese laborers in California are economically far better off, even if denied citizenship and the right to own land, than any like number of Japanese laborers either in Japan or elsewhere on the globe. They will remain here. Their children will grow up here. If forbidden to own farms and become independent producers of food, they will become each year a larger factor in the labor market of the towns and cities—competitors there against native wage earners. The Alien Land Law of California should have been entitled, ‘A Law to Force Asiatic Immigrants Into Competition with American Wage Earners and Tenant Farmers for the Benefit of American Employers and Landlords, and to Enrich Absentee Land Owners by Creating a Class

of Farm Renters Who are Forbidden Ever to Acquire Land.'”

It must be noted that the low standards of wages and living prevailing among the lower classes in Japan should not be made the pretext for exclusion, if Japanese immigrants upon their arrival here show themselves capable of adjusting themselves to the economic conditions prevailing in this country. Unbiased Californians admit, as they indeed should, that Japanese laborers no longer work for smaller wages than do laborers of European origin of the corresponding class, and that their standard of living is higher than that of immigrants of certain European countries. This is one of the reasons why California labor has ceased to see an economic menace in the Japanese.

In my article on “England and Japan” which brought forth a storm of protests as well as a flood of commendation, I attributed Japanese success in China partly, not wholly of course, to Japanese industry and frugality. One of my critics writing, apparently in a sullen mood, to the editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, in which the article was published, said that “frugality consisting of a little rice and less fish in contrast to our three square meals” was not the thing we should wish. Certainly not. Obviously this critic is totally ignorant of the mode of living in Japan, but he shows himself more ignorant of his own country when he fancies that this sort of retort will still appeal to intelligent Californians.

When he comes to visit California I would advise him to patronize Chinese, Italian, Spanish, Greek, French, German, or regular American restaurants rather than Japanese establishments, unless his pocketbook is well supplied with cash. We can smile with mingled complacency and pity when we hear disgruntled Americans or Europeans, constantly brag of their "high standards of living," knowing nothing of how the Japanese enjoy life.

But to come back to California labor. During the past year or two, various events have happened, tending to create among the laborers of that State a sympathetic feeling towards the Japanese. The first of such events was the conciliatory attitude of the Japanese steamship concern, the Toyo Kisen-Kaisha, towards the longshoremen who went on a strike in May, 1916. The San Francisco office of this firm was one of the two shipping concerns which promptly accepted the demands of the longshoremen.

Then came the strike of 3,000 culinary workers of San Francisco. When the strike was declared the Japanese employed by various restaurants voluntarily walked out. These Japanese had been denied admission into the union and had not enjoyed the protection which was back of the union men. And yet they had no hesitation in showing their sympathy for the striking workers by quitting their jobs. The occasion furnished food for reflection on the part of American workers, who were at



heart conscious that they had not been square with the Japs.

At this moment Mr. Suzuki, president of the Laborers' Friendly Society of Japan, came to San Francisco for the second time. He was again admitted as a fraternal delegate to the convention of the California Federation of Labor held at Eureka in October, and made an impressive speech. He brought with him a letter from the Laborers' Friendly Society of Japan, inviting President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor and representative labor leaders of California to be present at the fifth anniversary of the inauguration of the Japanese labor organization to be held at Tokyo this year. The labor leaders invited would have gone to Japan in the Spring had it not been for the extraordinary situation developing out of the European war.

At the Eureka convention, which I have already mentioned, an important resolution was adopted to the effect that the executive committee of the California Federation of Labor look into the practicability of organizing Japanese workers in this country with a view of affiliating them eventually with the American Federation of Labor. This is indeed a great stride towards the creation of better relations between American and Japanese workers. Another noteworthy aspect of the convention was its omission to recommend any fresh legislation for further restriction of the rights of the Japanese in California. Up to 1913 the successive conventions

adopted resolutions or platforms urging the prohibition of land ownership by the Japanese. When the anti-Japanese land law was finally adopted in 1913, the State Federation of Labor and the San Francisco Labor Council put themselves on record as favoring the enactment of a more stringent land law, depriving the Japanese of the right to lease agricultural land. But the Eureka convention last year, contrary to the proceedings of the previous sessions, did not adopt any such measure. Nor did the platforms of the State Federation of Labor and the San Francisco Labor Council, in the political campaign last year, include any plank looking towards further restriction of the rights of Japanese in California. True, the Eureka convention, as previously, did adopt a resolution objecting to Oriental immigration, but the significant part of it was the divergent views the resolution called forth. "This sort of resolution gets us nowhere," declared Hugo Ernst, representing the culinary workers of San Francisco, "why can't we face the question more squarely and honestly and organize the Japanese workers in our midst, which is the only solution of the question?" "You can't charge the Japs with unassimilability," said Richard Caverly, veteran of the Boilermakers' Union of San Francisco. "The same charge used to be directed against the 'lousy Irish.'"

With the Japanese Government faithfully adhering to the "gentlemen's agreement," and with

California labor showing a disposition to deal more squarely with the Japanese, we may reasonably hope that the delicate question which has taxed the diplomats of both countries will cease to be an acute issue.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE EXPATRIATION OF THE JAPANESE

Colonel Roosevelt's vision—His prophetic message of 1906—A fatal mistake of Congress—The crux of the Japanese question—Continental school of nationality law—The "dual nationality" of American-born citizens of European descent—The Japanese law of nationality—The expatriation of American-born Japanese—Their nationality not "dual," but "single"—The Japanese not the apotheosis of patriotism—The German nationality law of July, 1913—The reflection of Pan-Germanism upon American Germans—Physical assimilability does not mean mental assimilability—The mental attitude of European immigrants compared with that of Japanese—Expatriation of Japanese born in Japan—Attitude of naturalized Japanese in case of American-Japanese war—Mongolians both Asiatic and European—Hybrid races more progressive than "pure races"—Intermingling of Japanese and Caucasian blood—Professor Baelz on Eurasians—Important decision on a Japanese petition for naturalization.

Colonel Roosevelt, despite many unkind words heaped upon him, shows at times surprising vision. With special reference to America's relations with Japan he has often taken a stand which bespeaks a man of farsightedness. Upon the termination of the Russo-Japanese war, as President, he immediately withdrew the American legation from Korea, for he clearly foresaw that the Hermit Kingdom had signed its own doom through the supineness and corruption of its own officials and people.

His part in the Korean drama will be told in a

later chapter. Here we must note his prophetic message to Congress in the fall of 1906, recommending the extension of citizenship to the Japanese as the only means of safeguarding the inherent rights of the Japanese who had been legitimately admitted to this country. Had Congress acted upon the suggestion and provided for the naturalization of the Japanese, our relations with the Far Eastern Empire would never have been disturbed. It would have effectively forestalled such whimsical legislation as has since been witnessed on the Pacific Coast to the detriment of the traditional friendship of the two nations. On the other hand, Japan in appreciation of so gracious an act on the part of the Executive and Congress, would have manifested a spirit of accommodation, even greater than that demonstrated in the willing acceptance of the "gentlemen's agreement," thus affording to the Pacific Coast a still greater safeguard against the unrestricted immigration of Japanese laborers.

But in the year 1906 Mr. Roosevelt was so far ahead of the times, that his recommendation for the naturalization of the Japanese was given the cold shoulder where it was not greeted with derision and rebuff. In the light of the subsequent unhappy history of American-Japanese relations there can be little doubt of the egregious error of this course. Through its inability to discern the great problem which had begun to loom upon the Pacific, America let slip the golden opportunity of winning Japan's

friendship and gratitude, as she had won it just a year before in recognizing Japan's inevitable destiny in Korea.

The crux of the Japanese question to-day is that of naturalization. I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that Japan has no intention of embarrassing the United States by demanding the unrestricted immigration of her subjects of the laboring class. What she would see done is a simple act of justice toward the small number of Japanese who are already lawfully admitted into this country. In other words, the protection of these Japanese against such unwarranted legislation in the Western States as I have pointed out in the preceding chapter, is the only favor which Japan, in the name of international peace and amity, is asking. And the way to do this is to extend citizenship to the Japanese. Shall it be done, or shall it be left undone to the detriment of the traditional friendship of the two nations?

The absurd notion seems to prevail here that the Mikado does not allow his subjects to expatriate and swear allegiance to another country. This notion is due to the utter ignorance of Americans as to the Japanese Law of Nationality.

Let me say at once that the Japanese law in this respect is more liberal than those of the countries of continental Europe. Broadly speaking, there are two schools of nationality law. One is the Anglo-American school which determines nationality according to the place of birth. The other is the Con-

tinental school which recognizes allegiance to the sovereign by reason of blood-descent. In the light of the American law, all who are born upon American soil are citizens of the Republic. On the other hand, most European countries claim as their subjects all who are born of their natives whether at home or abroad. Section one, Article VII of the French Civil Code, for instance, provides that "Every person born of a Frenchman in France or abroad" is a Frenchman and owes allegiance to France. A similar provision is found in the laws of Germany, Switzerland, and other Continental countries.

Here we are confronted with a great anomaly in the form of a "dual nationality" for Americans born of European parents. They are American citizens, and, at the same time, French, Germans, Swiss, and so on. In a great crisis such as we face to-day, this anomalous condition is a grave obstacle to national unity. The only logical and reasonable thing for the European Governments to do would be to amend their laws of nationality and avoid conflict with the American law, thus divesting Americans of European descent of the nationalities of their parents.

What are the provisions of Japanese law in this respect? Up to March, 1916, Japan had a nationality law similar to that of the Continental school we have just noted. But the question of dual nationality, brought into bold relief since the open-

ing of the great war by the presence in this country of large numbers of Americans of European parentage, so greatly impressed the Japanese in America that they caused the legislators of the Japanese diet to pass last year a new law of nationality to harmonize with the American law. This new law provides that a Japanese boy who has acquired a foreign nationality by reason of his birth in a foreign country, may, provided he be domiciled in such country, divest himself of Japanese nationality, if his father or other parental authority take the necessary steps to that end before he is fifteen years of age; or, if he has attained the age of fifteen, he may himself take the same step, with the consent of his father or other parental authority, which is necessary until he attains the age of seventeen.

Apply this new Japanese provision to the Japanese children born in this country. They will all become American citizens if they take the necessary steps for expatriation, for, in the light of the American law, they are already citizens of the Republic. Unlike European-Americans their nationality will be "single," not "dual." They will owe their allegiance to the Stars and Stripes, and to no other flag. Credit must be given to the Japanese legislators for this epoch-making, though simple and wholly logical, concession to the territorial principle of the American law. They have blazed the path for the European Governments. Let us hope that the latter will not be slow in following.



But the new Japanese law is far from ideal, because it permits the Japanese army to enroll American-born Japanese boys over seventeen, if they fail to take steps for expatriation before that age. Such a reservation should be removed. This drawback is, however, only apparent. As a matter of fact, it will prove no impediment, for the eagerness of the American-born Japanese boys to avoid conscription in the army of a nation foreign to their thought and ideals, is the surest remedy for this defect. It will surprise Americans to know that many Japanese young men come to this country mainly for the purpose of escaping enrollment in the army. Human nature is the same the world over, and the Japanese is not, after all, so wonderful an apotheosis of patriotism. If even boys born and educated in Japan are beginning to show themselves apathetic toward military service, how can we expect the Japanese, born and educated here, and imbued with the American spirit of freedom, to surrender themselves to the conscription of a country of which they have but a faint idea? You may rest assured that before they are seventeen they will all avail themselves of the privilege of expatriation provided in the new Japanese law of nationality.

We have discussed the nationality of "Americans" born of foreign parents. Now we must consider the naturalization of foreign-born residents in America, or, to look at the matter from the other side, the expatriation of such residents.

The German nationality law adopted on July 22, 1913, provides: "German citizenship is not lost by a German who has, before acquiring foreign citizenship, secured from the competent authorities of his home State the written permission to retain his original citizenship." This provision permits, perhaps is meant to encourage, the acquisition by Germans abroad of dual nationality. It enables Germans in America to enjoy all the privileges of American citizenship without forfeiting any of the privileges of the German subject. It is intended to strengthen the German people as a unit—a manifestation of Pan-Germanism.

How does this Pan-German policy of the Government at Berlin react upon the Germans in America? Says the celebrated General von Bernhardt:

"The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany, but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, and, thus united, constitute a power in the State with which the Government must reckon."

This was written in 1910. When the present war broke out Mr. George Sylvester Viereck, Editor of the *Fatherland*, faithfully echoed Von Bernhardt's utterance in these fervent words:

"You (non-German Americans) have refused to listen to our reasoning. You were deaf to our pleas.

We shall go into the arena of politics. We shall try to beat you at your own game. One hundred and seventy members of Congress are of Irish extraction. There is no reason why they should not be joined by one hundred and seventy of German extraction. There is no reason why we should not labor for the election of men of our own blood who are in accord with our principles, which are also the principles of true Americanism."

During the Spanish-American war, *Die Grenzboten*, a very influential weekly in Germany, came out with this bold assertion:

"We have to consider that more than 3,000,000 Germans live as foreigners in the United States and are not personally interested in that country. A skillful German national policy should be able to manipulate this German multitude against the shameless American war speculators."

And in the early stage of the present war the German-American Society of Passaic, New Jersey, issued a manifesto containing these words:

"Come, all of you, German Societies, German men and German women, so that, united offensively and defensively, with weapons of the spirit, i. e., votes, we may help our beloved Germany onward."

To which the late Mr. Herman Ridder added this clarion call:

"There have been no traitors to the German cause either among the 66,000,000 Germans in Ger-

many or among the many millions of Germans and their descendants in this country."

I have quoted from the German law of nationality and given a few examples of utterances reflecting the spirit of that law, simply to show that races, which are apparently or physically assimilable with the American people, are often far from being assimilated mentally and spiritually. And in doing this I have no desire to single out the Germans and make them the only targets of criticism. Immigrants from certain other countries are perhaps more alien in thought and ideals than the Germans. Many Englishmen live here for years and decades with no intention of changing their nationality, and they entertain no more love or respect for this country than do Germans. In fact their assumption of an air of superiority often rasps the nerves of loyal Americans. As for immigrants from South and East Europe, their measure of assimilability is fairly well known. Especially in recent years increasingly large proportions of European immigrants do not become citizens. In New York City, for example, 500,000 of 1,433,749 persons of voting age in 1910 were unnaturalized and showed no intention to identify themselves with the Nation. Not only are most of these immigrants unable to read English, but they are also deficient in the knowledge of their own languages. These are vital facts which should be kept in view in discussing the "unassimilability" of the Japanese, who are eager to learn and to adjust

themselves to their new surroundings, who would build book stores where other immigrants would set up saloons. Is it fair that America should open her doors of citizenship without reserve to those immigrants whose assimilation is only skin-deep, and slam them in the face of those who are capable of assimilation in a deeper and truer meaning of the term?

But I must come back to the Japanese law of nationality. We have seen how an American-born Japanese can divest himself of Japanese nationality. It remains to be seen whether a Japanese born in Japan is allowed to expatriate. The Japanese law provides: "A person who has acquired a foreign nationality by his own choice loses Japanese nationality." This is reasonable. But the law provides exception for the male Japanese of seventeen years or more who are not allowed to absolve themselves from their inherent nationality until they shall have served in the army or the navy, or unless they are, for lack of physical qualifications or for any other reason, exempted from military service. Under the conscription laws of Japan a boy at seventeen becomes a member in the *landsturm*, though his active service of three years does not begin until he is twenty. After three years of active service he becomes a member of the reserve, corresponding to the German *landwehr* and remains so until he is forty. This means that a Japanese born in Japan, if physically qualified to become a soldier and ac-

tually enrolled, cannot, until he is forty, become an American citizen even in the event of naturalization being extended to him. After he has passed forty he is absolutely free to renounce allegiance to the Japanese flag. If a Japanese boy is exempt from enrollment for any reason he may expatriate at any time.

This, in brief, is the Japanese law of nationality and expatriation. The exemption it provides is deplorable and should be eliminated as soon as possible. On the whole, however, it is more liberal and progressive than the laws of continental Europe. If the naturalization laws of the United States were so revised as to extend citizenship to the Japanese, many would avail themselves of the newly granted privilege, for a considerable proportion of the Japanese here, for one reason or another, have never served in the army.

The question has often been asked: What would be the attitude of a naturalized Japanese, provided naturalization is extended to the Japanese, in case of war between Japan and America? Let me answer this question with an illustration from Japanese history. The retainer of a feudal lord became the adopted son of another lord. When war broke out between the two clans, the young samurai was in a quandary. How could he take up arms against his former lord? Yet on the other hand, how could he be untrue to his present lord? He reasoned it out thus: "To be untrue to my new lord would be an

act of treachery unworthy of the respect and name of my former master. I will fight for my present chief and by my valor add to the glory of the lord who trained me in the principles of chivalry."

This is the spirit of Japanese loyalty. The hero of the above story has ever been applauded and idolized by posterity. The history of feudal Japan is replete with such tales of heroism. May we not hope that such will be the attitude of Japanese in America once they are admitted into American citizenship?

There are critics who object to the naturalization of the Japanese upon racial grounds, and discuss the question from the viewpoint of intermarriage. Let us look at the question in the broader light of evolution. In excluding or discriminating against the Japanese on racial grounds, America ignores the fact that the Mongolian race is both Asiatic and European. Presuming that the Japanese are of the Mongolian family, which is a moot point, why should they alone be discriminated against, when European Mongolians such as Fins and Magyars, are allowed unrestricted freedom to enter the country and the unlimited privileges of citizenship? We must also remember that along the borderland where Asia meets Europe the Caucasians have mingled freely with the Mongols, resulting in a hybrid race whose physical characteristics are decidedly Caucasian. I am inclined to think that the Japanese, born and reared in America, will, by reason

of their new natural and social environment, lose in time much of their original racial type without the process of intermarriage. Judging from what has happened to the Mongols in Europe, this seems no absurd conjecture.

More absurd is the contention that the intermingling of Japanese and the Caucasian blood results in racial degeneration. On this particular aspect of the Japanese question such eminent biologists as Professor Loeb and Professor Boas, of Columbia University, have given a verdict virtually supporting my contention. There are people who cherish superstitious beliefs in the "purity" of race or blood. As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as "pure race." All races are hybrid. He betrays his hopeless ignorance who speaks of the Anglo-Saxon as a pure race. Again the Japanese is as mixed a race as the Anglo-Saxon; in his veins runs Malayan, Mongolian, and Aryan blood. The aborigines of Japan known as the Aino were, in the judgment of the foremost ethnologists of the world, Aryans. Is it not a blow to the superstitious believer in the innate superiority of the Aryan race that those Japanese Aryans who remained pure have totally degenerated and fare to-day no better than the North American Indians, while the Japanese, who are a conglomerate of Malayan, Mongolian, and Aryan, are fast coming to the forefront of civilization? The ancient Babylonians, Assyrians and Egyptians were perhaps as near specimens of homo-



geneous races, as can be found in history. Yet where is their glory to-day? They remained pure of blood, and declined while yet pure. The "glory that was Rome" was a civilization affected by a mongrel race produced by the combination of Trojans, Etruscans, Latins, and perhaps some other stocks. And Rome decayed when it ceased to assimilate alien blood strains. China furnishes another example of so-called racial purity. Yet her star waned centuries ago, and her salvation is hardly in sight. Look at America: She owes her vitality and progress to the continuous infusion of "new" blood from outside. As Dr. Doremus Scudder, a prominent pastor and publicist of Honolulu, says: "Our New England families are dying out, but their places are being taken by pioneers from all over the world, not by scions of the wealthy, overcultured and childless, but by honest workaday folk, some of them victims of oppression in their home lands; people who have lived close to the soil, who breed large families and by so doing show themselves unspoiled by the dry rot of physical incompetence." Woe to America when she shall receive no more vigorous pioneer stocks from abroad, and leave the country to the mercy of the men and women, steeped in pleasure, dazzled with the glitter of material prosperity, now dabbling in charity, now making a fad of birth control!

But I must not stay. America need not entertain the slightest apprehension concerning the matter

of the intermingling of Japanese and Caucasian blood. In the first place cases of such intermarriage will be few, at least for many years to come. The Japanese are proud of their blood (if one's blood is anything one should be proud of) no less than the Americans are proud of theirs. The few cases of intermarriage which may occur here and there need cause no misgiving, for the average offspring of Japanese-American parents is strikingly handsome, bright, intelligent and charming. I have often derived questionable satisfaction, I am ashamed to say, from encountering rabid anti-intermarriage Americans (which may mean any nationality), whose children are decidedly inferior, both in appearance and in intelligence, to the average Japanese-Caucasian child.

Intermarriage between Japanese and Caucasians has passed the doubtful stage of experiment. It is here to "stay." Cases of such marriage, though yet few, are nevertheless sufficient to show that it is nothing to be feared. In Japan and in the Eastern States of America, children born of respectable Japanese and Caucasians have found no difficulty in marrying either Japanese or Caucasians of a corresponding class. I know a German-Japanese who is happily married to a German nobleman and diplomat. I know an English-Japanese whose husband is a distinguished Japanese statesman, who has occupied various portfolios in the cabinet. I know an American-Japanese whose wife is a daughter

of a distinguished American clergyman. That such men and women of mixed Caucasian and Japanese blood have been readily received in the highest circles of Japanese and Western communities is an indisputable indication that intermarriage is nothing to be feared.

I have mentioned Professors Boas and Loeb as two authorities on biology who scout the prejudiced assertions concerning intermarriage. In this connection it is interesting to note the following statement made some years ago by Professor Baelz, a German physician of the Tokyo Imperial University:

“On this question I may speak with a certain degree of authority, having been the first, and in fact up to this day the only scientist, who has made a special study of the comparison of the physical qualities of the Japanese and European races. Besides, as a physician in Tokio during thirty years, I had the opportunity of examining an unusually large number of Eurasians, and I paid particular attention to them. The result of my observations is that they are a healthy set of people, and I do not hesitate to say that not one of the common arguments against them is supported by science. They are on an average well built, and show no tendency to organic disease more than Europeans or Japanese do. This is the more remarkable as many of them grow up under unfavorable circumstances, the father often having left them with little money to the care of a mother who has no authority

over them. This is a particularly important point if the moral qualities are considered. In Europe, too, we know that abandoned illegitimate children very often turn out badly, and a fair comparison must take that into serious consideration. To make quite sure about the intellectual and moral qualities of the Eurasian, I have asked the opinion of the man who is better qualified than any other to give an authoritative judgment—Mr. Heinrich, director of the School of the Morning Star. He has had in his classes, side by side, Europeans, Japanese and almost all the male half-breeds in Tokio. His opinion is, that if properly brought up and well-looked after, the half-breeds are morally and intellectually in no way inferior to the children of either parent. As a rule they are taller and more robust than the Japanese, and in every branch of learning they are fully up to the standard of their fellow-scholars.”

Let the prejudiced indulge in invectives and insinuations to their hearts' content. They will be ashamed of themselves when great lights in art, science, literature and other higher achievements, spring from among Caucasian-Japanese, as they most assuredly will.

It is unfortunate that Americans are, in discussing the Japanese question, inclined to invoke the set argument about the negro question. There is no comparison between the two. The Negroes were brought here as slaves from the jungles of a savage country. The Japanese have behind them cen-

turies of highly cultivated civilization. <sup>They are</sup> They are, as a Japanese writer proudly declares, the "knights among the nations," and have never been brought under a foreign yoke. The color of the Negro, like the leopard's spots, does not easily vanish through intermarriage. On the other hand, the offspring of Japanese and Caucasian parentage, when united to a full-blooded Caucasian, begets a child that is, both in physiognomy and color, absolutely Caucasian. Equally important is the obvious fact that racial feeling against the Japanese in America is not, and it has never been, half as strong as that against the Negro. Whether at hotels or at restaurants, in public conveyances or in places of amusement, the Japanese are never discriminated against in the East and South, and seldom even in California. This may seem a small matter, but it is an important indication that what racial prejudice there may be against the Japanese to-day will, with the passing of years, gradually decrease and eventually disappear. This seems all the more likely if one considers the many instances of white laborers gladly and harmoniously working under Japanese bosses or foremen.

In concluding this chapter it seems pertinent to cite the decision recently handed down by Judge Charles F. Clemons of the Federal Court at Honolulu, denying to Mr. Takewo Ozawa, a prominent Japanese resident in Hawaii, the privilege of becoming an American citizen. The interest in the case

lies in the fact that the judge in his decision frankly admitted that he was meting out a judgment which he knew was not just. This case pointedly illustrated the necessity of revising the naturalization laws of this country.

Judge Clemons quoted with approval the following passage from Dr. William Elliot Gulick's book, *The Evolution of the Japanese*:

"There is no necessary distinction between the Oriental and Occidental, the brown and the white man. That the 'yellow brain' and the Japanese heart are ultimately different from those of the Yankee or the Briton is the notion of tradition, not the fact of science."

Now, the Federal judge heartily agreed with the above view of Dr. Gulick, a great American authority on Japan, and yet he was compelled to add that his ruling could not be controlled by the worth of the Japanese, their moral and intellectual qualifications; he must determine only whether Congress had them in mind in its provision for the naturalization of "free white persons" and of "aliens" of "African nativity and persons of African descent." This question the judge answered in the negative, believing that the term "free white person" does not apply to the Mongolian race, of which he thinks the Japanese is a member.

As it stands, the law, Judge Clemons believes, cannot be interpreted as favoring the naturalization of the Japanese. That he sees injustice in this

law is obvious from the following suggestion which he advanced in his decision:

"The remedy lies with Congress, and our alien friends should, through their friends, or directly, seek that branch of the government, and if they show such devotion to the United States and its Constitution as this petitioner has shown in his twenty years of complete surrender to our customs and institutions, his petition should not fall on deaf ears."

It is strange that this important decision has received but scant notice from the public and the press. Judge Clemons is sympathetic enough to suggest that Ozawa and his Japanese friends urge upon Congress the need of a new naturalization law. With due respect for the judge, we must say that this cannot be done by Japanese who are aliens. It is not desirable that aliens should meddle with the politics and legislation of a country where they are residing only as guests. It is, therefore, the duty of fair-minded, justice-loving Americans to take the matter into their own hands and employ their energies and influence to secure the revision of the naturalization laws. As for the Japanese, they must remain absolutely "neutral," though they may at heart be intensely interested in such efforts on the part of their American well-wishers.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA

Japan's early attitude towards China—China's blunder in Korea—Chino-Japanese war—European encroachments upon China—China on the verge of disruption—Secretary Hay declares the "open door" policy—His definition of the same—Russia ignores the Hay note—American failure to back up the policy—Japan the only nation resolved to fight for the Hay policy—American criticism of Japan unfair—Russia still a menace—British inroads into Tibet—Spheres of influence—The British concession in Sze-chuan—Japanese adherence to the open door policy—Sphere-of-influence theory needs modification—Misinformation concerning preferential tariff enjoyed by Japan—No discrimination practiced by Japanese railway in Manchuria—Japanese efficiency benefits all in Manchuria—Japanese competition fair and unimpeachable.

To understand Japan's course of action in China it is of the utmost importance to remember that the island empire endeavored for years to keep herself free from European entanglements over the Chinese question. As early as 1884 France offered her hand to Japan and proposed that the two nations should enter into an alliance with a view to coerce China. The Japanese politely declined the overture. They had long been imbued with the idea that their relations with the "celestials" were, to use a Chinese metaphor, the "relations of the lips to the teeth." Destroy the lips, and the teeth are cold. To strengthen this traditional belief,



General Ulysses S. Grant in 1879 advised the Mikado to beware of European intrigues and to foster friendly relations with the Court at Peking. In those days it was Japan's sincere desire to cement friendship with China, and, if possible, to declare the doctrine of "Asia for Asiatics."

Fate, however, decreed that the two nations should come to blows over the disposition of Korea, the country which China had been scheming to annex. Japan regarded the independence of Korea, lying within gunshot of her archipelago, as essential to her own existence. Ignoring Japan's repeated proposal that Korea's independence be not molested, China proceeded with her own plans to annex the peninsula. The Celestial Empire saw in Japan only an inferior small nation to be dealt with in a high-handed manner. At any rate Japan went to war with the absolute conviction that China was the aggressor, and that she was forced to fight a war of self-defense against a foe believed by the world (including China herself), to be far more powerful than herself. When Japan brought China to her knees, the Government at Peking unfortunately invited European interference with the peace terms in process of negotiation. The result was the triple interference of Germany, Russia and France, compelling Japan to abandon the Liaotung peninsula which she had just secured from China as the chief spoil of war.

For the time being Chinese diplomacy seemed to

have won. Its glamor, however, soon vanished, and in the course of the few years that followed China's blunder in having invited European interference became obvious. When, towards the end of the nineties, the Powers of Europe began to vie with each other in establishing footholds in China, Japan's traditional policy of aloofness ceased to be serviceable. The doctrine of "Asia for Asiatics" which she had once dreamed of enunciating, was no longer practicable. The only course open to her was to coöperate with such European Powers as might be friendly to her, and thus preserve the balance of power against the European intruders. In plain language, Japan had to play the game as Europe played it. The result was the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The record of European intrusion upon China is indeed appalling. We may begin with the classic event of the British annexation of Honkong in 1841 as the result of the "opium war." In 1860, Russia swindled China out of the vast maritime territory lying to the north of the Amour River. In the same year the allied forces of England and France pillaged Peking and laid the magnificent Summer Palace in ashes. In 1874, France wrung Annam from China, and in 1885 Tonquin was also taken by the same Power. In 1887, even Portugal cut Macao out of the huge pie.

All this was alarming enough to the Japanese, but the infant nation, having just been lifted out

of the cradle of seclusion, was still directing its unsteady steps along rough and untried roads, and was in no position to raise a voice against Western encroachment upon China.

1895 Japan  
to Formosa  
With the German seizure of Kiau-chow in November, 1897, the political horizon of China assumed a new aspect more menacing to the Japanese. This ominous move on the part of Germany was followed by the Russian occupation of Port Arthur in December, 1897; the British lease of Wei-hai-wei on April 3, 1898; the French lease of Kwan-chow Bay on April 10, 1898; and the British lease of Kowloon peninsula on June 3, 1898. Even Italy demanded, on February 28, 1899, the lease of Sammun Bay on the coast of Che-kiang province as a coaling station and naval base, as well as the right to construct a railway from Sammun Bay to Poyang Lake.

In this international rivalry for the establishment of spheres of influence, the outstanding fact is that the European Powers were actuated by sheer lust for territory. They had no real grievance to justify their action in China. Towards them China never assumed an aggressive attitude, as she did towards Japan over the Korean dispute. Situated thousands of miles away from the Far East, these European countries could not possibly contend, as Japan reasonably could, that the unstable condition in China was a menace to them. The plain fact is that they took advantage of China's weakness and were bent upon exploiting the country to satisfy

their own greed. Had Japan been strong enough to call a halt to them, she would have unequivocally enunciated an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine before Europe's scramble for Chinese territory began. But Japan was weak, and when she at last awakened to the consciousness of her prowess she found European nations already firmly fortified in Chinese territory.

Following the German seizure of Kiau-chow it was no secret that the Chancellories of Europe began seriously to talk of the break-up of China. Not satisfied with obtaining leases of territory on the Chinese coast, they immediately entered into sharp competition for railway, mining, and various other concessions. China was divided into various spheres of interest or influence, and the huge empire seemed quivering upon the verge of disruption. Confronted by this ominous situation the late Mr. Secretary John Hay addressed, in September, 1899, a circular note to the leading Powers, setting forth the American attitude towards China which has come to be known as the "open door" policy.

It may be unpleasant for Americans to learn, but it is well to admit, that it was not Secretary Hay's note which prevented the disruption of Chinese territory or the closing of the open door. My knowledge of Far Eastern diplomacy in the past score of years leads me to the conclusion that it was not the American Government but Japan which made earnest efforts to enforce Mr. Hay's doctrine of

the open door. But before attempting to prove this contention, let us define the meaning of this celebrated doctrine.

The term "open door" has become the slogan and watchword of writers on the Chinese situation. Strangely enough, few have attempted to define it. Mr. Hay issued two different circular notes on two different occasions. The first was dated September 8, 1899, and the second July 3, 1900. In the first note Mr. Hay's aim was to secure equal commercial opportunities for all nations. In his own language the so-called "open door" was defined as follows:

First: That no Power will in any way interfere with any treaty port or vested interest within any so-called "sphere of influence or interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second: That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said sphere of influence (unless they be free ports), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third: That no power shall levy any higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such sphere than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, or any higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its sphere on merchandise belong-

ing to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such sphere than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.

In the second note, dated July 3, 1900, however, Mr. Hay enlarged the scope of the first note and came out squarely for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. The above definition of the open door must be kept in view in determining whether Japan's recent demands upon China really violated that doctrine, as I shall discuss those demands in Chapter X.

The principles enunciated both in the first note and in the second are just and incontrovertible, but the American public must not permit itself to be flattered into believing that these notes of Secretary Hay's really accomplished the purpose for which they were written. To one European Power, Russia, at least the American notes were not worth the paper on which they were written. Upon receipt of Secretary Hay's first note Russia not only expressed herself in favor of reserving for herself the right to levy customs duties on foreign imports in her sphere, but demurred upon the American proposal with regard to harbor duties and railway charges. With characteristic audacity on August 4, 1900, she hoisted the Russian flag over the Chinese customs house in Newchwang. She poured her troops into Manchuria and was preparing her way for the immediate absorption of a

territory of 363,700 square miles. Russia, in short, completely ignored Mr. Hay's "open door" note.

Alarmed by this critical situation, Japan, in the early spring of 1901, approached Germany, England, and the United States with a view to securing their coöperation in checkmating the Russian absorption of Manchuria, but none would render any assistance to Japan. How pitifully inexperienced the Japanese diplomats were at that time may be judged from their child-like hope that Germany might do something to help her against Russia. Even the United States, the very sponsor of the "open door" policy, declined to aid Japan. It is the old story—to the living in their need we measure out neglect, reserving our praises for the dead who are beyond our charity. So Japan earned, after the Manchurian war, more aspersions than praises mainly because she did not perish a martyr in the Herculean struggle with Russia. Yet the world must admit that had it not been for Japan's determination to fight Russia single-handed, the much heralded open door proclamation would have become a "scrap of paper." Had this come to pass other European Powers would immediately have followed Russia's suit and sliced for themselves large sections of China. Indeed, China would have ceased to exist as an independent State. In challenging Russia in 1904 Japan, therefore, fought not only for her own existence but for the integrity of China and for the "open door" doctrine of America.

It must, however, be frankly admitted, what the Japanese are reluctant to admit, that Japanese arms failed to attain the end for which they were employed against Russia. Blinded by the successive victories they had scored on land and sea, the Japanese believed that they had effectively shielded the "open door." This was a great delusion. When the smoke cleared away from the fields of battle, they found Russia just as strongly entrenched in Manchuria as before the war. In Korea they succeeded in destroying Russian domination, but in Manchuria they were too weak to cope with the Northern colossus. It had been their avowed purpose to drive Russia from Manchuria and thus realize the open door in China, but before they had reached anywhere near the goal their resources were exhausted, with no nation, pledged to the open door, coming to the rescue.

In diplomatic language Japan succeeded in maintaining against Russian intrusion the open door and the integrity of China; in reality her efforts were a failure. After the signing of the peace treaty of Portsmouth no one realized this more keenly than Japanese statesmen. They saw Russia not only occupying by far the largest portion of Manchuria but scheming to include Mongolia in her sphere of influence. Far from abandoning her empire scheme in the Far East Russia only diverted her activities into Mongolia through which she hoped to reach and dominate Peking. After the sacrifice of a hun-



dred thousand lives and \$1,000,000,000 in the titanic struggle that had just ended, Japan's position with regard to Russia appeared as precarious as ever. Especially were the militarists, who had faced the brunt of Russian onslaught in Manchuria, fearful of the Muscovite revenge which they thought not only possible but probable. What could Japan do but accept the inevitable and strengthen her foothold in Manchuria to prepare herself against Russia's fresh aggression?

No doubt this policy had its flaw. But American criticisms of it are strangely unsympathetic. Those who sit serenely amid opulence may find it easy to criticise the conduct of others perplexed by such strain and hardship as the Japanese experienced during the critical years following 1904. Such people cannot realize that the Japanese were struggling for their very existence. As for European censors of Japanese policy in China, I have only to ask them to remember the well-known remarks exchanged between Dumas and his friend Cremieux. Cremieux, a very homely man, tried to make fun of Dumas' appearance and asked, "Was your father a mulatto?" "Yes," returned Dumas, "my father was a mulatto, my grandfather a negro, my great-grandfather a monkey—my family began where yours ends."

Since the peace treaty of Portsmouth was signed, not only has Russia strengthened her position in Manchuria but she has become the virtual mistress

of Mongolia, measuring a million square miles. Her activities in the Khanates began immediately after the war with Japan, and in the Chinese revolution of 1911 she saw a golden opportunity to push her interests in that country. The result was the Russo-Mongolian treaty of October 3, 1912, establishing a Russian suzerainty over Mongolia.

England, ever on the alert to counteract the Russian advance, at once took action in Tibet. Beginning with Colonel Younghusband's spectacular expedition to Lassa in 1905, she was busy extending her influence in Tibet, and by 1912 there were stationed in that country at least 5,000 British troops. In the same year she entered into a secret agreement with Russia, the two countries dividing Mongolia and Tibet as their respective spheres of influence. In February, 1913, England persuaded the Dalai Lama to borrow \$10,000,000 from her and to purchase from her manufacturers all the arms and ammunition Tibet might need. The Lama also agreed to confer upon British capitalists the exclusive right to exploit the mining and other natural resources in Tibet.

In the meantime China, rent by revolution, was powerless to safeguard her interests in her outlying territories. She made only a feint of protest which was, of course, completely ignored. Here it must be emphasized once more that neither England nor Russia had any justifiable excuse for utilizing China's internal trouble and establishing a suzerainty over

Tibet or Mongolia. Their only reason was their greed. And yet the press of America and Europe was virtually silent on the British and Russian intrusion upon China. Can it be that Christian Europe "can do no wrong"? To our benighted souls it is a puzzle that European Powers may perpetrate any crime in Asia with impunity, while an Asiatic nation must be execrated and condemned for taking the necessary steps to prepare itself against their further encroachment upon its backward neighbors.

To know something of the portentous possibilities of the British and Russian policies in China, one need only think of the vastness of the territories which they have staked out for themselves. Russia claims as her sphere of influence Outer Mongolia (1,000,000 square miles), Sinkiang (548,000 square miles), and more than three-fourths of Manchuria (273,000 square miles). These total an area of 1,821,000 square miles. On the other hand, Great Britain claims Tibet (533,000 square miles), Szechuan (218,000 square miles), Kwantung (86,800 square miles), and the provinces along the lower reaches of the Yantse River (about 362,000 square miles), making a total of 1,199,800 square miles for the British sphere of influence. In the South, France claims Yun-nan (146,700 square miles) as her sphere of interest. Before the war Germany claimed Shantung (55,900 square miles) from whence she was scheming to expand in various directions.

The chief source of misconception on the part of Americans concerning Far Eastern affairs lies in their ignorance of Chinese geography. Open the map of China, mark out the spheres of influence established by European Powers, and compare them with the Japanese sphere. Then you will begin to wonder why it is you make so much ado about Japan's activities in China. As against England's 1,199,000 square miles, and Russia's 1,821,000 square miles, Japan's sphere of influence, consisting of South Manchuria (90,000 square miles), Eastern Inner Mongolia (50,000 square miles), Fukien (46,000 square miles), and a section of Shantung (18,600 square miles), totals 204,600 square miles. Remember that it was not Japan which originated the idea of spheres of influence. It was because European Powers were bent upon dividing China into so many spheres of influence that Japan was obliged to step in and take such measures as might be necessary to safeguard her position in the Far East against any emergency that might arise from such an unhappy condition in China.

It is interesting to note how spheres of influence have been established by the Powers. Japan paid for her small sphere in Manchuria a billion dollars and the blood of a hundred thousand of the flower of her population, for that was the cost of the war which was forced upon Japan by Russia. On the other hand, Russia, England and France secured their vast spheres practically for nothing. The

price paid by Germany for her sphere was the lives of two missionaries whose questionable conduct resulted in their murder by Chinese.

Perhaps the crowning achievement in concession hunting was the enormous concession, covering the vast province of Sze-Chuan, which was secured by an Englishman named Pritchard Morgan. The first contract for the concession was made with the Viceroy of the province in 1899. This granted to Mr. Morgan the exclusive right to exploit the resources of Sze-Chuan, including minerals, timber, and water power. It was provided that work should begin within twelve months from date of approval. Pritchard Morgan was too shrewd a promoter to let his chance slip for lack of performance of his share of the bargain. He sent engineers into the field. It is doubtful if they did any actual work, but at least they surveyed something. The contract was approved, so the story goes, by the Central Government in Peking on the 364th day after it was signed, thus bringing it within the bounds of legality as to any payments made by Pritchard Morgan; but on the morning of the 365th day, Mr. Morgan's representatives were notified that, as he had not commenced work within the year, his concession was void. At this juncture the British minister at Peking as well as Downing Street came to Morgan's rescue, and the contract was saved. When Yuan-Shi-kai became President of China, the concession, which had been on the tapis for thirteen years, was given a

new lease of life, according to a British group of financiers the exclusive right of working the vast oil fields of Sze-Chuan as well as mineral and other natural resources, reported to be the richest in China.

We have seen that Japan's war with Russia failed, or at any rate only partially succeeded, to enforce the "open door," if we understand by the open door the maintenance of China's territorial integrity. On the other hand, if the "open door" means equal commercial opportunities for all nations, as defined in Secretary Hay's first note, Japan has not only compelled Russia to observe the doctrine, but has herself strictly adhered to it. In the light of Mr. Hay's definition which we have already quoted, it is difficult to see how Western critics can accuse Japan of "closing the open door." In her spheres of influence she has never interfered with "any treaty port or vested interest," has never "levied higher harbor dues" or charged "higher railway rates" on foreign ships or merchandise, and has never interfered with the "treaty tariff" of China. What more do Western critics expect from Japan? Do they mean something different from Secretary Hay's definition when they speak of the "open door"?

Considering that every inch of South Manchurian soil was soaked with Japanese blood and that their coffers were left sadly depleted by the war, it would not have been surprising if the Japanese, in the wake of the great conflict, had been tempted to regard Manchuria as their own territory by right

*have  
told*

Manchuria is Chinese territory. International law does not recognize right of conquest, from a third party who is not in the war.

of conquest, and to adopt there discriminatory measures calculated to advance their trade. Yet, on the whole, they showed themselves remarkably considerate in dealing with foreign commercial interests. As soon as military rule was withdrawn foreign merchants were freely admitted into Manchuria, and the Japanese railways there carried all goods at the same rates.

True, Japan was unwilling to see foreign capital construct in South Manchuria such railways as might come in direct competition with her own lines, but here again she was simply following the example set by other Powers possessing spheres of influence in China. Germany, for instance, reserved the following right with regard to Shantung:

"The Chinese Government binds itself, in all cases where foreign assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or supplying of materials in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question."

Nor is this peculiar to Germany. Similar provisions are found in all treaties of concession which the Occidental Powers wrested from China before the Japanese début in Manchuria. That this was a bad example is no reason why Japan alone should be made a target of censure for following it.

Personally, I believe that this exclusive policy followed by the Powers in their respective spheres

of influence in China is a mistaken one, and should be gradually abandoned not only for China's benefit but to their own advantage. A mile of railway built in China, whichever nation may finance it, is of value to all nations interested in that country. But such railways, to be really beneficial to all, must not be built as enterprises representing some sphere of influence; they must be built for China and managed by the Chinese Government. So long as the Powers regard railways as means of advancing their respective interests, political as well as commercial, it is idle to speak of the "open door." That this view, radical as it may seem, is not without supporters in Japan may be judged from the following editorial, which recently appeared in the *Tokyo Jiji-shimpo*, assuredly the most influential financial organ in Japan:

"The rapid progress of Japan's export trade to China is largely due to the increase of China's purchasing capacity stimulated by the introduction of foreign capital, which has built railways, opened mines, and contributed in many another way to the economic advancement of the country. Had it not been for the work accomplished by foreign capital, China's demand for foreign goods would have remained very small, and our trade in China would never have forged ahead as it really has.

"The 'open door' and 'equal opportunity' for all trading nations have been our fixed policy in China. Unfortunately, people have not been lack-



ing who are so short-sighted as to fear the competition of foreign capital with our enterprises in China. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that our wisest course lies in the most faithful adherence to the policy of the open door, and in encouraging the exploitation of natural resources with the aid of foreign capital."

Is this not a counsel which all Powers interested in China would do well to take to heart?

In discussing the railway policy of the Powers in China it is pertinent to clear certain misunderstandings concerning the Japanese system in Manchuria.

Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks is authority for the widely circulated statement that "goods entering China over the Japanese railway through Korea enjoy a preference of one-third of the customs charges." Unfortunately Professor Jenks does not tell the whole story, and is, therefore, misleading. True, a preferential tariff is applied to the goods entering Manchuria from the Korean border, but this privilege is extended to all trading nations. Moreover, Japan was not the nation which initiated this special arrangement. As early as 1862 Russia obliged China to sign the "Convention for the Land Trade between China and Russia," in virtue of which no duties were levied within the limit of thirty miles on either side of the Chino-Siberian boundary line. In October, 1907, Russia secured a new convention enlarging the scope of the convention of 1862. By this new agreement goods trans-

ported by rail into Manchuria were to pay only two-thirds of regular import duty, so long as such goods remained within the prescribed area around the railway station. At Harbin, Russia's Manchurian metropolis, this special area extended to all points within a radius of three miles from the station. At other minor stations the area extends to a radius of a mile or a mile and a half.

In October, 1910, Russia secured further advantage by completely exempting from duty almost all important merchandise exported to Manchuria across the Siberian border. Under such circumstances the Japanese traders in Manchuria had been restive and had been urging the Government at Tokyo to take the necessary steps to protect their interests against Russia's unfair competition. As the consequence Japan in 1913 at last persuaded China to extend a preference of one-third of the customs charges to goods entering Manchuria by rail from the Korean border. She was, however, considerate enough not to demand, as Russia had demanded, absolute immunity from duty for any of her exports to Manchuria. Now the important thing we must remember is that the above privilege is not exclusive to Japanese and Russian goods. All goods, no matter from what country, enjoy the same privilege, if brought by rail through the Korean or Siberian border. If Russia and Japan derive any special advantage from the above arrangement, it is due only to the fact that Russian and Japanese

goods make up by far the largest portion of the imports that pass across the Siberian and Korean boundaries.

Another misconception prevailing among Americans relates to a certain railway schedule in Manchuria temporarily adopted by Japan. In March, 1914, the Japanese Railway Bureau, in conference with the Korean Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, adopted a measure by which all goods, Japanese and foreign, entering Manchuria via the Antung-Mukden line, were to be carried at rates thirty per cent. less than the regular rates. The underlying motive was to make the Korean and the Antung-Mukden railways the main artery of trade and communication between Japan and Manchuria, and thus bring the two countries into closer touch. When this schedule for the Antung-Mukden route became applicable, American cotton merchants complained a great deal, not because the new rates were not applicable to their goods, but because American goods, on account of more convenient steamship service, were accustomed to enter Manchuria through the port of Dairen, and not through Korea and thence by the Antung-Mukden railway. The Japanese railway authorities argued that the new schedule did not discriminate against American merchandise, and that it was through no fault of theirs that the Americans could not avail themselves of the advantages equally offered to all traders. Yet the Americans continued to protest, urging

that the South Manchuria Railway should adopt the same low rates for the Dairen-Mukden line, so that American cottons, preferring to enter Manchuria through Dairen, should not have to compete at a disadvantage with Japanese cottons transported over the Antung-Mukden line. After much parley the American merchants, in March, 1915, finally won the point, and to-day there exists no cause of complaint by them.

Japan's commercial advance in Manchuria is due to no unfair competition on her part. Mr. Robert P. Porter, of the *London Times*, clearly recognizes this fact when he quotes, in his book *The New World Power*, the following letter written by a British merchant in Changchun, Manchuria:

"With regard to that part of Manchuria which comes under Japanese influence, too great praise cannot be given. The conveniences and facilities afforded by the Japanese to one and all in regard to banking institutions, railway communications, postal and telegraph service are far and away superior to those afforded by the Russian and the Chinese institutions. The Yokohama Specie Bank, with its numerous branches, enables foreign traders to transact business on the same lines as they are accustomed to do in other civilized countries. Transactions with this bank are free from the exorbitant rates and the petty redtapism, to which it is necessary to conform in working with either the Russians or Chinese. It is a recognized fact that it takes any

time over an hour to get a cheque cashed at a Russian bank; moreover, the absence of any knowledge of the English language renders transactions with them considerably irksome. Every employee in the Yokohama Specie Bank, on the other hand, has a good knowledge of the English language. Notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese Customs are supposed to manage the Postal Service in Manchuria, that service has become practically confined to the transmission of Chinese correspondence. The Japanese appear to handle the greater part, if not all, of the foreign mail in a satisfactory manner.

“In conclusion, Japan has fulfilled all her obligations, and continues to do so, in the development of Manchuria, and woe betide the day if the country comes under Russian influence or if it is handed back again to the control of the Chinese. Too great attention cannot be devoted to this country by the Press in Great Britain, in order to direct the attention of British firms to the enormous prospects which await them here in various directions. It is to be hoped that they will soon awaken to these possibilities. If these efforts are delayed too long they will find that it is too late, as other countries will have secured the business.”

In her commercial rivalry with America and other nations in China, Japan has benefited herself simply by taking advantage of natural laws of trade. Japan's geographical situation, her enormous investment in China, the presence of 200,000 Japa-

nese there consuming Japanese goods, the abundant supply of cheap labor at her disposal, her familiarity with the use of the Manchuria pulse of which she is the greatest customer, a certain similarity between the Chinese language and her own—these are the conditions which have been instrumental in the advancement of Japanese trade in Manchuria. These points will be more fully discussed in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER IX

### JAPAN AND AMERICA IN CHINA

Japan's ambition to become a great commerical factor in China—This does not conflict with American enterprise—Anti-American feeling in Japan—Its *raison d'être*—Baron Shibusawa's idea of American-Japanese coöperation—How Japan benefits America in Korea—Japanese press invite America to rejoin the financing body in China—American international corporation's idea of coöperation with Japan—English opposition to such coöperation—American complaint about Japan's unreasonableness—Complaint of American manufacturers' export association—Anti-American circular of British chamber of commerce—Trade competition in China after the war—England obstructs American trade in China—America's share in China trade—Japanese monopoly of China trade impossible—Secret of Japanese success in China—Bean, the determining factor in trade competition in Manchuria—Japan, China's best customer—200,000 Japanese in China, an asset to Japanese trade—Japanese investments in China—American trade has not suffered in reality.

In discussing the question of Japanese immigration to America in Chapter V, I emphatically stated that Japan will make supreme efforts to relieve the pressure of population at home without causing embarrassment to America and the British colonies. In making such efforts she will inevitably follow two lines of action. First, she will utilize the territories already under her control, such as Hokkaido, Korea, Formosa, and a certain section of South Manchuria; and, secondly, she will follow the foot-

steps of England and strive to convert herself into a great commercial nation. It is the second line of action which has a direct bearing upon Japan's Chinese policy.

Japan's foremost aspiration to-day is to become a great factor in the commerce of the world. If she succeeds in this direction she will be enabled to support more comfortably than hitherto her increasing population upon the comparatively small area of land at her disposal. If her carrying trade increases, as it probably will, in proportion to her industrial expansion, half a million Japanese will eventually be living on her merchant ships alone.

It is, therefore, but natural that she should make supreme efforts to become a dominant economic factor in China. She sees in that country of two million square miles untold resources as yet little exploited. She sees in the four hundred million souls of China the possibility of creating a vast market for her merchandise. These are the bottom facts which afford impetus to Japan's Chinese measures, though her ambition on the Asian continent must at times have seemed political rather than economic.

In pursuing this policy Japan has no intention of hindering American activities in China. In his address in the Imperial Diet two months ago Viscount Ichiro Motono, Japan's Foreign Minister, made this statement:

"I note with great pleasure the symptoms of real



sympathy manifested for some time between Japan and the United States. A proposal for common financial action has been made by American capitalists. The Imperial Government will follow with lively interest the development of the economic *rapprochement* between the two countries."

There is no reason why Japan and the United States cannot coöperate in China, not only for their own benefit but also to the advantage of the Chinese. Once Japan clearly understands that America has no political ambition in the Far East, the former will be but too glad to welcome the latter to China.

It may sound curious to Americans, but it is nevertheless true, that a large number of Japanese are inclined to see political ambition in American policy in the Orient. They think that America, not content with the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine in her own hemisphere, is embarking upon an imperialistic career. She is, they fear, stretching her hands across the Pacific, intent upon extending not only her commercial interests but her political influence in China. In Secretary Knox's proposal for the "neutralization" of the Manchurian railways, in his scheme to construct the Chinchów-Aigun railway, in the Bethlehem Steel Company's project to establish a dockyard in Fukien, not to mention the American occupation of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines, the Japanese see the ominous rise of the United States in world politics. They

think that these American activities, like the similar activities of European Powers, are not merely commercial but political. They have seen enough of the sinister designs concocted by European Powers against Korea and China, menacing the very existence of their own country. In their minds it seems difficult to differentiate American enterprises from European. Moreover, American enterprises, backed by unlimited resources and capital, will, they apprehend, sooner or later drive Japanese trade and enterprise in China to the wall, if Japan does not take measures of self-protection against their onslaught. All European investors in China have enjoyed the backing of their respective governments. The railways they have built in China are as much political railways as they are commercial. The concessions they have wrested from Peking also have political meaning. Will not the same unfortunate situation develop from American investments in Chinese railways and canals and mines?

There is another class of Japanese whose opposition to American activities in the Far East is due to different motives from those I have just described. These Japanese are not so much concerned with American "imperialism" as they are desirous of showing the Americans what they can do in the way of retaliation. Their mood is one of resentment and defiance. They have been resenting America's discrimination against the Japanese and her apparent eagerness to forestall all their enterprises in Mexico

and even in South America. They have been deeply annoyed by the cry of "Wolf!" raised by publicists at Washington and a large number of American newspapers every time Japan takes a step on the Asian mainland. "Let us show these troublesome, meddling Yankees what we can do to them if they insist upon annoying us all the time with no justification whatever" is the sentiment of these people. The Japanese are but human. You cannot expect them to turn their left cheeks to you after you have slapped them on their right cheeks. They can understand you when you raise an issue over Japanese immigration to your own country, but they do not understand and will never understand why on earth you have to pursue them in Mexico and South America, when there is nothing to make ado about. There was absolutely no truth in the much exploited story of the Japanese designs upon Magdalena Bay, and yet one of America's foremost publicists introduced a resolution in the Senate, declaring that the United States could not see without grave concern the acquisition of any harbor on the American continent by a foreign corporation "which has such relations to another government, not American, as to give that country practical control for military or naval purposes."

Indulging in such fatuous anti-Japanese agitation, how can American publicists complain of Japan's objection to the establishment by a powerful American concern of a naval yard on the coast of Fukien

lying across a narrow strip of water from the Japanese territory of Formosa?

Fortunately, however, Japan is not going to follow a policy of revenge in dealing with American enterprise in China. She knows that such a policy would be to cut off her nose to spite her face. About a year ago Baron Yeichi Shibusawa, foremost among Japanese financiers, came to this country with a view to sounding the sentiment of American capitalists with regard to Chinese enterprise. It was highly unfortunate that his real motives were willfully misinterpreted by a certain class of Americans whose business seems to be to put unexpected meanings upon every Japanese opinion and action. These wiseacres have been spreading the report that Shibusawa's proposal is to grant Japan a veto power with regard to every American enterprise in China. If this extraordinary scheme were carried into effect, they fancied, American capital would be permitted to enter China only upon Japan's approval. Nothing can be more sinister than such a misinterpretation. What Shibusawa expressed was his desire and hope for the coöperation of American and Japanese capital. Certainly he did not entertain the Quixotic idea of forbidding activities of American capitalists who would invest in China independently rather than in coöperation with the Japanese.

The aptness of certain Americans to misrepresent Japan's measures in China is seen in their comment upon the abandonment of the Standard Oil Com-

pany's project of exploiting oil fields in China. They tell us that the project was dropped because of Japanese objection. Yet I know, upon the authority of the engineers who surveyed the oil fields for the Standard Oil, that the abandonment was due mainly, if not wholly, to the fact that the fields gave no promise of yielding sufficient oil to justify the enormous expenditure involved in the enterprise.

This American habit of blaming the Japanese every time something goes wrong with China is a serious impediment to the maintenance of friendly relations not only between Japan and the United States but also between Japan and China. It is due to the same mental habit of many Americans that they see a menace to American trade in the Japanese domination in Korea. And yet statistics show that American export trade to Korea increased twenty times in the decade that followed the establishment of Japanese rule in the peninsula. Prior to the establishment of the Japanese protectorate American exports to Korea were insignificant, those for 1903 having amounted to only \$199,188. In the following year, with the advent of Japanese rule, American exports to the country suddenly swelled to \$906,557. Since then the progress of America's export trade to Korea has been both steady and rapid, until in 1913 it reached the handsome figure of \$3,924,811. This is all the more remarkable, considering that America buys practically nothing from Korea. When we hear the

constant mutterings of certain classes of Americans, we cannot help wondering whether such people are not really working to force Japan to close the commercial doors of the Orient against America. Surely their complaints do not in the least help advance American trade or enterprise.

In the midst of such perennial nagging it is highly refreshing to note that certain financial groups in Japan and America have just entered into an agreement for harmonious coöperation in the promotion of economic enterprises in China. Mr. Willard Straight, President of the American International Corporation of New York, seems to be the leading figure in this new movement. Judge Elbert H. Gary, chairman of the United Steel Corporation, has also exercised his influence for a similar movement. This is the way to promote American interests in the Far East, manly in its attitude and constructive in its ideas.

That Japan will, on her side, welcome this new movement started in New York goes without saying. At this writing the Japanese press is urging American financiers to return to their former fold in the so-called five-Power group from which they withdrew four years ago at the instance of the Wilson Administration. The five-Power group, organized six years ago for the purpose of financing the Chinese Government, consists at present of banking interests of England, France, Russia, Japan and Germany. Under the existing conditions in Europe,

Germany is, of course, virtually excluded from this group, and the Japanese press is eager to have America fill the vacancy. Their general sentiment is judged from the following utterances of the Tokyo *Jiji-shimpo*, recognized as the most influential organ in Japan:

/ “China’s most urgent need to-day is money, for the country is on the verge of bankruptcy. Under the presidency of Li Yuen Hung, the North and the South may come to terms, but even a united China cannot maintain peace and order within its borders unless it has the wherewithal to keep the wheels of government running. The bare cost of maintaining China’s machinery of administration is estimated at \$3,000,000 per month. With no funds forthcoming from provincial governments, the Central Government knows no means to make the ends meet. Unless financial aid be proffered from foreign sources, China’s flickering hope for rehabilitation may once again come to naught in the recurring storm of revolution.

“The question is where she may look for aid. She has been struggling to borrow money from various sources, but as long as the five-Power group is in existence foreign bankers would hesitate to advance any considerable sum without conferring with that body. The trouble is that the five-Power group is in no position to take care of China’s finances. Even England’s great resources have been taxed to the straining point. Although Japan is in a

better shape, her treasury alone is not capable of supporting China. Whither but to the United States shall we look for immediate relief of our destitute neighbor?

"The reason for America's withdrawal from the financing group in China was that she did not wish to participate in any arrangement which might oblige her, along with the other Powers represented in that group, to interfere with the internal administration of China. If the Washington Government still entertains the same view, American bankers would hesitate to join hands with us. It is much to be hoped that the Wilson Administration will look at the question in a new light, for without prompt relief China's precarious Government cannot become stable."

When in the summer of 1916 the Siems Carey Company of St. Paul, backed by Mr. Straight's American International Corporation, broached the project of improving the Grand Canal of China, which runs through Japan's newly acquired sphere of influence in Shantung, it was reported from Peking that Japan launched a protest against the scheme. Considered from a legal point of view, Japan's vetoing power over the project seems indisputable, because Germany, whose rights in Shantung Japan has succeeded, had enjoyed in that province the exclusive privilege of financing or promoting all such enterprises as was proposed by the Siems Carey Company. And yet Japan had no idea of employing



the veto against the American project. On the contrary, she was desirous of coöperating with the American interest concerned. If the arrangement tentatively made between the American International Corporation and the Japanese financial group becomes definite, not only the improvement of the Grand Canal but many other projects will be launched on terms which will benefit China as well as the financial groups concerned. Due to the great war, Japan has had fortune thrust upon her. To-day her financiers can easily spare fifty to one hundred million dollars for investment in China. With the coöperation of American capital, there is no doubt that they will accomplish much in the economic field of China where capital is urgently needed.

The only danger to this new tendency for co-operation between Japan and America is, as I have already intimated, the hostile counter movement on the part of those Americans and Europeans whose business is to find fault with the Japanese. Already a section of the Chinese press, both vernacular and English, has been set at work to discourage this promising tendency. There is no gainsaying that the English newspapers in China, edited by Englishmen and financed by British interests, constitute a great power. These newspapers are as much on the alert to oppose Japanese interests as they are eager to promote those of England. They are, almost without exception, anti-Japanese, simply because they see in Japan a rising commercial com-

petitor of Great Britain. The moment Japan launches any new project in China the English newspapers turn a united front against it. Is it any wonder that American visitors in China, reading no newspapers other than these, readily fall in with the British views of Japanese activities? The native press, which is as frequently as not influenced and inspired by the anti-Japanese utterances of the English newspapers, is also ever ready to join in the propaganda of discrediting Japan. This unenviable disposition is now being exhibited at the expense of the growing intimacy between America and Japanese financiers interested in China. Says the *Peking Daily News* of a recent date:

“The whole story of Japanese intercourse with China since the China-Japan war is a story of persistent pressure, of unremitting inconsideration, of studied disregard of Chinese susceptibilities. The committal of any American project into Japanese keeping may perhaps be a guaranty of eventual materialization, but this may be bought at too high a cost. If we simply look at the thing from the point of view of what will pay best, we find an insuperable objection to the ‘American money and Japanese brains’ form of coöperation. It will not pay American interests to link themselves up with interests that reck nothing of Chinese feeling or rights. American enterprise in this country stands remarkably free from the taint of inconsiderate commercialism, perhaps freer than that of any

other nationality. The highest American interests can only be conserved by the maintenance of the American tradition. 'Evil communications corrupt good manners' internationally as well as in private and personal life, and it is to be hoped that American capitalists will realize this. The history of the past few months shows that it is quite unnecessary for American interests to be entrusted to Japanese manipulation. Several loans, a big railway building contract, and other by no means negligible pieces of business stand to the credit of American enterprise unassisted by Japanese cerebral convolutions. There is no necessary conflict of interest between gray matter and clean hands."

Such opposition was, of course, expected from the beginning. It is the natural outcome of the unfortunate Japanese diplomacy in China during the past few years, as well as of the British agitation in that country. While the war in Europe is obliging England to focus her energies upon affairs at home, it behooves the Britishers in China to see to it that the commercial field long monopolized by them is not invaded by Japanese or American interests.

It is indeed strange that American critics, while constantly complaining about Japanese competition in China, are silent about the more formidable competition offered by other countries. Before the war British interests, too, while raising a hue and cry against Japanese activities, kept significantly quiet about German inroads into their fields. It

seems as though Japan were by the whim of Allah called into existence for the specific purpose of shouldering all blames which in reality belong to other countries. Such perhaps is the treatment which all newcomers, especially Asiatic newcomers, must experience.

In September, 1916, the American Manufacturers' Export Association made a representation to the State Department at Washington. The document had special reference to the Japanese demands upon China following the clash of Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria in the summer of 1916. It reads in part as follows:

"The demands, while not fully disclosed by the newspaper reports, are sufficiently appreciated by this association to warrant its belief that they may have as their object the extension to other parts of China of special interests for Japan, and result in the exclusion of American prestige and a handicap to the extension of legitimate commercial interests in the former country.

"The United States has always stood foremost as the ready protector of Chinese sovereignty. In its wisdom this Government in March, 1913, upon the ground of impairment of Chinese sovereignty, withdrew its support from the American bankers then negotiating in conjunction with other Powers a loan to China.

"The present situation, threatening the right of China to independent action, justifies, in our

opinion, measures at least equally as effective as those referred to above.

"The history of the Japanese activities in Manchuria is the history of the almost complete loss of American trade, not a little of which was formerly enjoyed by the members of this Association. Should the present demands be granted by China what little business is now done by Americans with the Chinese will be cut or reduced still further."

I do not wish to be suspicious, but this memorial smacks of sinister motives which are not apparent on the surface. I hope I am unwarranted in saying that it is written at the instance of certain American manufacturers or exporters of British or German extraction.

This representation of the American Manufacturers' Export Association takes on a humorous aspect when placed beside the following circular distributed among English merchants in China last year by the British Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, China:

"Getting Busy—Our American friends recognizing the possibilities of this market and the fact that European Powers are engaged at the moment elsewhere, are 'getting busy' so as to take away all the trade they can from all of us.

"Organization—It is very necessary that British merchants should recognize that Americans have been laying their plans on very broad foundations and with consummate skill and foresight through a number of years.

"The British Position—The Americans have understood the Chinese character and have acted upon their understanding better than we have or can hope to do. We have no surplus indemnity, as Sir Edward Grey has stated, to hand back to China. We only estimated the exact costs of our expedition and trade losses, consequently there is nothing left over. If there were, it is too late for us to repay with any hope of imitating Americans. They were so long first in the field, and have been so far the only ones, that any repayment by ourselves would only add to the 'Kudos' gained by the American move.

"British Effort—A consideration of the above and many other facts which are within the ken of the members of the chamber should make us realize that we must fight for our commercial position not only against the Germans, who were our great competitors, but now against the Americans, who are seriously endeavoring to capture the Chinese market. It is extremely necessary for British merchants to unitedly strain every nerve to keep all we have and to increase our trade."

There is one American in Shanghai, President Gilbert Reid, of the International Institute of China, who has a clear view of the *post bellum* trade situation in China. He predicts that the keenest commercial competition there after the war will be between England on one hand, and America and Japan on the other. "It is not yet quite clear," he says.

“whether England’s conflict will take place first with Japanese or with Americans, or whether the conflict with these two Powers will be simultaneous.”

To those Americans whose business is to blame Japan every time something goes wrong with American business in China, I recommend a perusal of the following passages from President Reid’s article written almost two years before America’s entry into the war:

“There is an English law called ‘trading with the enemy act.’ This law, as the various orders in council, is meant not merely for British observance, but for universal application. In fact there is more of a prohibition placed on others in trading with the enemy than is placed on the British themselves. In a word, the traders of all countries, neutral as well as the allies, can trade only under sufferance of England.

“They may trade, of course, but under no circumstances with the Germans, though the trade be in American and Chinese goods, and not properly German goods. If they presume to do as they please and trade with the Germans, then England’s might is brought to bear, restraints on trade are ingeniously devised, and a regular boycott is set in motion. All this is done in the name of law, for the British have a ‘trading with the enemy act.’

“The position of the American merchant, to say nothing of the American missionary and educator, is, under this tremendous force of circumstances, a

subordinate one—subordinate to British official action even more than to British mercantile action. The only way for the American in China to do any business at all is to ‘keep in’ with the English. The British consulate has two lists, the black list and the suspected list, and on these lists American firms as well as British are placed by the good pleasure of the British consul general, resident in China, and dwelling in an international settlement. ‘Instructions’ are in some cases issued to Americans, particularly if they represent British or Japanese business houses.

“If an American merchant should presume to go contrary to the will or wish of his British majesty’s consul general, he will find it difficult to do any trade at all. For financial reasons he will find it expedient, during the period of war, to do England’s bidding, and disassociate himself, both in a business and social way, from the Germans. This much is clear, the American merchants’ position is subordinate to England. In fact, out here in China the Briton rejoices in the predominance of England over all countries, a predominance which he claims as a right, and certainly as a fact through superior power.

“Germany is thus not the only country which has advanced the theory that ‘might is right.’ It is not a wrong theory which is to be overthrown by England and her allies; it is the military and naval power of some other country which must give place



to that of England. More than once have I heard it said by some Britisher when I complained of British interference, 'This shows we have the power. You Americans can't do anything without us.'

"The fact that most of our American firms are carrying on trade as usual with the British cannot indeed be taken as proof that their trade is under restraint, but if we look closely we will see that there is here proof of subordination to England.

"When once any of our firms venture to have any business relations with England's 'enemy,' then the American is made to suffer. No matter that international law gives no countenance to such restraint on trade, if the American can't help himself, why should he rush into needless trouble?"

To show America's share in China's import trade, let me present a few statistical data.

The total value of China's imports increased from \$343,000,000 in 1907 to \$427,000,000 in 1913, the year immediately preceding the war, showing a gain in that period of about 24 per cent. A closer examination of the details of that trade, country by country, shows that in the same period 1907 to 1913, inclusive, the imports from Great Britain grew from \$60,500,000 to \$70,300,000; from Germany from \$12,600,000 to \$20,500,000; from Belgium from \$8,200,000 to \$11,500,000; from Russia from \$5,600,000 (1898), to \$16,100,000; from France from \$2,500,000 to \$3,800,000; from India from \$36,400,000 to \$48,400,000; and from Japan from \$44,900,-

000 to \$86,600,000; while the imports from the United States in the same period fell from \$29,400,000 to \$25,700,000.

It will, therefore, be seen that the increase in imports from Russia in the period in question, 1907 to 1913, was 185 per cent.; from Japan, 93 per cent.; Germany, 62 per cent.; France, 52 per cent.; Belgium, 40 per cent.; India, 33 per cent.; and Great Britain, 16 per cent.; while in the imports from the United States there was a decrease of 10 per cent.

The war made a considerable reduction in China's imports from Europe, cutting off entirely those from Germany, Austria-Hungary and Belgium, and materially reducing those from Russia, Great Britain and France. As a result the percentage of China's imports supplied by the United States has slightly increased, having been 7.1 per cent. in 1914, and 8.2 per cent. in 1915, against 6 per cent. in 1913. The total value, however, of China's imports from the United States in 1915 was less than in any year since 1910, having been but \$22,900,000 against \$25,800,000 in 1913 and \$26,800,000 in 1912.

The official trade figures of the United States show that exports to China in the fiscal year 1900 were to the value of \$15,259,000; in 1913, \$24,699,000, and in 1916, \$25,156,000. Exports to Japan in 1900 totaled \$29,081,000; in 1913, \$57,742,000; in 1916, \$75,008,000. The exports to China in 1916 are \$9,899,000 in excess of 1900; those to Japan in 1916 are \$45,927,000 in excess of 1900.

Comparing the fiscal year 1916 with 1900, the exports of the United States to China show an increase of 65 per cent., to Japan 158 per cent., and to Asia, as a whole (exclusive of merchandise for European countries sent to Asiatic ports) 136 per cent.

I have given these figures to show that Japan is not America's only, even chief, competitor in China, and that while American imports to China have not increased, those to Japan have increased phenomenally. After all England is the most formidable rival of America and other trading nations in China. We have seen that British imports to China in 1913 were to the value of \$70,000,000. But these figures represent imports from Great Britain alone, and do not include those from her colonies. If we include the latter, British imports to China reach the enormous figure of \$317,000,000. True, Japanese trade in China has of late increased more rapidly than that of England, but this is due partly to the peculiar, though natural and legitimate, advantages Japan enjoys, as we shall presently see, and partly to the fact that Japan is a newcomer in the field, starting from the lowest rounds of the ladder, while such great established interests as those of England had already reached the highest steps before Japan's advent as a trading factor in China.

The idea indiscriminately propagated that Japan is intent upon securing the monopoly of the Chinese

market is more absurd than sinister. Mr. Roland G. Usher speaks the truth when he says in his *Challenge of the Future*:

“They (the Japanese) see with clarity the impossibility of utilizing in Japan more than a portion of the exports of China, or of making in Japan more than a part of what the Chinese must buy. Such a limitation upon Chinese trade as a monopoly in Japanese hands would fatally limit, if not destroy, the very economic growth which they wish to foster. European and American capital they will welcome—nay, they will invite—on those economic terms which prevail in Europe. The purchase of Chinese goods by foreign merchants, the sale of foreign commodities to China will be stimulated to the maximum. There will be but one condition—it must involve no political concession or extraterritorial privilege not already in existence.”

The “secret” of Japan’s commercial success in China, and especially in Manchuria, is, in reality, no secret, but an open book to any who has the eye to read.

Western critics usually explain Japan’s commercial success in China with the hackneyed two words—cheap labor. Japan has an abundant supply of cheap labor, which enables her to turn out merchandise at comparatively small cost; hence she is able to undersell her Western competitors: such is their simple reasoning. There is a less charitable view, which attributes Japanese success wholly to

underhand measures of discrimination and double dealing. The first view tells only half truth; the second is a slander. As I see it, the first cause of Japan's commercial success in China lies in the fact that Japan, of all foreign nations, has been the greatest customer for Chinese products—a fact which has enabled Japanese merchants to enter into more intimate and lasting business relations with the native traders and consumers than is otherwise possible. Japan, buying so much from China, must needs send to that country in exchange her manufactured articles. This is the operation of the simple economic law, that the country consuming the major portion of the exports of another country holds the most advantageous position in supplying its necessary imports. The principal export of Manchuria consists of beans and bean-cake. Before the Russo-Japanese war the Chinese trader brought the bean product to Newchwang, and received in exchange foreign piece goods and sundries. The Japanese purchasers of beans and bean-cake paid the foreigner his profit on the turnover, plus the storage charges, lighterages, and freight, and were apparently contented with a situation impossible for them to remedy. Then came the war and all was changed. Japan began an aggressive campaign to gain control of the Manchurian trade, and success soon crowned her efforts. As Mr. George Bronson Rea, editor of the *Shanghai Far Eastern Review*, puts it:

“Under these conditions the foreign merchants

and their agents in the interior were placed at a disadvantage from the outset. As they could not penetrate into the interior and purchase beans by an exchange of commodities, they were reduced to selling their wares for cash—the one thing the native was short on. If they attempted to follow the lead of the Japanese and barter merchandise for beans, they were handicapped by their various charges at Newchwang, and having to ultimately sell to the Japanese at their price, which, of course, was unprofitable under the then existing conditions. The decadence of American and European imports followed as a natural consequence. A few venturesome American and British piece goods agents established themselves in the interior, firmly determined to win back their lost trade; but, acting solely as sellers and unable to reciprocate by purchasing the products of the farmers, results were discouraging, and they finally had to abandon the field as unprofitable. This, in short, is the real reason for Japan's success in Manchuria."

That really furnishes the key to the Manchurian question. Here is a country where there is no manufacturing industry, and whose agricultural products can be enumerated upon five fingers. Beans and their by-products, bean-cake, and bean-oil, constitute its only important produce. What can Western nations do with them? The annual crop of beans is approximately 2,000,000 tons, which has a value of \$40,000,000. How is Man-

churia to dispose of this enormous quantity? The Manchurians themselves do not want them, for their staple food, as well as their animal feed, is millet. Europe and America do not know, or at all events have not known, how to utilize them. Japan and China are the only places where the goods can be sold.

The Russo-Japanese war proved, as we have noted, a golden opportunity for Japanese traders to establish direct business relations with the native producers of beans or native dealers in the commodity, thus doing away with the medium of foreign merchants in Newchwang. Since the war Japanese purchases of beans increased by leaps and bounds, until to-day almost nine-tenths of the Manchurian produce is purchased by the Japanese.

So much for Manchuria. In other parts of China Japan is also a more liberal purchaser of Chinese products than any other country. If England, buying very little of China, manages to export to China \$300,000,000 worth of goods, is it any wonder that Japan, the best customer of China, should forge ahead in her export trade to that country?

The second cause of the rapid increase of Japanese trade in China is the presence there of 200,000 Japanese residents, who naturally consume goods from their native country. If they purchased Japanese goods to the modest annual value of \$100 per capita, this alone would amount to the handsome total of \$20,000,000.

The third factor is the enormous investment Japan has made in China, and especially in Manchuria. During the last ten years, Japanese investments in Manchuria, both governmental and private, have reached \$200,000,000. As against these investments, American capital in Manchuria is practically nil. Can America reasonably complain about the decline of her trade, while Japanese exports have been advancing?

But has American trade in Manchuria suffered so seriously as some would have us believe? It is true that American cottons have lost their supremacy in Manchuria. From which, however, it does not follow that America as a whole has been a loser, for the raw material that feeds Japan's spinning factories is imported from the cotton fields of America. As I have shown in a foregoing paragraph, American exports to China in the period between 1900 and 1916 have increased only 65 per cent., while those to Japan have increased 158 per cent. in the same period. In 1916 American exports to China totaled only \$25,156,000, while those to Japan amounted to \$75,008,000. I have also shown that American trade in Korea has increased twenty times since the establishment of Japanese rule there. Moreover, America has sold no small amount of railway material to the Japanese railway company in Manchuria. Prior to the war Russia built her Manchurian railways mostly with her own material, while the Imperial Railways of North China used



exclusively British material. But in the reconstruction of the Dairen-Changchung line and its branches (500 miles), in the building of the Antung-Mukden line (186 miles) and the Kirin-Changchun line (90 miles) Japan used exclusively American rails and rolling stock. The other leading American exports to Manchuria—flour, kerosene, and tobacco—are still holding their own against the competition offered by other countries. Taking it “by and large” we can see no reason why America should complain of the trade situation in Manchuria.

## CHAPTER X

### JAPANESE BLUNDERS IN CHINA

**Japan's blunders in China—The Cheng-chia-tun incident—Japanese demands after the incident—China needs Japanese efficiency—How Japan benefits Manchurians—New Japanese cabinet initiates a new Chinese policy—Foreign minister Monoto's statement—Japan's real difficulties in China—A Japanese justification of the "twenty-one demands"—"Group five"—Substance of the Chino-Japanese Agreement, May, 1915.**

Nothing shows more clearly than Japan's attitude towards China during the past few years that the Sunrise Empire has adopted Western vices as much as it has emulated Western virtues. Tokyo's diplomacy in the erstwhile Celestial Empire, notably that revealed in the celebrated "twenty-one demands," is exactly the diplomacy that has for more than half a century been practiced in that unhappy country by Paris, by London, by Vienna, by Berlin, by Petrograd.

We had hoped that Japan might, while accepting all the good that the West might have to offer, guard herself against that blazen vice of the Occident known as bullying diplomacy. In her younger days, when she took trembling steps into the dazzling concourse of the great Powers, Japan was herself made to suffer tribulations and hardships at the

hands of exacting diplomats whose home governments entertained no mercy towards the weak nations of Asia. Did not those bitter experiences undergone in her days of apprenticeship serve to teach her the lessons of sympathy and tolerance? As the wheel of fortune turned in her favor, did she herself not imbibe the unenviable spirit of those opulent nations of the West whose dealings with minor nations have been characterized by greed, arrogance, and callous indifference to the dictates of sympathy?

Alas! we had expected too much. When Japan, upon the heels of the fall of Tsingtao, insolently confronted China with the twenty-one demands, we were bitterly disappointed. Not that those demands were in principle wrong and unjustifiable, but because they were pressed upon China in utter disregard of the susceptibilities of the nation whose friendship she had been professing to value. The details of the negotiations that followed are too well known to require reiteration here, but there are a few points which might still be emphasized.

In the first place, Japan ought to have published the contents of the demands simultaneously with their presentation to China, and transmitted them at least to the British Foreign Office. There was no reason why the Japanese diplomat should avoid publicity, if he had, as he undoubtedly did, sincere confidence in the reasonableness of the demands. Instead of taking this sensible course, he urged

upon President Yuan Shikai the observance of strict secrecy. Could any one with common sense imagine that Yuan would keep silence, when he knew he could through publicity arouse the sympathy of the world in his favor and thus succeed in warding off at least some of the demands?

Even more reprehensible was the overbearing manner in which the demands were submitted to the Chinese President. With no previous warning, with no previous exchange of views with the Chinese Foreign Department, Japan abruptly brought forward an apparently formidable set of demands, and placed it directly in President Yuan's hands, thus ignoring the usual channel and the established etiquette of diplomatic presentation. To display such an attitude of insolence in dealing with China, that country of multitudinous ceremonies and conventionalities, was to invite contempt, let alone the wounds it inflicted upon her pride.

The negotiations that followed the presentation of the twenty-one demands dragged along for almost five months, and finally resulted in a compromise. Reserving the outcome of the parley for further consideration in later paragraphs, we must here note another untoward incident which occurred in Manchuria when the ink was scarcely dry upon the agreements resulting from the Japanese demands of January, 1915.

In July, 1916, a fracas took place between Chinese and Japanese troops stationed in a little Manchurian

money!  
town called Cheng-chia-tun, which is to be the terminus of a new Japanese line on which work was commenced a year ago. A Japanese peddler, it seems, had an altercation with a few Chinese Tom-mies, resulting in the imprisonment of the peddler in the Chinese barracks. Thereupon some of the Japanese soldiers stationed in the town went to the headquarters of the Chinese troops with the intention of releasing the captured Japanese. A hot argument followed, which soon developed into a rough and tumble fight, in which firearms played an important part. The result was a few casualties on both sides.

Without entering into non-essential details, that was the story of the Cheng-chia-tun incident. Its Japanese version naturally puts all the blame upon the Chinese troops. On the other hand, China attributes the incident to the unruly conduct of the Japanese peddler. As in all similar cases, it is difficult to determine where the blame belongs in this incident. Perhaps the Japanese contention was as nearly true as the Chinese. Perhaps the Japanese peddler was no less guilty than the Chinese Tom-mies. My intuition leads me to the conclusion that both were equally to blame.

At any rate Japan should not have seized upon the occasion to present fresh demands to China. Even presuming that the responsibility rested entirely with the Chinese troops (which is open to debate), was the damage suffered by Japan serious

enough to justify her in seizing upon the incident to press upon China such demands as these?

1. Apology from the Chinese authorities.
2. Indemnity for the killed and wounded.
3. Concession to Japan of the right to police certain parts of Manchuria.
4. Employment of Japanese officers to train the Chinese troops in Manchuria.

Perhaps the first two demands were justifiable; the last two were excessive and arbitrary. If Japan were really anxious to befriend China, even the first two should not have been proposed. Only through magnanimity and sympathy can Japan hope to win China's friendship, and thus really strengthen her position in Manchuria and in other sections of that country. That this view is shared by many Japanese publicists and editors is unquestionable. As an example of sympathetic utterances in the Japanese press, I quote the following passage from an editorial in the influential Tokyo monthly *Taiyo*, edited by Professor K. Ukita, an eminent historian and journalist:

"The reason why China has hitherto been unable to trust Japan is because the Chinese could not understand the exact meaning of the principle of preserving the integrity of China advocated by this country. Japan's policy toward China has been very unstable since the first revolution in 1912. It is true that she has occasionally declared to the world her advocacy of the principle of preserving

China's integrity, but her actions have not been in strict accord with her avowals.

"Hitherto Japan's diplomacy in China has been running counter to the canon of *bushido*, the Japanese code of chivalry. It would be a miracle if Sino-Japanese friendship were to result from such a line of diplomacy.

"The best way to establish the desired intimacy between Japan and China is for the Japanese to formulate the guiding principle of their diplomacy toward China, instead of grumbling about the attitude assumed by the Chinese toward them. When once this guiding principle is established, it is most important that it should be adhered to firmly and unflinchingly."

The engagement of Japanese officers in the training of Manchurian troops and the policing of certain parts of Manchuria by Japanese officers, are in principle a wise policy, if only China is farseeing enough to take this view without pressure from outside. The inefficiency and supineness of Chinese troops and police are as proverbial as the venality of their officers. If we could only make China see the situation as she should see it; if we could only persuade her to cast aside her unnecessary pride; incompatible with the sad plight in which she has found herself these fifty years; if we could only awaken her to the urgent necessity of being frank and honest with herself as well as with other nations, she would of her own volition come to see

the wisdom of borrowing Japanese efficiency to infuse vitality into her weakened body politic. But the way to accomplish this end lies not in coercion or the application of force, least of all in the pin-pricking policy so much in evidence in Japan's recent dealings with China. The only right method for Japan would lie in the patient observance of the dictates of justice, sympathy and tolerance. As Mr. Frederick Moore, formerly Peking correspondent of the Associated Press, who is far from being an apologist for Japan, frankly admits, the Manchurian natives, who have enjoyed the benefits of Japanese efficiency, are sincerely appreciative of the new régime ushered in by the latter in Manchuria. If Japan continues to benefit the natives through efficient administrative and economic policy, and, at the same time, refrains from resorting to the policy of coercion such as she has displayed during the past few years, will not China gradually come to listen to Japan's counsels? Says Mr. Moore:

*how far  
he has im-  
itated service  
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"The Chinese are a backward race, wasting their opportunities because of ignorance and the intense selfishness which centuries of most wretched individual struggling for sustenance has engendered. That China would be materially better off under their (Japanese) organization cannot be disputed. Before the Japanese came to Manchuria the people used to raise enough soy beans to support life. If they raised more there was no means of shipping them, and if they made money brigands or officials



robbed them of the surplus. To-day tens of thousands of coolies cross the Gulf of Chihli annually from Shantung Province to help harvest the great bean crops which go by Japanese railroad and steamship lines to Europe and compete there with the products of American cotton seed. It would be so, I have no doubt, with all China, were the Japanese to assume control. The Japanese would profit most, but the Chinese would also greatly benefit. The majority of the people (we have Manchuria as an example) would be glad of the opportunity to make a living where they are on the constant verge of starvation to-day. A coolie is lucky in China to draw a regular wage of three dollars a month; he will even raise a family on that income."

and can!

In view of the deplorable record of Japanese measures in China since the presentation of the twenty-one demands, it is highly refreshing to note the earnest efforts of the new Japanese Cabinet to readjust Chinese policy in the right direction. The unmistakable indication of intention on the part of the present ministry to regain China's good will is seen in the prompt cessation of the negotiations which its predecessor, the Okuma cabinet, had vigorously opened with China over the clash of troops in Manchuria,—the incident already described in the foregoing paragraphs. As I have stated, the Okuma Cabinet demanded the right of policing certain sections in Manchuria as well as the privilege of training Chinese troops in the

same territory by Japanese officers. These demands have been withdrawn by the new Cabinet, and the incident has been happily closed.

In explaining his administrative and foreign policy before the Diet last January, Premier Terauchi emphasized the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with China. Viscount Ichiro Motono, the Foreign Minister, elaborated the Premier's statement and set forth what may be called Japan's "new Chinese policy." He said:

"Why is it that China at times cherishes towards us misgivings and a certain animosity? The chief cause seems to be a tendency to interfere in the internal quarrels of China. Since the overthrow of the Tsing Dynasty and the establishment of the republic, various political parties have been formed in China, and we have in Japan people who are in sympathy with one or another of these parties. These people have a marked propensity to assist the particular party which is in sympathy with their own political or personal views. I believe all these persons are prompted by perfect good-will, but the consequences are deplorable. We have gained nothing but the animosity of our neighbors as well as misunderstanding of our real intentions by other nations.

"The present Cabinet absolutely repudiates these courses. We desire to maintain very cordial relations with China. We desire only the gradual accomplishment of all the reforms which China pro-

poses to make for her future development. We shall spare no pains to come to her assistance, if she desires it. We shall try to let her understand our sincere sentiments, and it is for her to decide whether to trust us or not. We have no intention of favoring one or another of the political parties in China. We desire to keep up relations of cordial amity with China herself, but not with this or that political party. It is essential for us that China should be able to develop in a normal manner in the path of progress. What we fear most is her disintegration as the result of continued internal troubles and disorders. We shall make every effort to the end that China may never find herself in such a position, for it is indispensable that she should maintain her independence and territorial integrity."

Not only is the Terauchi Cabinet striving to win China's confidence but it is equally anxious to restore the trust and good-will of the Powers interested in China. Let us once more quote from Viscount Motono's speech:

"Nobody disputes that Japan occupies a special position in China. But we must not ignore the fact that other powers have vast interests in China, and, in safeguarding our own interests, we must respect carefully those of others, and we must try first of all to move in accord with other powers with whom we have special agreements and try to reconcile our interests with those of other nations. We are firmly convinced that such is the best policy. In

all that concerns the common interest of all nations Japan has no intention of following an egotistic policy in China. She desires most sincerely to work in agreement with the interested powers. The Imperial Government firmly believes that with a little good-will a complete understanding can be reached for the welfare of China as well as to the advantage of all the powers."

It must be frankly admitted that during the tenure of the Okuma Cabinet, Japan's Chinese policy was of a nature to arouse suspicion and misgivings on the part of the Western Powers. With special reference to American interests in China, the new Cabinet seems desirous of establishing a better understanding between Japan and the United States. "I note with great pleasure," said Foreign Minister Motono in the same speech, "the symptoms of real sympathy manifested for some time between the two nations. The Imperial Government will follow with lively interest the development of the economic *rapprochement* between the two countries."

Looking at the situation through the perspective of the eight months following the resignation of Marquis Okuma, there is little room to doubt that the real cause of his retirement was the failure of his Chinese policy, which not only aroused popular discontent but called forth censure from the "elder statesmen." Marquis Yamagata, dean of the elder statesmen, an arch-conservative but a high-minded

patriot, had, with painful apprehension, been watching the growing estrangement of Japan and China, and had come to the conclusion that no one but Field Marshal Deiki Terauchi, then Governor-General of Korea, could save the day. Conceding that the elder statesman is an anachronism and an anomaly, we must nevertheless admit that Marquis Yamagata was in this case actuated by the highest motives. Whether his decision was right we have yet to see.

Heretofore Japan's trouble in handling the Chinese question has been due to the fact that the prime minister and the foreign department enjoyed but inadequate authority over the department of the army. The minister of the army is not a civilian, but an officer. In a Cabinet crisis he is not even obliged to resign with other ministers. The prime minister, in most cases a civilian, is supposed to enjoy controlling power over all the departments, and, indeed, no fundamental policy can be decided upon by any single department without his consent. But in the execution of any fundamental policy there are details which cannot be superintended by the prime minister, and in many cases details are just as important as the fundamental policy.

7. Take the Chinese question. There is no doubt that Japan desires to help China establish a stable government. That is the fundamental policy agreed upon in the councils of the Cabinet, whose members are all civilians except the ministers of the army.

and of the navy. But the army department might be headed by an officer who would at heart be apathetic towards such a policy. Now the prime minister, acting upon the resolution of the Cabinet, would indicate to the army minister the course of action to be followed by him and especially by his subordinates stationed in China. The army minister would apparently agree with the prime minister, but in some cases he would act in a manner that would run counter to the spirit of his professed agreement with the premier. Under these circumstances the civilian premier finds himself in an embarrassing situation, for he is not powerful enough to dictate to the military section of the government. I am inclined to think, though I have no definite information to verify my belief, that some of the demands presented by the Okuma Cabinet to China were essentially the demands of the army department with which the Premier and the Foreign Department had but little sympathy. I also suspect that in some of the troubles that have resulted from the contact of Chinese and Japanese soldiers in China the blame was on the Japanese side; but even when the Japanese troops were to blame the army department at Tokyo would naturally try to justify their action, and oblige the civilian premier and foreign minister to accept the militarist interpretation of the matter.

To me, this has been the weakness of the Japanese government—the inability of the civilian section

to control the military section. The ideal remedy lies, of course, in appointing civilians to the portfolios of the army and of the navy. Indeed, efforts have been made to bring about this change, but they have thus far made but little headway. In the meantime, Japan may, as a measure of expediency, do well to place at the head of the Cabinet a man who is not only able to control the army, but is also broadminded and sympathetic towards China.

The right adjustment of her relations with China is Japan's one great problem. Viewed in that light, Terauchi's assumption of power may do much good, if he will only make up his mind to be just and generous in dealing with China. Japan's policy in China must of necessity be firm, but a firm policy divorced from generosity is worse than a weak policy. If the Terauchi Cabinet shall succeed in reversing Japan's recent course of action in China, and enunciate a new policy calculated to promote friendly relations with the Government and people of China, it will have rendered a great service, not only to the two nations concerned, but to the cause of humanity and civilization.

The favorable effect upon China of the new policy enunciated by the Terauchi Cabinet is already perceptible. During the past two months two special envoys have come to Tokyo from the Chinese Government, both for the purpose of clearing away misunderstandings which have cast a gloom over the relationships of the two nations. One of the envoys

is Lu Sung-yu, former minister to Tokyo and a high official in the Department of Finance; the other is Wang Tah-hsieh, formerly minister to England and to Japan, and later Minister of Education. They have been received with the utmost cordiality by the Japanese Government and people. In appreciation of this manifestation of courtesy on the part of China, Japan is also contemplating the dispatch of a special envoy to Peking. At this writing it is reported from Tokyo that the Terauchi Cabinet has acceded to China's request for the much-needed increase of the customs tariff. These are hopeful signs. Whatever will eventually result from them must needs depend upon the duration of the Terauchi Cabinet. Given a reasonable time, it may succeed in carrying into execution what it has been advocating.

After all has been said in censure of the Chinese policy followed by the Okuma Cabinet, we would not be fair if we did not try to understand the point of view of the stalwart advocates of a "firm" Chinese policy, of whom Japan has many. That point of view may be said to be embodied in the twenty-one demands which I have discussed in earlier paragraphs. However severely we may feel constrained to condemn the manner in which they were pressed upon China, we must at least endeavor to appreciate the motives which prompted the Okuma Cabinet to push them. We must not permit the non-essential details of diplomatic parley which attended those



demands to obscure the cardinal point upon which Japan's policy hinges. That point is her desire to become the dominant factor in the molding of China's destiny. Call it an Asiatic super-Monroe Doctrine, if you will. The name is immaterial. The important thing is that Japan, the only Asiatic nation efficient enough to escape the yoke of European domination, is aspiring to the leadership of other Asiatic nations. To me this is a laudable ambition with which America, whose traditional policy has been to keep Europe at arm's length, must sympathize. Once this point is frankly conceded, even the apparently obnoxious "group five" of the Japanese demands is easily understood.

The ways of the diplomacy of the old school, no matter of what power, are always devious. The world would be better off if there were no such thing as diplomacy. Had there been no Wilhelmstrasse, no Quai d'Orsay, no Downing Street, there would have been no Kasumi-ga-seki at Tokyo. In submitting the twenty-one demands to China in January, 1915, Japan resorted to the usual methods of dickering. The so-called group five was included in the demands unquestionably for the purpose of driving the best bargain. The evidence of this is found in the following instruction which Foreign Minister Baron Kato handed to Mr. Eki Hioki, the Japanese Minister at Peking, on December 3, 1914, i. e., forty-six days before the submission of the demands to the Chinese Government:

"As regards the proposals contained in the fifth group, they are presented as the wishes of the Imperial Government. The matters which are dealt with under this category are entirely different in character from those which are included in the first four groups. An adjustment, at this time, of these matters, some of which have been pending between the two countries, being nevertheless highly desirable for the advancement of the friendly relations between Japan and China as well as for safeguarding their common interests, you are also requested to exercise your best efforts to have our wishes carried out."

Even if group five were not "wishes" but real "demands" I see no cause for excitement, provided, of course, they were presented in a manner acceptable to China. Take, for instance, the proposition concerning the supply of arms. China's urgent need to-day is not an efficient civil administration but an effective system of defense. In the organization of an effective military power the unification of arms is as essential as the training of officers and men. Can we not understand why Japan expressed her wish for the establishment of Chino-Japanese arsenals or the purchase of Japanese arms? Japan believes that China's military organization, if not guided and rehabilitated by her, will eventually be controlled by some European nation by no means congenial to her. Signs of this unhappy tendency were clearly discernible before the outbreak of the European war.

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Again, the employment of foreign advisers is unmistakably one of China's sovereign rights, which under normal conditions does not permit of foreign interference. But when a nation proves so wayward in the management of its own affairs as to jeopardize the welfare and safety of its neighbors, it becomes the right and duty of the neighbors to urge upon that nation such measures as will remove the cause of such embarrassment. Did not the United States play an important part in the secession of Panama from Colombia? Has she not assumed the control of the finances and police power of Haiti when Haiti has become troublesome to her? And are not Americans urging their Government to deal rigorously with Mexico? With the Monroe Doctrine firmly established, and endowed with enormous potential power to back that doctrine, the United States may remain equanimous with regard to Mexico, while Japan, enjoying no such advantage, is compelled to act more promptly in China.

To many Japanese it appears obvious that China, left to her own resources, will eventually become the Turkey of the Far East, if it has not already become such. Students of Near Eastern affairs all know what a hotbed of plots and intrigues the Turkish capital has been in the past half century. Russia, Germany, England, France, Austria, and Italy all played more or less important parts in the great tragi-comedy staged for the alien control of the Ottoman Empire. In their zeal to push their selfish

interests, they disregarded all decency in their diplomacy. They employed women of dubious character, bribed eunuchs, corrupted officials, and spread over the whole country a network of espionage. In this rivalry for the control of the Sublime Porte Germany proved a winner. What is the result? Not only has the Turkish Government become a tool in the hands of Germany, but the Turkish army and navy have been dominated by the Kaiser's officers. The fate of Constantinople is a vivid lesson to China and to Japan.

To Americans, unable to understand Japan's singular position in the Far East, it perhaps makes but little difference whether China is dominated by England, Germany, France, Russia, or Japan. From the Japanese point of view it is different. With the history of European diplomacy in the Near and Far East before them, the Japanese cannot but shudder at thought of the day when China shall be held fast in the grip of Europe. Can America guarantee that no European Power will dominate China if Japan stays away? To-day China employs 1,105 Englishmen as advisers and minor officials, 1,003 Frenchmen, 530 Germans, 463 Russians, and 174 Americans. Japan, whose destiny is so intricately interwoven with that of China, has only 207 officials employed by the Chinese Government.

The substance of the Chino-Japanese agreement of last year is briefly told. Japan agrees to return Kiau-chow to China, provided the Powers will, after

the war, permit Japan to dispose of it in this manner. In eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan, in order to offset the Russian domination of Outer Mongolia, proposes to establish a foothold. In South Manchuria, Japan secured the extension of the lease of Port Arthur and of the concession of the South Manchuria railway. She has also obtained for Japanese subjects the privilege to travel, reside, and engage in agricultural and commercial pursuits in any part of South Manchuria. This will greatly facilitate the industrial development of Manchuria. With all the limitations they had to contend with in the past, the Japanese have already created in Manchuria a vast new industry, the bean industry, benefiting not only the natives of Manchuria but tens of thousands of coolies of Shantung province. Where ten years ago Manchurian farmers barely eked out a living, they are to-day exporting \$40,000,000 worth of beans and bean-cake. This is entirely due to Japanese enterprise. 6 2

One may find an objectionable feature in the provision that the Chinese police regulations and Chinese taxation measures in Manchuria, to be applied to the Japanese must be approved by the Japanese consul. This is a penalty, which a backward nation with no efficient modern law or administration must usually pay.

With regard to Fukien Province, close to the Japanese island of Formosa, China engages not to grant any foreign Power the right to build any ship-

yard, military or naval station. Finally, China promises to safeguard the Japanese investment, amounting to more than \$10,000,000, in the Han-yeh-ping Company, and not to contract for it any foreign loan other than Japanese.

This, then, is the sum total of the new privileges which Japan has secured from China. What Japan was trying to do in China was to prepare herself against any emergency that may at any moment arise in that agitated country. Armageddon in Europe has for the time being stopped the onslaught of the Powers upon China. After the war, however, a sharp international rivalry will be resumed for the control of the country, both politically and commercially. Whichever side may win in the war, I cannot but apprehend that China will be the next field of rivalry among the European Powers.

Discussing America's *post bellum* position among the Powers the *New York Evening Mail* sounds this grim warning:

"America needs her funds and her sons mobilized, organized, prepared for her own defense in the stern days that will follow this war. Those days will find great nations armed to the teeth, insolent in victory, burdened with debt, freed from the moral scruples that used to keep nations true to international obligations, greedy for undeveloped South and Central America, envious of America's fat prosperity. No one who is willing to think can fail to see what is ahead of us."

If so resourceful and opulent a nation as America entertains such misgivings, how much more natural that Japan, that small, impecunious country lying next door to the possible coming storm-center of international rivalry, should feel restive as to her position after the war. Undoubtedly Japan thinks it necessary to entrench herself in China at the moment when such a move seems most effective. In the light of Europe's past dealings with the Orient who can say that she is wrong? Whether Japan has been going about the task in the right way is, as I have already argued, another matter.

## CHAPTER XI

### AMERICA AND JAPAN IN KOREA

Misconception concerning Japanese rule in Korea—Senator Stone's resolution—American-Korean treaty of 1882—Chinese plot in Korea—Korean envoy to America—America tacitly recognizes Chinese suzerainty over Korea—Japan first to recognize Korean independence—Factional feuds in Korea—China eager to annex Korea—Chino-Japanese war—Japanese efforts to reform Korea—The Russian intrigue in Korea—Russo-Japanese war—End of Korean independence—The open door in Korea never closed.

More than ten years have elapsed since the establishment of Japanese rule in Korea, and it seems reasonable to assume that the world has had ample time to understand clearly why Japan had to assume control of the erstwhile Hermit Kingdom. Yet the grievous fact is that the American public is far from having grasped the real meaning of the Korean episode. There are certain classes of critics whose aptitude for misinterpreting Japanese policy on the Asian continent falls little short of genius. Thanks to the diligence of such critics, Japan's real task in Korea has been obscured under the storm of censure and denunciation hurled upon her. Since Japanese diplomacy erred deplorably in the presentation of the recent demands upon China, these critics have redoubled their energy in attempting to discredit Japan. Admitting that Japan has committed many



blunders in her dealings with Korea and China, especially the latter, it must nevertheless be conceded that in Korea she has taken a course which permitted of no alternative—a task that was imposed upon her by the impotency and degeneration of the peninsular kingdom.

Even more mischievous than the efforts of these critics is the injection of the Korean question into the internal politics of this country. When Senator Elihu Root criticised President Wilson's failure to protest against the German ravage of Belgium, Senator Stone, a leading Democrat in the upper house, replied to the challenge of the Republican Senator with a resolution, setting forth the long-forgotten record of Mr. Root's dealings with Korea and Japan, when Korea's existence as an independent state was about to cease. The resolution was, of course, offered for the mere purpose of shielding President Wilson from the scathing attacks of Mr. Root. Did not President Roosevelt and Secretary Root acquiesce in the Japanese domination of Korea? Why blame Mr. Wilson for his failure to protest against the German violation of Belgian neutrality?

In view of these unfortunate and unwarranted exploitations of the Korean question, it seems necessary to put before the public the real nature of the matter—the history of American relations with Korea and of the circumstances which inevitably led to Japanese control of that country.

It is true that the American-Korean Treaty of

May 22, 1882, solemnly declares: "If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling." This provision was, however, virtually nullified as early as 1888—seventeen years before the Roosevelt administration acquiesced in the Japanese absorption of Korea. It is strange that no American authority on diplomacy seems to recognize this important fact. Before blaming Mr. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Senator Stone and his colleagues should have blamed President Harrison and his Secretary of State. The vital question is whether these Presidents and Secretaries of State were really to blame for ignoring the Korean treaty of 1882.

Let us pause for a moment and consider the first article of the Korean-American treaty above quoted. This article provides, as we have seen, that Korea and America are under mutual obligation to protect each other's welfare against the encroachment of other Powers. The absurdity of such an article ought to be obvious, for it is the chimera of chimeras to presume that a decrepit nation like Korea could come to the rescue, should a great nation like the United States be attacked by a third Power. The Hermit Kingdom was as weak and helpless in 1882 as she has been ever since, and one would almost think that it was a bit of American humor which actuated Commodore Schufeldt to put in the fore-

ground of the treaty a provision whose impracticability was a foregone conclusion. As the years rolled on, the hopeless condition of Korea became more and more evident, until the stage was reached wherein she had to be subject to the rule of either Russia or Japan. It is obvious that when a nation is so utterly destitute of the qualities necessary for the maintenance of its independence, reams of treaties and conventions are of little avail in propping up the decaying state. The question as to whether Korea should remain an independent nation was a question which had to be considered not from a legal, but from a political point of view.

To say that the United States had from the beginning no intention to adhere to the spirit of that treaty would be to charge her with insincerity, and I, for one, prefer to think that the course of events that followed the conclusion of that treaty revealed to her the hopelessness of Korea's case, necessitating a radical alteration of her policy towards the Hermit Kingdom. It was the same state of things which forced Japan to abandon her first avowal of a purpose to uphold the independence of Korea. However that may be, here we are chiefly concerned with the fact that the recognition by America of the independence of Korea was virtually repealed in 1888, when China, acting upon the pretension that the peninsular county was one of her vassal states, caused the recall of the Korean minister at Washington, against which America launched no protest.

In 1883 Prince Min Yong-ik, the nephew of the Queen, accompanied by a number of progressive young Koreans, proceeded to Washington to ratify the treaty of 1882. Min had been recognized as one of the leaders of the faction which stood for reform and progress, but upon his return home from America in 1884 he cast his lot, for what reason is not known, with the reactionary or Chinese faction, and in consequence was severely wounded by an assassin belonging to the radical party. Three years after the ratification of the treaty Korea decided to install a legation at Washington. At this time China exercised paramount influence over Korea. Li Hung-chang, one of the shrewdest diplomats China has ever produced, had sent his ablest lieutenant, Yuan Shi-kai (later President of China), to Korea with the secret instruction that he should endeavor by all means to vindicate China's claim for suzerainty over Korea. When, therefore, Yuan learned of Korea's plan to despatch a minister to America he lost no time in launching a vigorous protest against the arrangement, asserting that as a vassal state of China Korea had no right to send her political representative to any foreign country. The Chinese diplomat employed all sorts of tactics from persuasion to threat in the effort to prevent the departure of the Korean minister. But the Seoul court, heartened by American backing, would not yield, and let the minister leave Seoul on his journey to America before Yuan detected the plan.

1886

On the eve of his departure Yuan knew, to his great chagrin, that he was outwitted, and hurried his lieutenant down to Chemulpo whence the mission was to sail on the American naval vessel *Omaha*. He threatened that, unless the mission was forthwith ordered back to Seoul, he would return to China, intimating thereby that a calamity would befall Korea. But in reality Yuan had no intention of adopting drastic measures, for he feared that such a course might embroil China in trouble with the United States. The American government despatched the *Omaha* to escort the mission as far as the Japanese port of Nagasaki, and, what was still more important, an American citizen was to accompany the party in the capacity of adviser.

At the last moment Yuan receded, and allowed the Korean minister to start, though he imposed upon him the following conditions: That the Korean minister, upon his arrival in Washington, should first of all pay a call upon the Chinese minister, who would present him to the President; that in public functions participated in by the diplomatic corps the Korean minister should never precede his Chinese colleague; that on all important matters pertaining to the Korean Legation the Chinese minister should first of all be consulted. Accepting these conditions the Korean minister boarded the *Omaha*.

The picturesque party burst upon Washington in January, 1888. The Chinese minister there had already announced that he would introduce the

Korean minister as vassal envoy, and insisted upon carrying out this announcement. But Dr. Horace N. Allen, American adviser to the Korean minister, declined to accept such humiliating treatment, and insisted that the presentation of the Korean representative required no introduction from the Chinese Legation. At this juncture the American government showed no desire to exercise its influence in favor of the Korean envoy, and told him that the matter was one that had to be settled between the Chinese and Korean ministers. After much argument and counter argument Dr. Allen succeeded in presenting the Korean minister without Chinese mediation, although he felt constrained to tender his resignation as advisor to the Korean Legation, assuming all the responsibility for the course pursued. His resignation, however, was not to exonerate the Korean minister, much less did it solve the question of whether the representative of the Korean ruler should at a foreign capital be treated as an envoy from an independent nation. The Chinese government, seeing an affront to its dignity in the manner in which the matter was settled in Washington, demanded explanation of the Seoul court for the conduct of the Korean minister. Not satisfied with the apologies offered, China further demanded that the minister be recalled and punished for having slighted the legation of the suzerain State. The unhappy minister was ordered home to be disgraced in order to "save the face" of the Chinese,

and the Korean Legation at Washington, though allowed to remain there, became less than nominal.

The inevitable inference from this episode is that America was far from whole-hearted in upholding Korean independence, and when she acquiesced in the high-handed measure which China adopted in recalling and humiliating the first Korean minister to Washington, she virtually recognized China's suzerain power over Korea, thus converting into a dead letter the first article of the treaty of 1882. The American Government had perceived, seventeen years before the Roosevelt administration did, that no high-sounding proclamations and solemn covenants could maintain the independence of a nation, which had neither determination nor ability to uphold itself. The withdrawal of the American Legation from Seoul in 1905 was merely an epilogue to the drama written as early as 1888.

I have described America's diplomatic relations with Korea. More important is the part played by Japan.

Of all the nations Japan was the first to recognize the independence of Korea. In the seventies of the past century Japan sent an envoy to Korea only to meet a rude rebuff at her portal. Not only did Korea refuse to enter into friendly relations with Japan, but she fired upon a Japanese vessel which was peacefully at anchor off Chemulpo. Following this outrage Japan succeeded in 1876 in wresting from Korea a treaty of commerce and amity, the

first covenant ever entered into by Korea with any foreign nation.

The greatest significance of this treaty lies in the fact that it dealt with Korea as an independent State, thus ignoring the suzerainty China claimed to possess over that country.

The conclusion of this treaty naturally placed a heavy responsibility upon Japan's shoulders, for her adherence to the letter and spirit of the treaty must necessarily stir the ire of China, which was then universally regarded as immensely more powerful than Japan. Having herself emerged from tremendous political upheaval only several years before, Japan was far from prepared to run single-handed the gauntlet of such a powerful enemy. Following Japan's lead, several Western Powers likewise concluded similar treaties with Korea, but their advocacy of Korean independence was only half-hearted, for did not these Western Powers accept without protest the note from the Seoul court, stating that these treaties would make no change in the status of Korea as a vassal State of China? Not only this, but England and Russia practically departed from the spirit of their treaties with Korea, when on the occasion of the Russian occupation of the Korean island of Chee-wen (Port Hamilton) in 1885, these Powers negotiated not with Korea, the rightful owner of the island, but with China. Even the United States, which had the privilege of receiving the first envoy Korea ever sent to the West,



made no efforts to prevent China from recalling and punishing the minister.

Alone and unaided, Japan boldly undertook to uphold the independence of Korea in the face of an enemy, which had brought pressure to bear upon the Seoul court like an incubus. It soon became evident, however, that the peninsular people were decrepit beyond the point of renovation. Following upon the heels of the treaty of 1876, a spirit of reform in the internal affairs of Korea flushed the sky with a light of hope, which seemed to foretell the approach of sunshine after an arctic winter. A Japanese officer was invited to reform the degenerate army of Korea, and a few progressive Koreans were admitted into the government.

Apparently Korea was committed to the cause of progress. But it soon transpired that these progressive statesmen were merely dupes of a designing clique, which had made a feint of espousing a reform policy simply as the means of ousting from power the opposing clique, led by the arch-chauvinist and conservative Prince Tai-wun. Only a spark was needed to kindle a fierce factional feud. That spark was found in the military riot of 1882, caused by the shameless peculation of a few officers, who lined their pockets at the expense of their soldiers. At the instigation of Prince Tai-wun, the rebels forced their way to the palace, intent upon murdering all those who were in power, not excluding even the queen, the avowed antagonist of the conservative

prince. With the utmost inconsistency the insurgents also murdered the Japanese officer entrusted with the reformation of the Korean army, burned the Japanese Legation, and forced the Mikado's minister, with his staff and his countrymen, to beat a retreat to Chemulpo. This unfortunate riot resulted in an <sup>damage</sup> agreement by which Korea was to pay Japan an <sup>indemnity</sup> 10,000 Yen indemnity of 550,000 yen; but when she paid its <sup>anyway</sup> first installment of 150,000 yen, Japan magnanimously relinquished her claim to the remainder of the indemnity. In this matter Japan was actuated by her sympathy with the depleted condition of the Korean treasury as much as by the less altruistic desire of instilling in the Korean mind a friendly sentiment towards her. Some twenty-five years later, the same motives actuated the United States to relinquish in favor of China her claim to the greater portion of the Boxer indemnity. <sup>Amul!</sup>

Again the hope of Korea's regeneration was held out only to fade away like the flash of a meteor. A coterie of progressive Koreans, who returned from Japan imbued with progressive ideas, organized themselves into what was known as the Independence Party, whose object was to consolidate Korean independence by adopting progressive measures. The king himself seemed well disposed to heed the advice of these reformers, and endorsed the invitation of two Japanese as advisors to the court. Acting upon her avowed policy, Japan backed the Independence Party and all the movements calculated

to further the cause of progress. At the same time, however, Japan was careful to impress these progressives with the danger of "forcing the pace," for she was well aware that a State like Korea could not be suddenly aroused from the torpor of centuries. But the inexperienced radicals, to whom the regeneration of their country seemed a case of "now or never," were too impatient to refrain from rash measures, while the conservative clique was employing all its resources in its attempt to expel the radical element from the administration. At this juncture, China threw her influence on the conservative side of the scale, and the unsuccessful *coup*, resorted to by the indiscreet radicals, left the government in the hands of the reactionaries. Again the Japanese Legation was reduced to ashes, and a number of Japanese officers and residents were murdered.

The decade following this ruinous upheaval witnessed a continuous encroachment by China upon Korean administration, and the gradual elimination of Japanese influence from the peninsula. All this while, however, Japan protested time and again against China. China was thoroughly entrenched in the Hermit Kingdom, and just as thoroughly was Japan determined to uphold the independence of the helpless nation. The crash between the two Powers was only a matter of time. By 1894 the little islanders of Nippon were thoroughly prepared to settle the matter by war. Having perceived that the

internal administration of Korea had been going from bad to worse, Japan, in that year, proposed to China that the two Powers coöperate in executing reforms to maintain the integrity of the peninsular kingdom. This proposition China met with a flat refusal. The result was the war of 1894-1895, in the wake of which Korea was left in Japan's hands. But even the shock of the great war that swept through their own country proved powerless to awaken the dull people of the peninsula. Unheeding Japan's advice to rehabilitate their internal affairs along new lines, they did nothing but quarrel among themselves, or at best, play at all manner of silly pastimes.

Soon after the war Japan sent to Korea one of her ablest statesmen in the person of Count Inouye, with the instruction to urge upon Korea a programme of reform. To facilitate the execution of this programme, Japan loaned Korea \$1,500,000. But all the sane advice offered by Japan fell upon deaf ears, and the Koreans went on repeating the old story of plots and counter-plots among themselves. This unfortunate state of things was largely responsible for the assassination of the queen on October 8, 1895, although the Japanese Government itself could not avoid the responsibility in so far as it failed to foresee that the appointment to the post of minister of Korea of an indiscreet, unscrupulous man might entail an embarrassing situation.

The political situation in Korea, already disturbed

by the continuous factional feuds and the consequent assassination of the queen, became worse confounded by the appearance of Russia on the scene with all her sinister designs, aimed at the disintegration of Korea. The indolent, unpatriotic people, weary of Japan's insistence upon reform, readily handed themselves over to Russia, which would have none of reform and progress in the peninsula, but would let things go along the old way, knowing that this would admirably serve her purpose.

Thus the curtain rose on a new scene in February, 1896, when the weak-minded king practically removed his court to the Russian Legation, and immediately ordered the murder of all the ministers known to be friendly towards Japan. Thenceforth Russian activities in Korea became more and more ominous, and seemed to lead the peninsular nation into the final stage of disintegration. As it became more and more evident that the Russian absorption of Korea was merely a matter of time, Japan became restive and made another effort to stay Russian encroachment. The result was the agreement of April 25, 1898, which contained the following article:

"The Imperial governments of Russia and Japan recognize definitely the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and pledge themselves mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country."

But all these pledges and agreements were of no

use, for Russia's ultimate plan was to add Korea to her own map. The matter could be discussed only in the language of shot and shell, if Japan was to convince the great White Czar of the unjustifiability of his pretensions. The war that ensued was the final act in the great drama of the Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea; and the public must be sadly deficient in political insight if it does not perceive that the war and the consequent establishment of a Japanese protectorate over Korea was forced upon the Mikado's Empire by the necessity of safeguarding her vital interests, indeed her very existence.

The war left Japan in a position to act in Korea *ad libitum*. But before assuming the direct control of Korean administration, Japan exhausted all her good efforts in her attempt to maintain Korea's independence. Thus, in February, 1904, when the Russians in Manchuria were retreating before the onslaught of the Japanese, Japan concluded a protocol with Korea, in which the Seoul court promised to adopt the advice of the Tokio government "in regard to improvements in administration," while the Mikado's government pledged itself "to ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea," and to "guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Korea." The Tokyo administration spared no pains in urging upon the Korean ruler the necessity of administering the government in accord with modern principles. But the venality and supineness of the Korean officials had become

such that any amount of good advice proved of no avail. Far from sincere in coöperating with the Japanese in carrying out administrative reforms, they hindered them at every point by resorting to plots and intrigues, in which they were past masters. Instead of endeavoring to improve the conditions of their own country, they foolishly conspired to subvert the new order of things by invoking the assistance of a third power. It was, therefore, inevitable that in November, 1905, Japan should assume the control of the foreign affairs of Korea, sending Prince Ito to Seoul as resident-general, who was invested with the power to direct all matters relating to the external relation of the country.

This episode, however, made no change in the internal affairs of the country. The Korean emperor and officials still enjoyed initiative power, and were at liberty to adopt or reject Japan's advice as they pleased. And thus the Japanese were repeating the same experience, the uselessness of which had been indisputably proved during the thirty years that preceded. But at last Japan's patience was exhausted, when, in the spring of 1907, the Korean emperor again sent his emissaries abroad, this time to the Hague Conference, hoping to embroil Japan in international complications over the disposition of the Korean question.

And thus the curtain went up on the last act of the Korean drama, when in July, 1907, Japan, de-

spairing because of the treacherousness, impotency and indolence of the Korean ruler and officials, wrested from them an agreement conceding to her the control of internal affairs of the peninsula. In the meantime the emperor, knowing that his game was lost, abdicated on July 18, 1907.

This episode virtually ended the Korean tragedy—a tragedy which might never have been enacted had Korea heeded Japan's advice thirty years before. In speaking of the American occupation of the Philippines, Mr. Roosevelt once said: "The inevitable march of events gave us the control of the Philippine Islands at a times so opportune that it may without irreverence be called providential." The same may be said with regard to the Japanese control of Korea. It was "the inevitable march of events" which drifted Japan into the haven where she now finds herself. And again with Mr. Roosevelt the Japanese would say that "unless we show ourselves weak, unless we show ourselves degenerate sons of the sires from whose loins we sprang, we must go on with the work we have undertaken." Furthermore, the Japanese control of Korea seems far more justifiable than the American occupation of the Philippines, inasmuch as Japan's interests in Korea, political and economic, were immensely more vital than were those of the United States in the Philippine Islands. To the Mikado's Empire, the sacrifice of these interests and the abandonment of Korea to a third Power, bent upon territorial



aggrandizement, seemed to spell a menace to her own existence.

So much for Japan's diplomatic dealings with Korea. Now the question is whether the Japanese control of the peninsula has been prejudicial to foreign, and especially American, interest.

It is trite to say that the "open door" of Korea has never been closed. Japan has never adopted any measure inimical to foreign interests in the peninsula. It is, of course, not given to Japan to sacrifice her own interest in order to promote that of other nations, but her methods in competing with Western nations have always been and will ever be legitimate. Japanese capital may seek to buy up American enterprises in Korea, as it indeed has done in the case of the Seoul electric trolley lines, but that would simply be a case of give-and-take, and if the terms offered are not acceptable the Americans are under no obligation to sell. Ask Messrs. Collbran and Bostwick whether they sold the trolley lines in Seoul under agreeable circumstances and on satisfactory conditions, and they will not hesitate to answer in the affirmative. Inquire also whether there is any occasion for apprehension as to the future of the American mining concern in Korea, and you will readily discover that not a fleeting shadow is cast over their bright prospect. The metals produced are purchased by the Japanese almost on the spot, thus doing away with the trouble of shipping them to distant countries, and

the mine owners all bear testimony to the satisfactory state of their transactions with the Japanese buyers.

As for America's export trade with Korea, I have already proved that it has increased by leaps and bounds since the inauguration of the Japanese régime. He talks through his hat who complains about the closing of the Korean doors against America. It is time that the American advocates of the "open door" in the Far East should pause and think whether their cause will be served by indulging in sentimentalities and platitudes, not unmingled with insinuations and allegations, at the expense of Japan's reputation.

## CHAPTER XII

### JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES

Japanese intercourse with the Philippines three centuries ago—Toyotomi's ambition to conquer the islands—Japan closes doors after Toyotomi's death—Japan's present attitude toward the Philippines—Filipino attitude towards Japan—Japanese control of the Philippines impracticable—The islands not suited to Japanese colonization—Two conditions under which Japan may take the Philippines—Why Japan did not object to the American occupation of the islands—What Japan wants on the islands—American occupation beneficial to Japan.

Three centuries ago Japan came pretty near attacking the Philippines. But for the sudden demise of Toyotomi-Hideyoshi, the hero who conceived a gigantic scheme of conquest, the flag of Nippon might have been planted in the islands.

The story of the abortive expedition to the Philippines broached by Japan's empire builder of three centuries ago, betrays, in a most striking manner, the natural aspiration of the islanders to explore the lands and seas to the southward. In the middle of the sixteenth century they began to venture forth into the yet unknown world, seeking riches in the islands that lay off the coast of China. Stimulated by the expansion policy of Toyotomi the seafaring spirit of the islanders soon blossomed into daring enterprise. No less than three hundred vessels, all

very small and none exceeding three or four hundred tons, braved the rough seas and frequented the coasts of Tonking, Annam, Siam, Borneo and Java. One undaunted soul, Hasekura-Rokuyemon by name, even crossed the Pacific to Mexico in a small ship on his way to the Pontiff at Rome. Another sailed to Siam and quelled the insurrection which had been disturbing the country. In appreciation of this service the King of Siam betrothed one of his princesses to the Japanese hero. "Little Japans" sprang up at various points visited by the Japanese rovers of the sea, many of whom were undoubtedly piratically inclined rather than engaged in legitimate trade.

It was in this period full of venturesome spirits that Toyotomi-Hideyoshi conceived a fantastic scheme. He saw the vision of a vast empire of which no other place than Peking was to be the Mikado's capital. As for himself he would set up a government at Ningpo in South China whence he would sway not only the southeastern section of the Asian continent, but the Philippines, Borneo and Java. In his letter to the Viceroy of Goa, Portuguese India, dated October 19, 1591, Toyotomi even intimated his intention to carry an expedition into India. About a month later he sent an envoy to Manila and bluntly told the Spanish Viceroy there to surrender at once, unless he preferred the humiliation of capitulating at the point of the Japanese sword. The Viceroy was highly indignant at the affront, but considering the complications then existing

between Holland and Spain, wrote a courteous but noncommittal reply. Soon after this incident Catholic missionaries were sent to Japan from the Philippines. They found the Japanese favorably disposed toward the new religion. In the course of a few years they succeeded in converting no less than eight thousand souls. In the meantime correspondence was kept up between Toyotomi and the Viceroy of the Philippines, without, however, arriving at any agreement as to the proposition upon which Toyotomi insisted from the first.

At this moment a peculiar incident occurred in Southern Japan. A Spanish vessel called the *San Philippo* was wrecked off the coast of Tosa Province. Her pilot, who survived the disaster, boastingly told the emissary sent by Toyotomi that the secret of Spain's territorial expansion lay in the skillful employment of religion and missionaries as fore-runners of *conquistadores*. Toyotomi, who had never suspected the ulterior motives of the missionaries from the Philippines, was greatly surprised by the confession of the indiscreet sailor, and immediately ordered their execution. This undoubtedly made Toyotomi all the more anxious to subjugate the Philippines; but his dream of empire was destined to be carried with him into his grave, for he died suddenly in the fall of 1598.

It was thus that Japan first came in contact with the Philippines. Had not Toyotomi's successors adopted a drastic policy of exclusion in order to keep

out the designing missionaries who were said to be the van of Spanish conquerors, Japan might long since have become the mistress of the Southeastern Pacific. But the Tokugawa Shogunate, which succeeded Toyotomi as military magistrate of Japan, not only excluded foreigners from Japan but prohibited the Japanese from going abroad. To make isolation complete it put an injunction upon the building of seagoing vessels. With the cessation of her overseas activities Japan's progress was arrested. When she was awakened half a century ago by the impact of foreign cannon balls she found herself lagging hopelessly behind the Western nations in navigation and other useful arts and sciences.

In the fifty years that followed Japan has striven might and main to catch up with the advanced nations of the West. With the acquisition of modern arts of war and peace she is taking up the enterprise which her sons dropped three centuries ago.

With these historical antecedents before us is it any wonder that the Japanese are to-day crying for southward advance? We can fully understand and appreciate even such bold advocates of southward expansion as Mr. Yosaburo Takakoshi, though we deprecate his jingoistic utterances, which are liable to defeat the very purpose which he wishes to attain.

It is not necessary that Japan should, in order to extend her influence and interest in the south, absorb the islands now under the American, Dutch or French flags. Confining our discussion to the Philip-

pires, it must be emphasized that Japan does not covet the territory. She would of course take it if she could get it for a song. It is absurd to tell Americans that Japan would not take the Philippines even for a gift. She would be glad to accept them, if America, with the unreserved consent of the Filipinos, were to hand them over without regret or reluctance. But the Japanese know the Philippine situation too well to fancy even for a moment that the islands can be had for the asking. They know that an attempt to acquire the territory will cause endless trouble and countless expenditure, for the Filipinos, who have been opposing American rule, will more strenuously oppose Japanese rule. Certainly the Japanese are not foolish enough to think that such a game is worth the candle.

There is something naïve about the hackneyed assertion that the Japanese, being an Asiatic race, would be more successful than any Caucasian people in ruling the Philippines. This is the argument advanced by well-meaning Americans advocating the transfer of the Philippines to Japan. Even the American residents in the islands, or at any rate many of them, are openly voicing the same sentiment. This futile, if sincere, argument is due to their disregard of the peculiar psychology of the backward peoples of the Orient. These peoples, having been accustomed to Western domination for so long, look up to Occidental peoples as their superiors, while they look down upon the Japanese

as upstarts and imitators of the Occidental. This is the attitude particularly of the Filipinos.

The Filipinos cherish the belief that they are superior to the Japanese. They are proud of the fact that they have enjoyed the influence of Western civilization for four centuries, while it is only fifty years since Japan has come under the same influence. They use the Spanish language derived from Latin, the language to which the world has paid homage. Their customs and manners have been influenced by Christianity, and they think that their ideas and sentiments are more similar to those of the Occidentals than to those of the Japanese.

In view of the unwillingness of the Filipinos to remain even under the American yoke in spite of all the generosity which the Americans have showered upon them, it is difficult to see why they should even so much as consider accepting the rule of an Asiatic race which they regard with mingled suspicion and contempt. The United States has been expending thirty million dollars a year in the Philippines. Certainly Japan can never be so liberal.

Turn from the material benefits to the political freedom conferred upon the Filipinos by American rule, and you will be convinced that they have not the slightest reason to welcome Japanese colonial administration, which is, like that of most European Powers, decidedly different from the colonial policy of the United States. The American Government has inaugurated in the Philippines a congress com-



posed of representatives elected by the people. In this legislative body not an American is represented. The Filipinos have a quasi-cabinet as well as a senate. Most of the important posts in the central government are occupied by the natives, while the local functionaries are all natives. American officials are returning home in increasing numbers. Two thousand American teachers, who went to the islands in the early stage of American administration there, have been gradually returning to America, and to-day in most schools even the teaching of English is done by natives. In the primary schools the pupils are taught to sing the patriotic songs such as "My Native Land, the Philippines, the Philippines!" Such freedom will not be allowed under Japanese rule. It would be the height of folly on the part of the Filipinos to cast off American protection in order to accept Japanese domination.

*China* But suppose, for argument's sake, that Japan was anxious to annex the territory. What can she do with it? She cannot colonize it to any appreciable extent, for the climate there is against the Japanese. If Japan is anxious to obtain a colony it is mainly because she must relieve the congestion of population in her own territory. What good would it do to Japan to acquire, at a great sacrifice of blood and treasure, a territory where her people cannot thrive? That the tropical climate of the Philippines does not afford wholesome and com-

fortable abode to the Japanese is obvious from the fact that they cannot cope successfully even with the climate of Formosa which is much milder than that of the Philippines. Cold calculation convinces us that it would be far more profitable for the Japanese not to tamper with the territorial autonomy of the Philippines, but to confine their activities there to the exploitation of resources and the development of trade, with the coöperation of the natives.

There is another factor which militates against Japanese settlement in the Philippines—I refer to the presence of large numbers of laborers, Chinese and native, whose wages are lower than those demanded by Japanese laborers. In spite of the application of the Chinese exclusion law, there are already some 50,000 Chinese in the islands. When the exclusion law is removed, with the withdrawal of American suzerainty, the Chinese will pour into the country in increasingly large numbers. This is a condition which the Japanese cannot afford to lose sight of, if they wish to find in the territory an outlet for the surplus population of their own country. *Em.*

Had climatic and other conditions in the Philippines been congenial to Japanese immigration there would have already been a considerable number of Japanese there, because no restrictive law has been applied to Japanese immigration. The fact is that, in spite of the favorable attitude always maintained by the Americans in the islands towards Japanese

laborers, the Japanese population there scarcely exceeds two thousand.

The idea of converting the territory into an integral part of the Japanese Empire, therefore, seems highly impractical. But if Japan were ever to acquire the Philippines, the acquisition would be made only under one of two conditions. First, she would not decline to become the mistress of the country if the Filipinos would willingly place themselves under the rule of the Mikado. Business sense forbids Japan to fight for the absorption of the islands at any considerable cost of blood and money. Secondly, Japan might be compelled to annex the country, even against her will, if its internal conditions, after the withdrawal of American authority, were such as to invite the aggression of ambitious European Powers.

The second point is the more vital and must be driven home to the reader. After her bitter experience in China and Korea where she had to confront on the field of battle two mighty military Powers of Europe, one after the other, Japan will not permit any third Power to encroach upon the territorial rights of the Philippines, after the benevolent government of the United States there has become a thing of the past. Even the American suzerainty, with all its indisputable altruism and its unmistakably well-meaning policy, was not entirely welcome to the Japanese who saw an imperialistic tendency in the westward expansion of

American territory. Japan did not raise a voice against the American occupation of the Philippines only because the overwhelming majority of the Mikado's subjects had been convinced that America was their best friend, and harbored no sinister designs either upon the Philippines or upon Japan. Their knowledge that the establishment of American rule in the Far East was incompatible with the cardinal principles of the Monroe Doctrine, did not prevent them from according hearty approval to the American advent in the Philippines. Indeed their welcome of American administration was so wholehearted that Prince Ito proffered his good offices to the Government at Washington, saying that he would be pleased to go over to the Philippines and persuade Aguinaldo, leader of the insurgent natives, to quit the vain struggle and accept with good grace the new rule which promised to be liberal and benevolent. Had America's relations with Japan in 1898 been as unhappy as they have been during the past few years a different story might have been written, for under such circumstances Japan would not have permitted American domination of the Philippines to pass unchallenged.

What Japan really wants in the Philippines is not territorial rights but economic privileges such as have been enjoyed by her equally with all nations. If the Japanese were ever to become an important factor in the economic life of the islands, it would not be as laborers but as *entrepreneurs* aiding in the

exploitation of the natural resources of the territory, with the assistance of the cheap labor which can readily be secured in the islands. As I write I learn from the newspapers of Manila that a Japanese concern has recently purchased an extensive sugar plantation at Manila for \$1,020,000. It is also reported that Japanese interests are negotiating for sugar lands in Negros and for hemp lands in Mindanao. This is quite plausible and in perfect harmony with the natural desire of the Japanese.

In the advent of Japanese enterprise in their country, the Filipinos need see no alarming signs. Once they are convinced of Japan's peaceable intentions they will, I trust, welcome Japanese capital and undertakings. It would be to the mutual advantage of both peoples that the pluck, industry and enterprise characteristic of the Japanese should be infused into the economic fiber of the islands. Suspicion is the curse of progress and of amicable relations between nations. It is unfortunate that the world has become so suspicious of Japan that every move she makes nowadays is viewed in distorted lights. That Japan obliterated Korean autonomy and set up a sphere of influence in Manchuria is no argument that she will do the same in the Philippines. Such a conclusion can be reached only in complete disregard of historical background. Only because her hand was forced by the ruthless aggression of European Powers has Japan absorbed Korea and become a dominant political factor in Manchuria.

When a well-meaning Senator at Washington suggested on the floor of the Senate that the Philippines be transferred to the sun flag of the Mikado, the Japanese could not but smile. The suggestion is a curious paradox being, on the one hand, highly sentimental, and, on the other, highly materialistic, presuming that the dollar can accomplish everything. To say, as does many an American editor, that Japan may take this suggestion seriously is an outrage upon the intelligence of the Japanese. Even a child knows that America has no right to sell the Philippines to any foreign Power, and that the Filipinos would fight such an ignominious deal to a finish. Both the Americans and the Filipinos may rest assured that Japan will never be so foolish as to believe that the Philippines may one fine morning drop into her lap with no effort on her part.

It is obvious, as I have pointed out, that the occupation of the Philippines by America is inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine, which presupposes that the United States should take no hand in the political affairs of other continents, as she insists upon excluding foreign political influence from her own hemisphere. Yet Japan is ready to admit that international affairs cannot always be adjusted in perfect accord with any fixed doctrine or theory. From a purely selfish or commercial point of view the Japanese are well aware that the continued American occupation of the Philippines, at least for some time to come, will be beneficial to them,

since it will usher in better sanitary conditions, advanced means of communication and an up-to-date school system, all tending towards the stimulation of Japanese enterprise and trade in the islands.

After all has been said and done we must not forget that the peoples of the Far East stand upon common ground. In the years to come they must by mutual coöperation establish and enforce something like a Monroe Doctrine for their own world. To consume themselves in petty suspicion and disgraceful quarrel is to toll their own knell. This sentiment on their part no nation can understand and appreciate better than does the United States, whose policy in the Americas has been to keep the Powers of Europe at arm's length.

## CHAPTER XIII

### JAPANESE "DESIGNS" UPON MEXICO

Sensational reports about the Japanese in Mexico—Statistics of the Japanese—Viscount Yenomoto's project—His dream of El Dorado rudely dispelled—A thriving Japanese colony in Chiapas—Those "200,000 Japanese troops" in Mexico—Racial kinship between the Japanese and the Mexicans—Guglielmo Ferrero's views—Japanese in the Mexican army—Mexicans more friendly to the Japs than to the Gringos—The "big interests" in Mexico—The German propaganda—The Japanese designs upon Magdalena Bay—The truth about the Magdalena Bay scare—Why Charles M. Schwab failed in China—A case of tit for tat—Why the Mikado refused to receive Felix Diaz, Huerta's special envoy—The Japanese in South America—German plot to unite Mexico and Japan—Secretary Lansing's denial disappointing.

As a rule man is endowed with five senses: no more, no less. But now and then whims of Nature create human beings—and journalists—whose senses number more than five. These creatures seem to possess that sixth sense, known in the case of carrier pigeons as *orientation*.

The word seems to be especially applicable just now to those agitated American people and far-sighted newspaper men who see things across the Mexican border which are invisible to ordinary observers. They are blessed with the extraordinary faculty which might be designated as the telescopic



eye. These people, for instance, see 200,000 trained Japanese soldiers in Mexico when the total Japanese population in the country of the Montezumas—men, women and children—does not exceed 2,000. They see a Japanese dreadnought purposely beached on Tiburon Island notwithstanding the fact, emphatically attested by Admiral Winslow, that there is nowhere in Mexican waters even the shadow of a Japanese warship. They see a Japanese naval base on Turtle Bay, guarded by a formidable fleet, in the case of the lone *Asama*, aground on a reef, and endeavoring to get afloat with the assistance of another ship or two. They see the hand of Japan guiding that of Carranza in writing protests against the "punitive expeditions" of the American army. They see a fleet of Japanese merchantmen bringing arms and ammunition to the *de facto* Government of Mexico from the Mikado's arsenals at a time when all the materials of war which Japan can possibly spare are being shipped to Russia and her allies. They see a Japanese firing at American sailors on board the *Annapolis* at Mazatlan, in apparent ignorance of the fact that it was the Mexican mob which went crazy and fired the first shots.

These are only a few of the wonderful things which, of all men, the American endowed with the sixth sense is privileged to see. Shall we envy him his privilege, or shall we pity him for having to sit up nights because of the evil specters created by his extraordinary faculty? We think we can understand

what the editor of the *Chicago Tribune* meant the other day when he said: "The next great war will be between the two great *yellow* races—the Japanese and the American."

But this is not the place for humor. In deference to the solemn mood of the far-sighted, if for no other reason, we must not jest when talking about the Japanese in Mexico.

To be earnest, then, what are the real facts about the Japanese in Mexico? According to the investigation of the Japanese legation at Mexico City, there are at this writing in the Mexican Republic some 2,000 Japanese, of whom about 300 are women and children. Of 1,700 male adults the majority, say about 800, are mining laborers; 400 are farmers and farm laborers; 200 are domestic servants, and the remaining 300 include storekeepers, physicians, carpenters, tailors, fishermen and miscellaneous laborers. Of the leading cities where the Japanese population numbers more than a hundred, Mexico City claims 300, Coatzacoalcos, Chihuahua, Guadaluajara and Jaurez 100 each. The miners are employed mostly in the copper and silver mines of Chihuahua and Coahuila.

The most prosperous Japanese community in Mexico is found in Sokonusko County, in the State of Chiapas. This county has an area of 364 square miles, and is inhabited by 60,000 people. Of this population 2,500 are of foreign origin or descent—1,800 Guatemalans, 410 Chinese, 90 Germans, 75

Spaniards, 100 Japanese and a handful of Americans, Englishmen and Frenchmen.

The genesis of this thriving Japanese community in Chiapas, if so small a population as 100 may be said to constitute a community, may be traced to the unsuccessful attempt of a Japanese statesman, the late Viscount Buyo Yenomoto, to establish an extensive colony in Chiapas about twenty years ago. The Viscount, one time Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, was persuaded by Mexican promoters to take 150,000 acres of government land in Chiapas with a view to converting it into a coffee plantation. The price was very low, and the terms were liberal. Yenomoto, then a private citizen, was tempted to try his hand in the new venture. To a man accustomed to prohibitory prices of land in his own country, the Mexican project must have seemed a veritable El Dorado. In 1897, he sent the first contingent of 32 settlers to the Chiapas settlement. But it did not take long to discover that the land was far from flowing with milk and honey. The expenditure which the venture called for proved more than Yenomoto could endure, and the vast tract, for which he had paid but the first installment or two, was abandoned after a brief experiment. With the land reverting to the Mexican Government the 32 colonists, most of them destitute, dispersed to different parts of Southern Mexico.

Thus ended Yenomoto's dream. From the ashes of the doomed experiment, however, rose a new

colony destined to become prosperous beyond all expectations of the first founder. A few enterprising members of the original colony saw a chance to open small shops in Escutitla. Fortune soon smiled upon them and the modest stores grew steadily until to-day they have become a predominating economic factor in Chiapas.

The foremost figure in the Japanese community in Chiapas is one S. Terui, head of the Japanese Mexican Coöperative Society, which owns large grain and stock farms, an extensive plantation, as well as a large acreage of wild land. Its trading department, with headquarters at Escutitla, operates a string of stores in various towns and villages. These stores supply the surrounding country with provisions, dry goods, hardware, agricultural implements, and what not. Next to this company the Kobashi-Kishimoto firm, engaged in similar lines of trade, is the most prosperous. So enterprising are these two firms that they maintain medical departments in their respective stores, and employ not only competent druggists but also well-qualified physicians. In a country where medical practice is particularly backward this unique innovation is highly appreciated by the natives and has proved a great success. Most of the successful Japanese in Chiapas have married Spanish or Mexican women, and are treated by the natives with great respect.

Apart from the Chiapas colony, Mexico has not

yet seen any Japanese enterprise to speak of. The straggling trail of Japanese immigration has left no impress upon the country, mainly due to the fact that Japanese immigrants have been contract laborers, imported by plantation owners or railroad companies. In the few years following 1906 more than a thousand Japanese were brought by the Kebasho Cultivation Company, an American-British firm, to the sugar beet plantation of 25,000 acres at Oakenia, about 140 miles inland from the port of Coatzacoalcas on the Gulf of Mexico. About the same time some 2,000 Japanese laborers were imported to be employed in the building of the Guadalupe-Idzapa section of the Mexican railway. Dissatisfied with the treatment they received, these laborers, upon the expiration of the contract terms, gradually deserted the plantation and the railroad. To-day the Kebasho plantation employs but a hundred Japanese, while only 150 Japanese are working on the Mexican railroad. A considerable number returned home while the others were scattered over different parts of the country. The failure of the first attempt at Japanese emigration to Mexico put a damper upon the zeal of the emigration promoters both in Japan and in Mexico, and no considerable number of Japanese have since come to Mexico.

These are the Japanese whom we see described as 200,000 trained soldiers! We have noted that out of the total of 2,000 Japanese, 300 are women

and children. Of the remaining 1,700 not more than 10 per cent. have had military training. To make 200,000 trained soldiers out of 1,700 odd Japanese would tax the brains of the greatest mathematical genius of the world. To some people, however, it is nothing difficult; they have performed the feat so often that the public is beginning to think that maybe after all 1,700 Japanese are numerically equal to 200,000!

Not wishing to indulge in dubious humor, I shall, at once, endeavor to account for the obvious hyperbole so often published in the newspapers. In the first place, it is not easy to tell a Japanese from a Mexican, especially when a Japanese is acclimatized to Mexican environment. The theory has been advanced that in remote antiquity the Japanese and the Mexicans were of the same racial family and shared the same abode, perhaps on the American continent. The theory is not yet proved, but the fact remains that the two races greatly resemble each other at least in physiognomy. Guglielmo Ferrero, the brilliant Italian historian and philosopher, adds strength to this view, held by many eminent ethnologists, when he writes in the *Paris Figaro*:

"To what race do these populations (natives of Mexico and South America) belong which have resisted with so much vigor European conquest and immigration? It is not necessary to be a learned anthropologist to find in them a certain resemblance

to the Japanese. I shall never forget the impression produced on me at Uspallata, in the Andes Mountains, by the men who came to take the mail from the Argentine Republic across this colossal mountain range into Chile. 'Are these men Japanese?' I asked one of the persons who accompanied me. 'They may be Japanese,' was the answer, 'for there are a considerable number of them in Chile, and they are just as likely to be Chileans.'"

Is it any wonder that some wild-eyed reporter, catching a glimpse of a passing train full of Mexican soldiers, should really think that they were Japanese troops landed, perchance, from a Japanese warship at Mazatlan or Manzanillo? So, after all, it is the Japanese who are to blame, is it?

In justice to our good friends of the fourth estate, let it be said that a small number of Japanese no doubt have joined the Mexican army, some on Carranza's side, some on Villa's. The statement issued on July 2 last by Governor Estaban Cantu, of Lower California, categorically denying the presence of Japanese soldiers in the army of the *de facto* Government, is perhaps too sweeping. Thanks to the chaotic state of the country, not a few Japanese formerly employed in mines or on farms, have been left without employment. It would have been surprising if none of such Japanese had been driven by poverty to join the army which at least secures them from starvation.

Moreover, it is reasonable to presume that some

Japanese, by reason of long residence, have become so attached to Mexico that they really espouse the cause of the Mexicans. It is nothing extraordinary that some twenty-one Japanese living in Lower California should address a letter to the *de facto* Government, as they seem to have done, strongly urging the latter to resist the military occupation of Mexican soil by the army of the United States. The photograph of this letter, written in Japanese characters, was published in the Mexican periodical, the *Accion Mundial*, for May 27. As reported in American newspapers, it was made to appear that the letter emanated from San Francisco and was an indication of the anti-American propaganda instituted by Japanese in California.

The racial kinship apparently existing between the Japanese and the Mexicans has proved a great advantage to Japanese settlers in Mexico. There is no prejudice between them, and they have freely intermarried. Everywhere and at all times the Japanese have been most cordially received by the natives, and the Japanese have been ready to reciprocate by showing them due respect. Of course, the Japanese have had their share of the miseries entailed by the lawlessness of the country; but on the whole the natives have been more friendly towards the "Japs" than towards the "Gringoes." As years pass, intermarriage between the two races will become more and more frequent. And the injection of Japanese blood into the veins of the



Mexican people may yet prove the redemption of the country, if the best characteristics of a race are concomitant with its blood. Certainly Mexico needs, and needs badly, the infusion of greater intelligence, ingenuity, wisdom, pluck and industry into its political, social and economic fiber.

I am reluctant to favor the view advanced by many Americans that certain big interests, eager to precipitate American intervention in Mexico or, what is better, American annexation of at least the northern half of Mexico, are responsible for the circulation of irresponsible reports concerning the alleged Japanese activities in that country. It is perhaps nothing more than a coincidence that the newspapers, whose publishers own vast lands in Northern Mexico, happen to be the champions of intervention and of thinly-veiled advocacy of annexation. Describing one of the land holdings of one of such publishers, the *Mexican Herald*, for August 24, 1908, says:

"With over a million acres of the finest agricultural and grazing land, with large herds of blooded cattle, horses and sheep roaming over this vast domain, the big Hearst cattle ranch and farm in Chihuahua is the peer of any such estate in the world, whether it lies in the great corn belt of Illinois or Kansas, or stretches for miles across the wind-swept prairies of Texas or Oklahoma. Two hundred and fifty miles of barbed wire fence enclose a portion of this vast ranch and within the enclosure graze

60,000 thoroughbred Herefords, 125,000 fine sheep and many thousand head of horses and hogs."

The mere enumeration of instances similar to the above would fill many pages. Now the theory of anti-interventionists is that these big interests are deliberately spreading alarmist news about Japanese "designs," for the sinister purpose of scaring the American Government into taking steps towards intervention or annexation. At this particular moment the engineers of the German propaganda are doing their part in creating the apparition of Japanese invasion in Mexico. Ever since the beginning of the European war the German press, publicists and writers have been making gratuitous efforts to convince the Americans of the inevitability of their clash with the Japanese in the Pacific and in Mexico. From the great mass of German propaganda literature of this nature, let me quote the following passage penned by Professor Ruegalabouger of Heidelberg University:

"The Japanese glances are wistfully cast across the Pacific to America. Whether ethnologically and anthropologically tenable or not, for decades the most popular theory preached in Japan, particularly in the University of Tokyo, is that the Japanese are descendants of the old Mexicans, who were subjugated by the Spaniards. In the recent Mexican troubles Japan made untiring efforts to manifest her sympathies to the Mexicans, particularly so when United States troops occupied Mexican terri-

tory (Vera Cruz). Japan will make her influence felt in Central and South America at the expense of the United States."

Purposeful literature of this nature has been welcomed with avidity by advocates of preparedness, for it certainly comes in handy in their efforts to attain their ends.

Of the numerous stories concerning Japanese "designs" on Mexico that of the historic "Magdalena Bay incident," in which even a distinguished publicist at Washington played an important part, has made perhaps the strongest impression upon the public. So important in the American mind is the incident that I feel justified in giving an authentic account of it which has never been presented before the tribunal of public opinion.

That no nation will ever think of establishing a naval base at such a place as Magdalena Bay, as the Japanese were said to have designed, may at once be granted, for the geological and climatic conditions of the country preclude such an attempt. It is a spot condemned by nature to be a desert beyond reclamation. The bay itself is a noble stretch of water, landlocked, placid and deep. But the entire region extending for more than 400 miles along the ocean is absolutely rainless. If one were to live there one would have to have fresh water carried by ships from Todos Santos at the extreme southern tip of the peninsula. The nearest point available as a source of water supply, Todos Santos, is, neverthe-

less, 300 miles from Magdalena. The geological aspect of the region is forbidding. Mr. James H. Wilkins, for many years an explorer of the Pacific Coast of Mexico, writing in the San Francisco *Bulletin*, says of the country:

"I am more or less familiar with all the great desert regions of North America—with Death Valley, the region around Salton Sea, and the most desolate regions of Utah. None of these display the true desert conditions so impressively as the territory of the Hale concession (Magdalena Bay region). It is a weary expanse of rock and sand, glittering under a perpetual sun—lifeless, treeless, without a blade of grass or a plant except the tenacious orchilla or an occasional petaya cactus. There is not a drop of living water on the tract; only here and there are some small, uncertain water holes. The sole inhabitants are a few heartbroken looking lizards that gain a sustenance God alone knows how."

This rainless, barren region, fully 400 miles long and 50 miles deep, has, since the seventies, been known as the Hale concession, as a San Francisco *entrepreneur* named Joseph P. Hale once had the exclusive concession to gather orchilla, the only desert plant that took a fancy to thrive there, and which was valuable in dyeing silks in the days when aniline dyes were unknown. But when the coal tar derivatives replaced the orchilla the concession became valueless, and Hale, or his heirs, in 1901 or

thereabout offered the concession for sale for \$150,000, or less than three-fourths of a cent an acre.

This, then, is Magdalena Bay. Certainly not a pleasing or promising picture. In the face of a hostile fleet a garrison at Magdalena would soon perish of thirst and hunger. Could any man normally intelligent be so Quixotic as to make any serious effort to set up a naval base or a colony in such a place? And for all we know, leaders of the Japanese Navy have never enjoyed the reputation of being particularly soft in the head.

But I know how the tempest in the teapot started. It started from various sources.

In December, 1910, a Japanese named Yokoyama, manager of the Toyo Hoge Kaisha (Oriental Whaling Company) of Tokyo, secured from the Mexican Government a fishing concession along the Pacific Coast. The concession was far from exclusive, for Americans, Germans, Englishmen and others had enjoyed the same privilege. For lack of the necessary capital, the Oriental Whaling Company has failed to utilize the privilege.

The concession had nothing to do with Magdalena Bay, for it covered only the section between Salina Cruz and Manzanillo. But it was readily exploited by sensation-hunters and by those with their own axes to grind. About the same time, that is, in the early spring of 1912, another Japanese, engaged in fishing at Monterey, California, took a trip to Magdalena Bay at the invitation of J. S. Blackburn, repre-

sentative of the John Henry Company of New York, organized under the laws of Maine for the purpose of exploiting the Magdalena Bay region. This company, eager to open up Magdalena Bay, offered alluring terms to a Japanese, Otojiro Noda by name, and asked him to start a fishing establishment and also to bring Japanese settlers there. Noda, escorted by Blackburn's agent, went to Lower California, and inspected the bay and the surrounding country. He reached the conclusion that not until human beings, as well as cows and horses, learn to subsist on sand and sea water would Magdalena Bay ever be colonized. Neither could he see how the fishing industry could profitably be established at such a place. So nothing resulted from Noda's trip. Noda, one of those ne'er-do-wells, trying his hand at everything and succeeding in nothing, died almost penniless in Sacramento in the Spring of 1916. And this was the man whom the newspapers presented to the public as an emissary of the Mikado's Government!

While trying to interest Noda in the Magdalena Bay scheme, the John Henry Company also approached a Japanese steamship company, the Toyo-Kisen-Kaisha, with a view to importing Japanese settlers. The colonization plans had been communicated to Secretary of the Navy Mr. George von Meyer, who in turn sounded the State Department on the matter. Assistant Secretary Mr. Huntington Wilson had, it was reported, written to the John

Henry Company, stating that the plans, as submitted to him, would not be objected to by the State Department. But approved or vetoed on the part of the State Department, the project had, from the beginning, no hope of realization, for the simple reason that the land on Magdalena Bay is utterly unsuited to colonization.

But all this furnished fire enough to heat the teapot. With due fanning by the yellow journals and their dubious allies, the fire soon became hot enough to cause a tempest in the pot. The result was the solemn and formidable resolution offered on August 2, 1912, by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, declaring that the United States could not see without grave concern the acquisition of any harbor on the American continent by a foreign corporation "which has such relation to another government, not American, as to give that country practical control for military or naval purposes." The recent canard about the Japanese attempt to establish a naval base on Turtle Bay and at Panama is fashioned from the fantastic material furnished by the fairy tale of Magdalena Bay five years ago.

These little incidents would be of no particular significance were it not for the unhappy influence which they are likely to produce—have already produced—on the other side of the ocean. It was soon after the enactment of the Magdalena Bay comedy that Mr. Charles M. Schwab's Bethlehem Steel Company secured or tried to secure from the Chinese

Government a concession to establish a dockyard on the coast of Fukien province, lying across a narrow strip of water from the Japanese island of Formosa. It would have been nothing short of a miracle had the Japanese, after seeing the Lodge resolution and all that, not raised a voice against this American project, which was infinitely more formidable than an innocent concession such as was secured by, or offered to, Japanese on the Pacific Coast of Mexico. Anyhow the Schwab project came to naught. It does not take much stretching of the imagination to see that it was a case of tit for tat. And the case is bound to be repeated many times hereafter, if America insists upon investing the Monroe Doctrine with new meaning from time to time, so as to exclude Japanese subjects and *bona fide* Japanese enterprise from Mexico and from the countries further south.

As long as Americans assume such an irrational, unfriendly attitude towards the Japanese in Central and South America they must be ready to accept without astonishment any move which the Japanese may make in China and Korea with a view to blocking and frustrating American enterprises. If the Americans complain about it they are not good sportsmen. So far Japan has done nothing to halt American enterprise in the Far East, except in such a portentous case as the Bethlehem Steel project in Fukien. In spite of all Western insinuations with regard to Japanese policy on the Asian



continent, Japan has always seen to it that the latchstring of the commercial doors of the Far East is placed outside. If the Americans do not try to pull the string, or do not know how to pull it, their trade in the Orient must languish of their own fault.

It is well to emphasize the fact that Japanese emigrants have never come to Mexico or South America in any considerable numbers, except where tempting inducements have been offered by governments or plantation owners in those countries. For some time the Government of the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil, offered bounties to Japanese immigrants, thus hoping to facilitate the development of the coffee plantations. In Peru, also, private interests were responsible for the stimulation of Japanese immigration. And yet there are to-day not more than 21,878 Japanese in entire South America, i. e., 15,462 in Brazil, 5,428 in Peru, 683 in Argentina, and 305 in Chile.

Japan has no desire to create serious issues with America over the Mexican situation. She has had more chances than one to "test" the Monroe Doctrine, if she wished, for her subjects have often been preyed upon and even murdered by bandit-like Mexican troops of one faction or another. Had she been bent upon making mischief she could easily have found excuse to lodge protests with the Mexican Government, such as it was, for the sole purpose of embarrassing the Government at Washington. To

the contrary, Japan has been so fastidiously considerate of the susceptibilities of the American Government and people that the Mikado politely refused to extend official reception to Ferix Diaz, whom the Huerta Government dispatched to Tokyo as special envoy in February, 1913. Japan felt constrained to take this embarrassing and delicate step for fear that official recognition of the Diaz mission, at the moment when she was anxiously watching the acts of the California legislature which had proposed an anti-Japanese land law, and when the embers of the Magdalena Bay incident were still smoldering, might be far from pleasing to the American nation. Japan's highly diplomatic note of regret reached Huerta after Diaz had already proceeded as far as Vancouver, British Columbia, on his way to the Mikado's capital. Virtually stranded there, the envoy saved his face by going to Paris.

I cannot conclude this chapter without saying a few words on the dramatic, though grotesque, plan made by the German Foreign Minister, Dr. Zimmermann, for embroiling Mexico and Japan with the United States. As I have already said in a fore-paragraph, Germany has, ever since the opening of the war, been engaged in underhand activities extremely embarrassing to Japan. Through various channels and by dubious means she has been spreading false news with regard to Japan's attitude towards America. Foreign Minister Zimmermann's letter instructing Von Eckhardt, the German minis-

ter to Mexico, to bring about a Mexican-Japanese alliance was the last straw.

Dr. Zimmermann's letter permits of two interpretations. Either it was meant to intimidate the United States, or it was written to send a coquettish glance towards Japan. It will serve neither purpose.

Obviously Germany has misjudged Japanese sentiment. The fact that there is in Japan a good deal of pro-German feeling and admiration for German valor and efficiency does not mean that she is wavering in her belief in the cause of the Entente Powers. It does not mean that she is half-hearted in supporting her allies. The undercurrent of pro-German sentiment in Japan is due mainly to the presence in considerable numbers of professors and technical men trained and educated in German universities. Politically, however, Japan has pledged herself to the cause of her allies. Germany must know that once Japan gives her word to a foreign Power she never breaks it.

It is highly regrettable that the American public is inclined to entertain doubt and even suspicion as to Japan's attitude towards the Mexican game of Germany. True, Secretary Lansing promptly issued a statement exonerating Japan from all charges in connection with the plot. To the Japanese, however, the statement was somewhat disappointing; it did not seem emphatic enough to meet the monstrous suspicion thrown upon an inno-

cent nation by a designing Power. If even the most fastidious regard, which Japan has these many years invariably shown towards American sensitiveness about Mexico, has not convinced the American Government and people of her sincerity, what indeed can be done to convince them?

## CHAPTER XIV

### AMERICA AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

✓ The first Anglo-Japanese alliance—It accorded Japan no material benefit—Its real significance—Its benefit to England—The second alliance—Its *raison d'être*—The third alliance and the American situation—Japan's duty in the present war—Why Japan entered into the war—Diplomatic negotiations between Tokyo and London after England declared war—The future of the alliance to be determined by Russia's attitude—The Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Japanese entente—British and Japanese interests in China—Japanese complaint about England's "selfishness"—England's complaint about Japan's aggressiveness—The "dog in the manger"—British interference with the Hindus in Japan—Japan's duty in India.

Nothing at this moment furnishes so much food for speculation as the new alignment of the Powers likely to follow in the wake of Armageddon. Italy has dropped out of the Dreibund. From Berlin have come whispers of a separate peace with Russia. In Petrograd mutterings have been heard of Russia's dissatisfaction with the way England has been treating her. And in England the voice of disapproval of Japan's aggressive policy in China has been growing louder. Is this an indication of Downing Street's desire to break with Tokyo when the treaty of alliance terminates in 1921?

In the Far East equally momentous developments are taking place. Japan has already entered into a new convention with Russia which may easily develop into an alliance. Will she couple the compact with an *entente* with Germany? Not a few Japanese writers and publicists have come forward with tributes for German efficiency, while no fewer Germans have been urging the wisdom of making up with the Japanese. The German officers and men who capitulated to the Japanese at Tsingtau have been accorded the most courteous treatment ever since their arrival in Japan. As if adding significance to the incident, a section of the Japanese press began, soon after the fall of Tsingtau, to voice sentiments by no means flattering to England. Will Japan prove after the war so rash as to cut asunder the ties of alliance which have united her to England during the past fifteen years?

Not only are these questions of vital interest in the study of world politics, but they have direct influence upon our relationship with Japan. By joining hands with England and France in the present war the United States has become Germany's avowed enemy. For years, perhaps for decades, to come Germany will not forget the hurts which she believes we have unnecessarily and ruthlessly inflicted upon her. It is not unthinkable that she will, after the war, make earnest efforts to reconcile Japan and align herself with that Far Eastern Empire. The sensational disclosure of the German plot to bring

about a triangular coalition between Mexico, Japan and Germany, as well as the subsequent speeches of Dr. Zimmermann, the Kaiser's Foreign Minister, justifying this dramatic move, may be regarded as an indication of Germany's desire to befriend Japan. So long as America remained contented with enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in this hemisphere, she had little reason to be concerned with the "entangling alliances" of the Powers of the old world. But the part she has now undertaken to play in the world war must perforce greatly influence her future position among the Powers. It is, then, obvious that Japan's relations with European Powers after the war will in no small measure affect our own relations with her. It is with this fact in view that I attempt, in this and the two following chapters, to forecast the *post bellum* alignment of the Powers with Japan as the central figure. Let us first study Anglo-Japanese relations.

To forecast the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance it is essential to know something of its past. The first alliance, concluded on January 30, 1902, was of far greater significance than was realized by its authors. On the face of it, the treaty accorded Japan no tangible benefit. It partook rather of the nature of a shadowy assurance against attack. It simply prescribed that if either high contracting party should become involved in war with a third Power, the high contracting party would maintain a strict neutrality and exercise its influence to prevent

other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. It was only in the event of a third Power or Powers joining in hostilities against either high contracting party that the other was expected to come to its assistance. Now the only Power expected at the time to encroach upon Japan's rights was Russia. Since there was but little probability of any third Power joining Russia in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, it was not thought likely that England would be called upon to render military assistance to Japan. Thus the risk run by Great Britain was very small.

The statesmanship of Lord Salisbury and Lord Landsdowne foresaw all this and more. A victorious Japan, in the then approaching war with Russia, meant the checkmating of the Russian advance in the Far East, a nightmare of the British statesmen. Even if Japan were defeated at the hands of the Muscovite, the Far Eastern situation, so far as British interests were concerned, could not have become worse. Open-minded publicists of Great Britain have been frank enough to admit this advantage bestowed upon their country by the alliance. As Mr. Alfred Stead put it:

"For Great Britain the gain, even before the Russian war, was much more substantial. British diplomacy assumed a new importance at Peking when backed by Japan, and, amongst other results, the Tibetan expedition was rendered possible. Since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, and the



consequent revelation of Japan's power, the advantages to British diplomacy in Europe have been very considerable. In fact, British foreign policy all over the world has been influenced and strengthened by the alliance. The destruction of the Baltic Fleet enabled four British battleships to be sent home to play a very important part in the diplomatic crisis in Europe. We owe so much to our alliance that we should thank our lucky stars that Japan, the much-courted new Power, paramount in the Far East, is anxious not only to renew the alliance, but also to extend its scope."

Was the treaty, then, a one-sided agreement? To be frank, the alliance did not accord Japan much material benefit. True, England financed Japan in the latter's struggle with Russia, but that would have been done anyway, even in the absence of the treaty of alliance. The real advantage Japan received from the alliance was something that could not be spoken of in terms of dollars and cents.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was one of the most romantic incidents in the history of the nations. It was not merely an alliance between two nations, but a hand-clasping between two hemispheres which had long appeared as though ordained by providence to remain forever separated. It was the first union of the East with the West, the first recognition that an Asiatic nation was capable of rendering assistance to a foremost Power of the Occident. The advantage thus gained by Japan

was of necessity sentimental, but its significance was none the less great. Japan was definitely recognized as an important factor in world politics, and was accorded a place in the concourse of the world's great Powers. No longer was her voice to be ignored in the disposition of Far Eastern questions.

The diplomatic feat accomplished by Lord Salisbury and Lord Landsdowne in concluding the alliance with Japan was, coming as it did at the moment when the Kaiser was holding up before Europe the picture of the yellow peril, particularly remarkable. The far-seeing English statesmen knew the ulterior motives of the astute monarch's dramatic "appeal" to Christendom, and refused to be beguiled or scared by his cry of the Oriental menace. To the contrary, they saw in Japan's sudden awakening and rapid progress great possibilities not only for the advancement of England's own interest, but for the regeneration of the Orient.

Japan's brilliant victory over China, regarded as the sleeping Hercules of the East, was the event which first elicited British admiration. The excellent discipline and great efficiency displayed by Japanese officers and troops during the Boxer disturbance of 1900 intensified the respect already entertained by the Englishmen for the Japanese. In contrast to the lawlessness and brutalities of the troops from certain Christian countries the humane conduct of the Mikado's "heathen" soldiers was indeed conspicuous. It was, therefore, not merely incidental

that the Anglo-Japanese alliance followed upon the heels of the Boxer troubles.

The first treaty of alliance was not a defensive and offensive alliance in the true sense of the term. In the war with Russia, upon which Japan staked her very existence, the instrument was useful to Japan only in so far as it assured England's moral support. It was only towards the end of the war that Great Britain came out squarely for an unqualified alliance and agreed to cast her lot with Japan in the event of another war. The result was the second Treaty of Alliance of August 12, 1905. In place of the lukewarm provision of the first treaty the new treaty contained the following definite article:

"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers either contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests (in Eastern Asia and India), the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

This new agreement was made public when the outcome of the peace conference at Portsmouth was quivering in the balance, Japan, anxious to end the war on honorable terms, Russia wishing to continue hostilities until she was in a position to dictate her own terms. It went into effect on the

day it was signed. Had it not contained an article forestalling its application to the war then going on in Manchuria, the new alliance would have been employed as a lever to oblige Russia to accept peace terms more favorable to Japan than were actually agreed upon.

In the minds of many students of international affairs it remains a question why England insisted upon inserting in the new treaty such a clause of exemption, if she wished to be of real service to Japan. Looking at the situation through the perspective of history, it is certain that England's main object in concluding the second treaty of alliance was to prepare against the rising tide of German Power and influence which had begun to be strongly felt not only in Europe but in the Far East. To guard her interest in Tibet and India against the possible Russian advance was but England's minor purpose in renewing the alliance, though the world was made to believe that this was the *sine qua non* of the treaty. The British statesmen would have been surprisingly deficient in farsightedness had they failed to see that, thanks to Japan's firm stand in Manchuria, Russia had been sufficiently crippled to prevent, at least for a decade or so, the renewal of her vigorous movement towards India. They would indeed have been nearsighted had they not discerned the ominous situation arising out of Germany's rise in world politics. In renewing the treaty of alliance with Japan, England undoubtedly

had in view such a calamity as she faces to-day, obliging her to remove her troops from Asia and to transfer her warships from Oriental to European waters. The part played by Germany in the Morocco incident and in the Near Eastern situation attests the above interpretation.

But the treaty, coming in the psychological moment when Japan needed foreign sympathy and encouragement most keenly, was welcomed in the Mikado's Empire with great enthusiasm and appreciation. The press were effusive in praising England's chivalrous spirit in renewing the alliance, and believed that the new treaty was of no small influence in determining the Russian attitude at the peace conference. And indeed the alliance has exercised great influence in preventing Russia from waging a war of revenge against Japan.

The second treaty of alliance was to have remained in force for ten years, but circumstances obliged its revision four years before its termination. Upon the heels of its conclusion events followed one another in rapid succession. Korea had ceased to be a problem. British influence in Tibet had been firmly established. But the greatest factor which necessitated its revision was the signal change that had come over the relationship between Japan and the United States.

Beginning with the now historic "school incident" in San Francisco, the anti-Japanese agitation in California had become portentous enough to threaten

the amicable relations between the two nations. The Japanese statesmen, of course, did not so much as dream of ever going to war on account of the California question, for they certainly had the wit to foresee that war would never solve the immigration question. They would have been exceedingly stupid had they failed to see that war with America presupposed the withdrawal of all the Japanese population from this country and the abandonment of all hope of sending any emigrants to these shores for many years after such a war.

And yet no small section of the press showed a disposition to exploit the California question to the detriment of friendly relations which the two Governments were anxious to maintain. This was where England's apprehension came in. Should Japan and the United States fall out, would not England, as Japan's ally, be called upon to come to Japan's assistance? A careful examination of the preamble and articles of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was all that was needed to be convinced of the impossibility of applying the treaty to a war that might develop out of the immigration or California question. But the feeling of uneasiness prevailing both in America and in England was something that could not be ignored.

Consequently the Mikado's Government thought it the part of wisdom to assure the Americans and Englishmen that the Anglo-Japanese alliance could never be applied to an American-Japanese war.

Thus in the third treaty of alliance signed on July 13, 1911, Japan agreed to insert the following article: "Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting Power an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force." Almost simultaneously the United States entered into a general arbitration treaty with Great Britain. To those who have the eyes to read, these instruments ought to be sufficient to convince that Japan has no intention to drag England into the war which many fire-eaters think unavoidable between Japan and the United States.

In renewing the treaty of alliance with Japan for the second time, Great Britain had, as in the case of the alliance of 1905, an eye upon Germany. So far as Russia was concerned, British interest in the Far East was no longer in danger. There is reason to believe that in 1911 or thereabouts the two European Powers entered into an understanding defining their respective spheres of influence in Tibet and Mongolia. In the meantime, the Mikado's Empire not only effectively checked the Russian advance on the China Sea, but succeeded, by dint of shrewd diplomacy, in healing the hurts Russia had been nursing after her defeat in Manchuria.

On the other hand, the German advance in China had assumed such an ominous aspect that England had begun to doubt the security of her own position.

Even when the smoke of battle was still hovering over the plains of Manchuria (1905), the brilliant British writer on Chinese affairs, Mr. B. L. Simpson, clearly foresaw the approaching conflict of the German programme with the established British power in the Far East. He said:

“For the German programme (in China) is as clear as the light of day. In a few years another naval base somewhere in the region of Swatow will be required, and then, linked by a system of German railways, a huge slice of Northern, Central, and Southern China will be practically ruled from Berlin. It may seem nebulous and vague to those who sit in the darkness of blissful ignorance far away, but it is patent to those whose business it is to follow audacious Empire plans. Tientsin will mark the extreme Northern limit of these ambitions; Kaifengfu the Northwestern; Hankow the Central West; and Swatow the extreme South. Including, therefore, great portions of nine or ten provinces of China, the German programme is so framed that it clashes directly with no other Power in the world excepting England.”

Considered from the British side, therefore, the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, was concluded chiefly with a view to forestalling possible German aggression both in China and Europe. Japan, on the other hand, considered the treaty to be of great value as a means of furthering friendly relations with Russia. Without the influence of the



British alliance, it is open to question whether Japan could have succeeded as she did in reconciling Russia in so short a period after the war.

We have seen that the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 was concluded with a view to preparing the two sea-powers against the portentous rise of Germany. They had in view just such a case of emergency as the present war wherein England might be enabled to remove her troops and men-of-war from the Orient, leaving the protection of that region to the Japanese. Japan was glad enough to enter into the compact, mainly because she saw a perpetual menace in the occupation of Kiau-chau by an European Power whose sovereign had long been actively engaged in prejudicing the whole Occident against Japan.

In the present Titanic conflict, then, Japan's duty permits of no misconstruction. With the text of the treaty before us, we can readily understand why Japan joined hands with Great Britain in the present war. It is obviously England's right to call upon Japan for aid, while it is Japan's duty to respond to England's call. Read the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance carefully, and you will notice that *wherever* either high contracting party be attacked by a third Power the other high contracting party is required to come to its assistance *in the regions of the Far East*. The treaty does not say "aggressive action in the Far East," but "aggressive action wherever arising." The state of affairs de-

scribed in the treaty had certainly come into existence by the time England asked for Japan's aid, and Japan could not shirk the responsibilities put upon her shoulders by the treaty.

It is amusing to see the American press indulging in all manner of allegations with regard to Japan's entry into the war. Friends of Germany claim that the tide of American sentiment turned against England the moment she called upon Japan to act. Why the American public should be reluctant to recognize Great Britain's obvious right to ask for Japan's aid is difficult to understand. Back of this "much ado about nothing" is perhaps racial prejudice. Had Japan been a Caucasian race, no nations would have criticised England's act in calling upon Japan at such a moment of grave danger, and no one would have questioned Japan's right and duty to join hands with her ally.

The plain fact is that Japan did not enter into the war without conferring with England "fully and frankly." For the information of prejudiced critics, it is necessary to put this fact on record.

On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war, Sir Conyngham Greene, the British Ambassador to Japan, hurried back to Tokyo from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his Government was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and desired to

ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities. Baron Kato answered that the question before him was so serious that he could not answer it on his own account.

On the evening of the same day, Count Okuma convened a meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of this meeting, Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not evade the responsibilities which she had assumed in entering into alliance with England.

At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to declare war at once. But on August 7 the British Ambassador asked for an interview with Baron Kato and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed in such a manner as would oblige Japan's immediate entrance upon the war. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma requested the "elder statesmen" and his colleagues in the Cabinet to assemble at his mansion. The conference lasted until 2 o'clock the next morning. Before it adjourned Japan's policy had been definitely formulated.

The Japanese press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and England were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate Germany's scheme to transfer Kiau-chau to the Chinese Government before she was compelled to hand it over to Japan. Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this scheme

she would still have enjoyed, in virtue of Article 5 of the Kiau-chau convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some future time "a more suitable territory" in China. This was exactly the condition which the allies did not want established in China. If, on the other hand, Germany were forced by a third Power to abandon Kiau-chow, either peacefully or by the arbitrament of the sword, China would no longer be under obligation to "cede to Germany a more suitable place."

In the present world war, as during the preceding decade, the Anglo-Japanese alliance has proved to be of mutual advantage to the high contracting parties. Will it survive the great upheaval which is shaking Europe from its foundation? With Kiau-chow restored to Chinese sovereignty, and with Russia becoming more and more friendly towards Japan, has the *raison d'être* of the Anglo-Japanese alliance virtually ceased to exist? In a word, what will be the future of the alliance?

That the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance largely depends upon Russia's attitude after the war seems indisputable. If, at the peace conference that is to follow the war, Russia is given what she has been coveting, she will continue to be friendly with Great Britain and will keep Germany at arm's length. In that case there is no reason why Japan would not renew the alliance with England, though perhaps in more or less modified form. She has already entered into an *entente cordiale* with Russia.

By renewing the alliance with England, she will become a party to a triangular combination and thus secure herself against Germany's not improbable desire for revenge. England, too, will be anxious to participate in such a combination, for she knows that she will have to bear the brunt of Germany's bitterest enmity for many years after the war.

If, on the other hand, Russia is dissatisfied with the outcome of the peace parley, and shows herself inclined to be reconciled with Germany, Japan will of necessity hesitate to continue the alliance with England on the same basis as hitherto. For it is a foregone conclusion that Japan will avoid, if she can possibly do so, another disastrous war with Russia, knowing that her resources are too limited to cope with Russia's tremendous potential strength. Japan's present relationship with Russia is one of *entente cordiale*, and not one of alliance, for the recently concluded convention provides no mutual obligations of the high contracting parties to extend armed assistance to each other. On the contrary, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in its present form, obliges either high contracting party to render armed assistance to the other in case either is involved in war, defending its territorial or special interests mentioned in the treaty. Should Russia and England cease to be friends as the result of the peace conference and eventually become involved in war, into which Germany might be easily drawn as Russia's ally, England, upon the strength

of the present alliance, would oblige Japan to open hostilities against Russia and Germany. The instinct of self-preservation must impel Japan to avoid such a disastrous course.

Much has of late been said of Japanese discontent with the alliance with England. But the public has forgotten that before Japan began to complain of England's "selfishness" many British newspapers and publicists had long been assailing Japan. As early as 1908 such men as Lord Stanhope, F. B. Wooman, B. L. Simpson, and Lancelot Loton openly attacked Japanese ambitions, and urged the readjustment of England's Far Eastern policy. The same sentiment has been voiced in not a few English newspapers. At that time Japanese publicists and press said nothing to return British "compliments." Japan's whole attention has been devoted to the recuperation of her energy and to the readjustment of her position in Manchuria. As she gradually recovered from the shock of the Russian war, she began to cast about and found that England's attitude towards her had been far from cordial. She began to wonder whether her European ally really cared for her.

It was not, however, until after the fall of Tsingtao that a few Japanese newspapers and publicists openly attacked British policy in the Far East. The reader will recall that when Japan decided to enter into the war England dispatched a cruiser and a contingent of troops to participate in the siege of Tsingtao,

the German stronghold in Kiau-chow. Upon the fall of Tsingtao one or two newspapers in Tokyo came out with the assertion that England, upon the strength of the part she had played in the capture of Tsingtao, coveted the northern half of the Tientsin-Pukow line controlled by Germany. It was also rumored that England was averse to the extension of Japanese influence in Shang-tung, formerly Germany's sphere of influence. How true these statements were only those within the inner official circles at London and Tokyo can tell. The fact remains that they did no small injury to the cordial relationship between the two nations.

In the celebrated Japanese demands presented to China in January, 1915, Japan expressed the "wish" that China grant her the privilege of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, in which considerable Japanese capital had been invested, as well as the railways between Nan-chang and Hangchao and between Nan-chang and Chaochou, provided that Great Britain would not object to the concession. These cities are in the Yangtse Valley, which England has long since staked out as her own sphere of influence. Whether England put her foot upon Japan's scheme to secure the above-named railway concessions is not known, but the significant fact was that the British press severely criticised that particular phase of the Japanese demands. At any rate Japan failed to get the concessions.

Most Britishers in China are anti-Japanese. They believe that the Japanese are their inevitable rivals in the Far East, and cannot understand why their Government should tie its hands with an alliance with Japan and render itself unable to check Japanese ambitions. They can see only the \$2,000,000,000 they have invested in China, and resent the gradual incursions of Japanese traders into the fields long monopolized by them. They often fail to see the situation in the broader light of international relations. What would have become of the British prestige in the Orient, had England, lending ear to the ill-considered counsels of her people in China, bade good-bye to Japan in 1911?

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But this feeling of the "dog in the manger" is not confined to the Britishers. The Japanese entertain the same sentiment with regard to certain parts of China, notably Manchuria, where their investments amount to \$250,000,000. The blame is on both sides. The idea of the exclusive "sphere of influence" is, as I have pointed out in the chapters on China, pernicious and must be modified, if not abandoned. To one looking at the situation from a detached point of view, it seems incomprehensible that England cannot be more generous towards Japanese enterprise in the Yangtse Valley, while Japan is likewise inclined to look askance at British activities in Manchuria. The "valley" has an area of 362,000 square miles. Certainly England cannot monopolize such a vast territory in addition to Tibet,



533,000 square miles in area. One fails to understand why she should be reluctant to see Japan build there a few hundred miles of railway which would, after all, as much benefit her as Japan. In the Japanese sphere in South Manchuria, measuring 90,000 square miles, we know of no instance of British enterprise being hindered by the Japanese. When in 1913 the British Government, on behalf of the Anglo-Chinese corporation, sounded the Japanese Government as to whether objection would be made to the corporation's project to lay a railway between Kingshao and Chaoyang in Manchuria, Japan cheerfully endorsed the plan.

As for trade competition, no one should complain of his defeat as long as his successful rival observes the rules of sportsmanship. Despite all unkind words that have been said about the Japanese, one must concede that their commercial success in China has largely been due to their perseverance, industry, agility and frugality, as well as the peculiar advantage they enjoy in China due to the circumstances which I have fully described in Chapter X. Moreover, you cannot succeed in business in China, where competition is so keen, by spending in a luxurious office only four or five hours the day, devoting the rest of the time to golfing and dinners and socials.

The growing friendship between the natives of India and the Japanese has furnished another cause for suspicion, not to say irritation, on the part of England. It is nothing new that even bona fide

Japanese travellers and merchants in India are subjected to espionage by British officials. Not only have the Englishmen in India been suspicious of those Japanese likely to come in contact with the radical elements of the Hindu population, but they have shown a disposition to exclude Japanese commercial enterprises from the country.

The reader will recall that in the summer of 1915 British warships fired at and stopped two Japanese merchantmen in Chinese waters. Boarding the Japanese vessels the English officers examined documents and seized a number of Hindu passengers, who were afterward imprisoned or executed in Hongkong. About that time the Japanese Government, at the request of the British Government, ordered all the Hindus, known as radicals, out of the country on short notice. Some of those Hindus were undoubtedly revolutionists, but there were also men whose ideas were sane and far from dangerous. To drive them all out of the country, giving them no alternative but to go to Shanghai or Hongkong, where grim fate awaited them, did not, to many Japanese, seem just. When, in the summer of 1906 Sir Rabindranath Tagore, India's foremost poet and savant, visited Japan, the Japanese Government, again at England's request, watched him so closely that the distinguished guest made no effort to conceal his disgust. All these incidents called forth very caustic criticisms directed against both the British and the Japanese governments. Must England, which has

for many decades been a haven of refuge for political exiles from the Continent, show herself so intolerant of a handful of Hindu radicals seeking refuge in Japan? This was the feeling expressed by not a few newspapers.

The provision of the existing treaty of alliance as to Japan's duty with regard to India is not clear. Suppose India rose in rebellion while England's hands were full in Europe: would Japan be required to quell the insurrection in virtue of the alliance? Japan would undoubtedly prefer British rule for India to German or Russian domination, if the country had to be dominated by some European power; but the point is that she would be reluctant to take part in crushing the just aspirations of the Hindus for independence and freedom.

After all has been said and done we might still have safely predicted the renewal of the alliance five years hence, had it not been for the difficulty of forecasting the *post bellum* attitude of Russia. It is to be hoped that with the downfall of the pro-German faction at Petrograd, Russia's friendship with England will be more wholehearted, thus ensuring the continuation of the *entente cordiale* now binding the two Powers. At any rate Japan prays that she will not have to face the embarrassing situation wherein she may be obliged to choose between Russia and England as her partner after the war.

## CHAPTER XV

### AMERICA AND GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

German overtures to Japan—Frankfurter Zeitung on Japan and America—Attitude of German-Americans—German temperament different from Japanese—Fundamental principle of German policy in the Far East—Prince Bismarck—General Bernhardt—The Kaiser's game in the Chino-Japanese war—German "advice" to Japan—German occupation of Kiau-chow—The Kaiser's game in the Russo-Japanese war—Japanese fear of Germany not easy to remove.

It is indeed a far cry from the Japanese capture of Kiau-chow to the Mikado's alliance with the Kaiser, yet so ironical is fate that such a turn of affairs after the war is not wholly unthinkable. Have not Russia and Japan, locked in deadly combat only a decade ago, become virtual allies? Already indications are abroad that such a card is at least in the diplomatic game of Berlin. I have already referred to Dr. Zimmermann's note, instructing Von Eckhardt, the German minister to Mexico, to bring about a coalition between Mexico and Japan.

Admiral von Truppel, former Governor of Kiau-chow, frankly admits that "German work in China can no longer be carried on without taking Japan into consideration." According to a writer for the McClure Newspaper Syndicate, the German press

suddenly ceased criticising Japan when the latter presented the celebrated twenty-one demands to the Chinese Government in January, 1915. In the official circles at Berlin, it is reported, pains are taken to do nothing that would hurt the susceptibilities of the Japanese. In a pamphlet entitled "Volkerdammerung im Stillen Ozean," Dr. George Irmer, who spent some twenty years in the diplomatic service, asserts that "Germany's colonial future must lie in the neighborhood of Europe, in Africa first of all," and regrets that Germany has antagonized the peoples of the Far East by painting a picture of the Yellow Peril that in reality never existed. A complete readjustment of Germany's Oriental policy is, he urges, of the utmost importance if she is to mend her shattered prestige and to enjoy her due share in the development of trade in Eastern Asia. In another pamphlet entitled *Japan in the World War and the China Problem*, Dr. H. Smidt, who was in Japan at the beginning of the war, openly advocates the formation of a German-Japanese alliance.

Whether Germany will eventually become Japan's travelling companion on the diplomatic road is a question which must vitally affect America's own position. By declaring war upon Germany, we have incurred the bitter enmity of the German government and people. Will not Germany court Japan's friendship for the very purpose of embarrassing us? And will Japan, on her side, prove so reckless as to

accept the proffered hand of Germany with a view to settling outstanding scores with the United States? Already German newspapers are publishing comments of a seditious nature. Says the influential *Frankfurter Zeitung*, for one:

“One must admit that Wilson is wise, and that all the Americans are wise, if they now arm. For us Germans this wisdom is not of much importance, for—a fact, which does not yet seem to be fully realized—it is only half directed against us. There is another who must be expected to watch attentively the seizure by America of this favorable opportunity to put off her military weakness without seeming guilty of ‘militarism.’ This other is Japan. Nobody can doubt that a reckoning between Japan and America lies in the womb of time and must infallibly be born one day. What a splendid opportunity for America now to catch up Japan’s immense military advantage, and, under the temporary pretense of hostility to Germany, to work for permanent motives of hostility toward Japan, while remaining pretty sure that not everybody will see it. The moment could not be chosen more skillfully. For Japan can only be annoyed, and can not protest. Outwardly Japan must clasp the new friend to her heart.”

There is another factor which complicates the situation still worse. We must remember that there are many millions of German-Americans whose attitude and sentiment are naturally influenced by

the policy of their native country. In the maintenance of amity and friendship between the Far Eastern Empire and the Republic, therefore, the German-American population is a factor which must be seriously considered. Prior to the war the German elements in this country had no more reason to be hostile towards Japan than had the other American stocks. With Kiau-chow, Germany's military and commercial base of operation in the Orient, seized by the Japanese, the feeling of the German-Americans has been deeply stirred, and to-day many are extremely outspoken in condemning the Japanese. If they are determined to avenge the wrongs which they think Germany suffered at the hands of the Japanese, they are capable of doing incalculable injury to the amicable relations between Japan and this country. The bold propaganda, which some German-Americans have been carrying on in the interest of their native land ever since the beginning of the war, furnishes an indication of the length they may go in their agitation against Japan, once they make up their minds to estrange the two countries.

Let us at once admit that there is a good deal of pro-German sentiment in Japan. We must at the same time remember that whatever friendly feeling there is towards Germany is largely due to the influence of those Japanese who have been trained and educated in German universities. In the field of international politics and diplomacy it cannot be gainsaid that Japan entertains grave fears of the

Kaiser's Empire. Moreover, there seems to be in German diplomacy and militarism something that repels the subtle nature of the Japanese. We need not dwell upon the Kaiser's impetuosity, so much in evidence in Germany's activities in Europe. To the Japanese it is not necessary to recall Louvain and Dinant, and the so-called policy of "frightfulness" practiced by Germany since the beginning of the present war. The Japanese have themselves seen enough of German diplomacy and militarism in their own hemisphere. To their ears the Kaiser's celebrated instructions to his troops, dispatched to the scene of the Boxer disturbance in China, still sound the note of terror. "Kill and burn everything that lies in your way" was the keynote of that instruction. Compare it with the Mikado's rescript to his soldiers:

"The soldier and the sailor should esteem valor. Ever since the ancient times valor has in our country been held in high esteem, and without it Our subjects would be unworthy of their name. How then may the soldiers and the sailors, whose profession it is to confront the enemy in battle, forget even for one instant to be valiant? But there is true valor and false. To be incited by mere impetuosity to violent action cannot be called true valor. The soldier and the sailor should have sound discrimination of right and wrong, cultivate self-possession, and form their plans with deliberation. Never to despise an inferior enemy or fear a superior, but to



do one's duty as soldier or sailor—this is true valor. Those who thus appreciate true valor should, in their daily intercourse, set gentleness first and aim to win the love and esteem of others. If you affect valor and act with violence, the world will in the end detest you and look upon you as wild beasts. Of this you should take heed."

In comparing these two imperial instructions we cannot help wondering if there is not something radically different in the disposition of official Germany and that of official Japan. However that may be, we are assured that Germany's diplomatic dealings with Japan have not been of a nature to enlist the confidence and sympathy of the latter.

The fundamental principle of German policy in the Orient was voiced by Prince Bismarck when he told Prince von Bulow: "In Russia there is a serious amount of unrest and agitation for territorial expansion which may easily result in an explosion. It would be best for the peace of the world if the explosion took place in Asia, and not in Europe. We must be careful not to stand in the way, otherwise we may have to bear the brunt of it."

In these few words the Iron Chancellor set forth Germany's fundamental policy in the Far East. The conversation took place towards the end of the "eighties," and in the "nineties" this fundamental policy began to show itself in German activities in Eastern Asia.

There is not a shadow of doubt that the principle

laid down by Bismarck has been closely followed by his successors and the Kaiser. It explains the *raison d'être* of that historic picture of the "Yellow Peril" painted by the versatile German Emperor. It furnishes a key to the general attitude of Germany towards Japan. It shows why Germany seemed always anxious to divert Russia's attention towards the Far East.

It would be scandalous to presume that the Kaiser was foolish enough to believe, even for a moment, that the Japanese, rallying under their sun flag all the fighting forces of Asia, would march across the continent and trample under foot any territory of Europe. Only a perverted mind could conceive such a case. In no other light than that of the fundamental principle upon which Germany's Far Eastern policy is established can we account for the Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril.

While, on the one hand, conspiring to divert Russian ambition to the Far East, German diplomacy was at work to prevent the establishment of harmonious relations between China and Japan. Says General Friedrich von Bernhardt: "The political rivalry between the two nations of the yellow race must be kept alive. If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia." This frank utterance, coupled with the confession of Prince von Bulow, leaves no room to

doubt that Germany's Far Eastern policy was based upon the theory that Asia must remain the happy hunting ground of European nations.

It is this political immorality, practiced by the military and bureaucratic leaders at Berlin, which Japan has fought. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the Japanese entertain no animosity towards individual Germans. Japan has sent many students to German universities and has welcomed many German scholars and experts to her educational institutions and her various governmental departments. And Japan is sincerely grateful for all that German civilization has done for her. This accounts for the absence of enthusiasm over the Japanese victory at Kiau-chow. German prisoners in Japan have been treated with the utmost cordiality. True to the most advanced principles of International Law, Japan even permitted German merchant vessels, which had entered Japanese harbors before the declaration of war, to depart unmolested. These ships fled to Manila where they were interned, only to be seized by America upon her entry into the war.

It was a feeling of fear, rather than a sentiment of bitter animosity, which actuated the Japanese to declare war upon Germany and join hands with Great Britain in observance of the terms of the alliance. It is unjust to say that the Japanese are nursing rancor and are reluctant to forgive Germany for robbing them of the spoils of the war with China.

Had Germany only refrained from constantly assuming a provocative attitude towards Japan during the past twenty years, the latter would have been but too glad to forget the Liao-tung incident and the grim picture of the Yellow Peril which had done much to prejudice the whole Occident against the Japanese and other Asiatic peoples.

When, therefore, a Japanese asserts that Germany is a "menace" to his country, he is not repeating the stereotyped diplomatic cant which has of late become the byword of writers and speakers on the European situation. On the contrary, he has substantial evidence to prove his assertion. And in proving it he does not necessarily point to the German seizure of Kiau-chow or to the German interference with the Chino-Japanese peace terms, for these are merely a few of many manifestations of the fundamental Far Eastern policy of the Wilhelmstrasse so clearly described by Bismarck and von Bulow.

When the Kaiser, hand-in-glove with the Czar and the French, deprived the Mikado of the Liao-tung peninsula, the Japanese, not yet well versed in the diplomatic practices of Europe, could not clearly understand why Germany, of all Powers, should be the prime mover in that sordid scheme to bully them out of the spoils of war. Only vaguely did they suspect the German desire to ingratiate herself into Russia's favor.

We now know that Germany, in driving the

Japanese out of the Liao-tung peninsula, had a two-fold aim in view. First, she wanted to win the Czar's good will by clearing Russia's way of Eastern advance, and secondly, she wanted Russia to occupy the peninsula so that the Muscovite would not raise objection to the seizure of Kiau-chow which he was, on her part, contemplating.

To drive this home to the reader it is pertinent to describe in detail how Germany ordered Japan out of the Liao-tung peninsula.

In the middle of April, 1895, Japan, after brilliant victories, concluded a peace treaty with China. On the day the treaty was signed at Shimonoseki between Prince Ito and Li Hing-Chang, all Japan was celebrating the glorious termination of the war. Newsboys tore through the streets waving extras with the bold headlines: "China cedes Liao-tung Peninsula!" The Rising Sun was flying over every house, and the cries of *banzai* were heard before the palace of the Mikado.

Suddenly out of the blue came the report that Germany had approached Russia and France with a view to force the retrocession of the Liao-tung peninsula. The report was soon confirmed. Then the whole country was stricken with grief and shame. Never was Japan's honor so ruthlessly outraged.

On the morning of April 23d the German, French, and Russian ministers at Tokyo deigned to present themselves, one after the other, at the Foreign Department, each bringing with him a note admonish-

ing Japan for affronting the Powers by taking the Liao-tung peninsula. The German "advice" was of the most peremptory nature, and the masterful, overbearing manner in which it was handed to the Foreign Department by the Kaiser's envoy is still a topic of occasional conversation among the Japanese. The German Minister brought two copies of the advice, one in German, the other in the Japanese language transcribed in Roman letters.

The note was very brief and bluntly stated that the Japanese occupation of the Liao-tung peninsula was a menace to the Chinese capital and would jeopardize the peace of the Far East. "Therefore," it concluded "the German Government advises the Japanese Government to abandon the idea of occupying the territory."

The original note even contained such a threatening phrase as this—"Japan is weak, Germany is strong; the outcome of an armed conflict between the two countries is obvious."

Yes, Japan was weak at the time; wherefore she had perforce to swallow the medicine so kindly administered by Germany—to make her strong. Like a docile youth, Japan accepted the advice of the three Powers and on May 10, 1895, the Mikado issued the following rescript:

"Devoted as we unalterably are to the principles of peace, we were constrained to take up arms against China for no other reason than our desire to secure for the Orient an enduring peace.

"Now the friendly recommendation of the three Powers was equally prompted by the same desire. Consulting, therefore, the best interests of peace, and animated by a desire to not bring upon our people added hardship or to impede the progress of national destiny, by creating a new competition and thereby making the situation difficult and retarding the restoration of peace, we do not hesitate to accept such recommendation.

"By concluding the treaty of peace China had already shown her sincerity of regret for the violation of her engagements, and thereby the justice of our cause has been proclaimed to the world.

"Under the circumstances we can find nothing to impair the honor and dignity of our Empire if we now yield to the dictates of magnanimity and, taking into consideration the general situation, accept the advice of the friendly Powers."

Thus the Japanese withdrew with what grace and dignity they could from the peninsula. On the day the Imperial Rescript was issued many a tragical scene was enacted at Port Arthur where the Japanese troops were still encamped. One officer killed himself in protest against the abandonment of Port Arthur; many cut their fingers and with their own blood wrote petitions urging the Government not to be bullied by the Powers.

When the triple interference had become imminent Japan earnestly requested England and America to employ their good offices and restrain the

hands of the three Powers. But no aid was forthcoming. Had England and the United States exercised their influence in Japan's favor, the great Manchurian struggle of 1904 would have been forestalled and Japan would not have declared war upon the Kaiser in the present world conflict.

Germany's interference with the peace terms between China and Japan was only the first in the string of events calculated to estrange the two countries. The Kaiser's part played in the Chino-Japanese peace negotiations belongs to one of those pages in history which may never be fully written, but it is generally believed that the Kaiser advised China to sign the peace treaty proposed by Japan, intimating that he would induce Russia and France to join him in his effort to frustrate the treaty.

Looking back at the situation, it seems strange that Japan was not even permitted to insert in the revised peace treaty an article forestalling the passing of the Liao-tung peninsula into the hands of a hostile Power, for that territory in the possession of Russia or Germany could not but prove a menace to the very independence of Japan. Japan no doubt wanted to neutralize that danger zone, or secure a right of preëmption over it, but she was given to understand that the intervening Powers would not allow her to press for any such guarantee.

So the Japanese withdrew without any guaranty whatever. What was the result? Only a year or two later Russia occupied the self-same peninsula from



which the Czar and Kaiser drove the Japanese in the name of the peace of the Far East and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. It was plain that the Kaiser agreed to connive at the Russian occupation of the Liao-tung Peninsula on condition that the Czar would not object to the German seizure of Kiau-chow.

And the German occupation of Kiau-chow, coming as it did in the wake of Japan's evacuation of the Liao-tung peninsula, was especially distasteful to the Japanese. They could not see why the Kaiser should have preached to them so diligently about the territorial integrity of China and the peace of the Far East, when he was waiting for the first opportunity to plant his flag on Chinese territory.

That first opportunity was afforded the Kaiser by the murder by Chinese of two German missionaries in Shantung Province. The missionaries belonged to the mission of Bishop Anzer, who was noted for his militancy. The Berlin Government immediately instructed its minister at Peking, Baron von Heyking, to demand of the Chinese Government the cession of Kiau-chow Bay and its adjacent territory. Before China had time to answer the German note, four German cruisers suddenly appeared in Kiau-chow Bay and landed a large detachment of marines. What could poor China do but obey the mandate of the Kaiser and sign the "murder convention"?

The immediate outcome of the territorial ambitions displayed in the German occupation of Kiau-

chow and other similar instances was the Boxer disturbance, the gruesome story of which is still fresh in our memory. When the Boxers, filled with a desire for revenge, besieged the legation quarters in Peking, Japan at once proposed to the Powers that she be permitted to rush her troops to the scene of disturbance and rescue the beleaguered foreigners.

Again the Kaiser intervened. Unless Japan could, he insisted, guarantee that her action would by no means interfere with the interests of other Powers, the German Government could not consent to her proposal. Had it not been for the Kaiser's obstructive tactics, Japan would have landed her troops at Tientsin much sooner than she did. And when the Japanese soldiers were at last allowed to land in China, even the Kaiser had to admit that they were the most orderly and most plucky of all the foreign troops which the Boxer incident brought to China.

The Boxer disturbance did not stop foreign aggression in China. On the other hand, it aggravated the situation by affording the covetous Powers fresh excuse for grabbing Chinese territory. Russia, for one, lost no time in utilizing the incident and rushing troops into Manchuria in large numbers. The German Emperor, though by no means fond of the Czar, was all that time encouraging the Muscovite ruler to concentrate his attention upon the Far East, thus hoping that Germany might be free from Russian rivalry in Europe. In September, 1901, the two rulers met at St. Petersburg and came into a

definite understanding with regard to Russian activities in Manchuria.

Then came the great war between Russia and Japan. The Mikado saw in the Russian aggression in Manchuria and Korea an imminent danger to the very existence of his country, and determined to stay the Muscovite advance even at the point of the sword. Shortly before the opening of hostilities between Japan and Russia, the *London Times* published an article reporting the existence of a secret understanding in virtue of which the Kaiser was to render clandestine assistance to the Czar in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. Whether the *London Times* was correctly informed we have yet to see, but it is at least significant that in the course of the war Germany showed Russia many marks of good will, which at times amounted to the violation of neutrality. It was no secret that a German steamship company sold to the Russian Government a number of vessels. When the Baltic squadron of Russia under Rozhestvenski was proceeding to the Far East, the same German company permitted one of its steamships to accompany the Russian warships and help them secure coal in their long voyage. All these events called forth protests from the Japanese Government, but of course the German Government paid no attention to such protests.

When the Japanese troops were measuring swords with the Russians on the plains of Manchuria, the Japanese army extended to a German Prince the

privilege of proceeding to the front with the army. Abusing the courtesy the Prince was found secretly sending war reports to the German Government or the Kaiser without previously submitting them to the censoring officers. Considering the secret assistance which Germany was rendering Russia through all stages of the war, you can well imagine the consternation of the Japanese Generals upon discovering the true mission of the Prince.

Such is the history of German diplomacy towards Japan. It is a history which cannot easily be forgotten by the Japanese. Not that the Japanese are unforgiving or uncompromising, but because Germany has inspired in their hearts a feeling of awe, too deep to be removed unless German policy shows unmistakable signs of a fundamental alteration. The unpleasant memory instilled in the Japanese bosom of reckless German activities in the Far East has been unhappily accentuated by the unscrupulous conspiracy of the Wilhelmstrasse to embroil this country with Japan, when the latter is making supreme efforts to maintain and promote friendly relations with America. If the alienation and eventual hostility of Japan and America be one of the aims of German diplomacy in striving to win Japan's good will, a German-Japanese *rapprochement* must be the remotest possibility.

## CHAPTER XVI

### AMERICA AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE ENTENTE

American objection to Russo-Japanese friendship—Its reason removed by the liberation of Russia—Why Japan fought Russia—Why Japan needs Russia's friendship—Russia's former empire scheme—Russia's ambitions in the Far East—Her encroachment upon Manchuria—American failure to check Russia—Japan disgusted with foreign criticisms—History of Russo-Japanese *rapprochement*—First convention—Second convention—The latest convention almost an alliance—Its real object—It does not affect American interests—Special agreements between Russia and Japan.

When, in 1907, Japan took the first step towards an *entente* with Russia, Mr. Jacob H. Schiff, who had been largely instrumental in floating in America the Mikado's loans for the war with Russia, came out squarely in opposition to this new move on the part of Tokyo, and declared:

"It can certainly not give any satisfaction to the American people, when they find Japan, to whom they had lent their unreserved support in her desperate struggle for self-preservation hardly more than a decade ago, joining hands, under the protection of England, with her erstwhile foe who sought to crush her, and thus combine against the forces of civilization, who wish to see established a strong, self-reliant China, rather than an impotent vassal state,

a second India. America will be the last to deny Japan's dearly purchased right to work out her manifest destiny on the Asian continent, but Japan must not seek to do this by acting in unison with Russia, whose methods of government are not such that its blessings ought to be permitted to be extended beyond its own borders."

America's objection to Russo-Japanese friendship is chiefly sentimental. Most Americans entertain innate dislike of Russia. Viewed in the lurid light of gigantic autocracy, her exile system and her oppression of the Jews, Russia presents an unpleasant picture. The recent revolution in Russia must, however, serve to dissipate much of the justifiable prejudice which the American people have entertained toward the Muscovites. If the new democratic cabinet at Petrograd manages to outlive the uncertain conditions which have inevitably followed the recent revolution, and succeeds in establishing a stable government in the face of the reactionary forces conspiring to undermine it, America will not hesitate to extend the hand of friendship not only to the Russian people but to the Russian government. Under such new circumstances, such objections as have been raised by Mr. Schiff against a Russo-Japanese *entente* will be removed. They will also serve to disarm those habitual alarmists who see in the alliance of Russia and Japan a grave menace to American interests in the Far East.

In discussing Tokyo's attitude towards Petrograd,

it is of the foremost importance to remember that Japan, for obvious reasons, could not afford to keep on antagonizing Russia. Japan did not fight Russia in the missionary spirit. To protect her interests in Korea and Manchuria, and to safeguard her very existence menaced by Russian descent upon those countries, was the only reason which impelled her to measure swords with the Muscovites. It would be the height of folly on the part of Japan to cherish animosity towards Russia, when she knows full well that she cannot afford to wage another costly war against her foe of 1904. If the Russians, regretting their past blunders in the Far East, show themselves sincerely desirous of entering into amicable relations with Japan, the latter must by all means respond in a spirit of friendship.

Notwithstanding all insinuations indulged in by American newspapers that Japan has been increasing her armament with an eye upon the United States, no one familiar with Japan's real motives can doubt for a moment that her absorbing concern has been Russia's possible revenge upon her, as well as China's precarious condition which threatens to become at any unexpected moment a storm center of international rivalry. Japan's victories over Russia in the war of 1904-5, brilliant as they were, were far from dealing a fatal blow to the Russian position in Manchuria. Upon the termination of the war the Japanese found the gaunt figure of the Muscovite looming upon the horizon of Manchuria as men-

acingly as ever. After the sacrifice of a hundred thousand lives and a billion dollars in the titanic struggle that had just ended, the Japanese succeeded in dislodging Russia only from one-fourth of the Manchurian territory, leaving the remaining three-fourths in the clutches of the Muscovite. Not only was Russia permitted to strengthen her hold upon by far the greater portion of Manchuria, but she embarked, immediately after the war, upon the gigantic scheme of converting the vast territory of Mongolia into her protectorate, thus hoping eventually to reach and dominate Peking. In the vast empire scheme conceived by the Czar's military *entourages* in the historic days of Viceroy Alexieff nothing short of the complete absorption of Manchuria and North China was Russia's aim. With his way in Manchuria blocked by the Japanese, the northern bear set another snowball rolling from the frozen shores of the Baikal in the direction of Mongolia. Who knows but that the snowball may yet roll on until it reaches the gulf of Chili by way of Peking? In the light of the history of Russian expansion such an apprehension is more than justifiable. According to Foreign Minister Miliukoff's recent statement, even the new democratic government at Petrograd seems almost as imperialistic as its reactionary predecessor. It is, undoubtedly, with a view to preventing such an eventuality that Japan has been striving to establish a foothold in Eastern Inner Mongolia. In persuading China, in



the treaty of May 25, 1915, to open Inner Mongolia to the trade and residence of foreigners, Japan hoped to erect a protecting wall between Peking and that section of Mongolia already dominated by Russia.

Japan has been taking every precaution to protect vulnerable points against any emergency that may develop from the Russian domination of Mongolia and North Manchuria. At the same time she has been fully aware that her resources are too limited to wage another war against the Northern Colossus. In the war of 1904-5, as I have already noted in a previous chapter, her resources both in men and money proved too small to cope with Russia's tremendous resources, thus compelling her to accept peace terms far from satisfactory to her. And when the peace treaty of Portsmouth was signed the world was reluctant to give credit for what Japan had accomplished in the interest of the open door and integrity of China. On the contrary, she was made an object of suspicion and fear, a target of insinuation and aspersion. In books, magazines and newspapers she was charged with pursuing a policy which ran directly counter to the open door doctrine enunciated and defended by the late Secretary Mr. John Hay.

As a matter of fact it was not America which initiated the doctrine; neither did she make any serious effort to defend it when Russia was about to absorb Manchuria. Before Secretary Hay issued the famous "open door" notes in September, 1899,

and in July, 1900, Great Britain enunciated the same principle. But both England and the United States, when confronted by the imminent danger of China's disruption, failed to back up the doctrine they had proclaimed. To Russia the American notes were not worth the paper on which they were written. Upon receipt of Secretary Hay's first note Russia not only expressed herself in favor of reserving for herself the right to levy special duties within her sphere of influence, but demurred to the American proposal with regard to harbor duties and railway charges. With characteristic audacity she hoisted on August 4, 1900, the Russian flag over the Chinese customs house at Newchwang, and in August, 1901, the Imperial Russian Controller of Newchwang issued the following proclamation:

"As this port has now reverted to the control of the Imperial Russian Government, all you who have matters in dispute and the like should bring your petition to the superintendents or other Government officers, where redress can be obtained and cases settled in perfect justice and impartiality. . . . If after the issuance of these presents there be found any person disobeying this proclamation, I will punish the delinquent severely and will exercise no mercy."

In a word, Russia completely usurped the Chinese customs in Manchuria. As the *London Times* reported at the time, the Russian Administration at Dalny (now Dairen) refused the Americans the

permission to build warehouses for the storage of American kerosene, and announced the intention of excluding American oil altogether from Manchuria. The Russian authorities looked upon the Americans with keen suspicion if they ventured further than a couple of miles from Newchwang, and refused to recognize British passports in Manchuria, insisting that all British subjects travelling in that country must possess Russian passports, which were procured from the Russian Administration at Port Arthur with great difficulty and unnecessary delay. In April, 1903, the Czar demanded that the Peking Government agree not to open any new port in Manchuria, nor admit new consuls from any third Power without previous consent of the Russian Government. Russia had also obtained the exclusive right to navigate the Amur, the Sungari, and the Ussuri, forbidding the vessels of any country, other than China and herself, to utilize those waterways. Thus completely isolating Manchuria from the outside world, Russia was busy pouring her troops into that country, and was preparing her way for the immediate absorption of a vast territory of 363,700 square miles.

Put to this test what did America do? Not only did she not take any positive action to enforce the open door policy but she declined to assist Japan, the only nation determined to stay the Russian advance. In the early spring of 1901 Japan, alarmed by the ominous activities of Russia, approached

England, Germany, and the United States with a view to securing their coöperation in preventing the Russian absorption of Manchuria. None gave encouraging reply. Obviously England and America were not willing to offer the sacrifice of blood and treasure upon the altar of the open door so sacred to them.

Thus Japan was compelled, alone and unaided, to challenge Russia, staking her very existence upon the issue of the combat. In the war that followed Japanese blood soaked every inch of South Manchurian soil. When the conflict came to an end, Japan was rewarded with no praise, but found herself indicted by the very nations whose avowed principles of the open door in China she had so valiantly defended. The world apparently forgot that had it not been for the sword of the Japanese the much-heralded open door notes would have been converted into scraps of paper, and that the way would have been opened then and there for the disruption of China's huge territory.

Japan was frankly disgusted at the unreasonable attitude of the Powers, and was convinced of the thanklessness of the costly task she had undertaken for the sake of the "open door" in China, and of the folly of assuming an antagonistic attitude towards Russia which might oblige her once more to fight a single-handed battle with the Northern Colossus. She saw no alternative to a policy whose purpose was to secure her positions in Korea and Manchuria by establishing friendly relations with Russia.

There is another factor which has influenced the Japanese mind in favor of an *entente cordiale* with Russia. Japan must have Russia's coöperation to turn her Manchurian railways into a financial success. For some time after the war the Russian Government tried to cripple Japan's railway enterprise by refusing to establish any traffic connection between its Eastern Chinese and Japan's South Manchuria railway. Without this connection the South Manchuria system could not expect to have any share in the inter-continental traffic between Europe and the Far East. How was Japan to attain this end without befriending Russia? She had borrowed of England \$20,000,000 for her railway enterprise in Manchuria. How was she to pay this debt if she did not take advantage of every opportunity that could be utilized without infringing upon the rights of other nations?

The history of the *rapprochement* which has culminated in the convention signed on July 3, 1916, is briefly surveyed. The first step towards an *entente cordiale* between Tokyo and Petrograd was taken two years after the war of 1904-5, when the two governments signed a convention binding each of the high contracting parties (1) "To respect the actual territorial integrity of the other, and all the rights accruing to one and the other party from treaties, conventions and contracts in force between them and China." (2) "To recognize the independence and the territorial integrity of China and

the principles of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire," and (3) To sustain and defend the maintenance of the *status quo* and respect for this principle by all pacific means within their reach."

Such was the substance of the convention signed on July 30, 1907. Almost simultaneously a convention arranging for the connection of the Russian and Japanese railways in Manchuria, a treaty of commerce and navigation, as well as fisheries convention, were entered into between the two nations. There was nothing unusual in the treaty of commerce and navigation, but in the fisheries convention Russia made important concessions in favor of Japan. It bestowed upon Japanese subjects the right to fish along the entire Russian coast, with the exception of inlets and rivers, on the Behring Straits and the Okhotsk and Japan Seas.

This placed Japan and Russia on a relationship of *entente cordiale*. And yet the Russian people were far from understanding Japan's true motives and instructions. A group of Russian officers, headed by General Kropotkin and General Linevitch, still entertained the notion that the peace treaty of Portsmouth was naught but an agreement of truce, and that Russia was bound to declare a war of revenge upon Japan. Toward the end of 1909 the popular feeling of suspicion with regard to Japan had become so intense that the Russian Government felt obliged to issue a statement, assuring the public

of Japan's sincerity in desiring to remain at peace with Russia. With Petrograd's position made so clear by this voluntary statement, the way was paved for the two countries to enter into a new convention on July 4, 1910, reasserting the principles established in the previous agreement. Let the convention itself explain its nature and object:

"With the object of facilitating communications and developing the commerce of nations, the high contracting parties mutually engage to lend to each other their friendly coöperation with a view to the amelioration of their respective railway lines in Manchuria and the improvement of the connecting service of the said railways, and to abstain from all competition prejudicial to the realization of this object.

"Each of the high contracting parties engages to maintain and respect the *status quo* in Manchuria resulting from the treaties, conventions and other arrangements, concluded up to this day, between Japan and Russia, or between either of these two powers and China.

"In case any event arises of a nature to menace the *status quo* above mentioned, the two high contracting parties shall, in each case, enter into communication with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to the measures they may judge necessary to take for the maintenance of the said *status quo*."

From such a treaty it seemed but a step to a vir-

tual alliance. When the European war broke out Japan not only offered to supply Russia with arms and ammunition, but emphasized her friendship by returning to the Czar all the weapons of war which she had captured in the Manchurian war, and by restoring to the Russian flag the three warships also captured by the Japanese during the same war. To convey his appreciation of these generous acts on the part of Japan, the Czar sent, in May, 1915, Grand Duke George Michaelovitch to the court of the Mikado. It was an open secret that the Grand Duke, ostensibly on an errand of felicitation, came intrusted with the mission of sounding the Japanese Government as to the possibility of strengthening, and enlarging the scope of, the *entente cordiale* then existing between the two nations. The negotiations that followed finally bore fruit in the convention of July 3, 1916.

To call the new convention an alliance is, perhaps, not quite correct. A treaty of alliance must provide mutual obligations on the part of the high contracting parties to render armed assistance to each other in case their respective interests are in danger. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, for instance, provides that "if by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any power or powers, either high contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial interests or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other contracting party will at



once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

The new Russo-Japanese convention contains no such provision. Let the convention tell its own tale:

"First. Japan will not become a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against Russia. Russia will not become a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against Japan.

"Second. In case the territorial rights or special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognized by the other contracting party are menaced, Japan and Russia will act in concert on the measures to be taken in view of the support or coöperation necessary for the protection and defense of these rights and interests."

This is the text of the laconic instrument. We have yet to see what Russia and Japan really mean by "mutual support and cooperation." Does it simply mean a moral or financial support, or is it another phrase for armed assistance? If the purpose of diplomacy be, as it has too often been in the past, to make a treaty capable of two constructions, the Russo-Japanese convention may be an *entente cordiale* or a downright alliance according to the convenience or inconvenience of the high contracting parties.

The most significant part of the convention lies in the wide application which it apparently permits.

While it is obvious that the new covenant aims chiefly to secure the respective interests of the contracting parties in Manchuria and Mongolia, its scope is not restricted to these two countries but covers the entire Far East. Where are we to seek the *raison d'être* of such a comprehensive convention? Against what particular Power or Powers do Russia and Japan propose to protect their interests after the present war in Europe?

In spite of the fatuous efforts of certain American publicists and newspapers to create the impression that the new convention is directed against the United States, the immediate occasion for and the real objective of the alliance is Germany. Japan fears that Germany, smarting under the surrender of Kiau-chow, will let no opportunity pass unutilized to challenge Japan's position in China. At the peace conference that is to follow the war, Germany will employ every means to regain Kiau-chow. Should she fail to regain Kiau-chow, she will by all means try to regain the Shantung railways now held by the Japanese. To forestall such eventualities it is of the foremost importance that Japan should enjoy the support not only of England but of Russia.

So far as American interests in the Far East are concerned the convention will make but little change in the present situation in the Far East. This is obvious not only from the text of the convention but in the light of the motives which prompted the two Powers to conclude it.

Long before the conclusion of the new pact America was unmistakably given to understand that no enterprise or investment, having political or commercial importance, could be launched in Manchuria without due recognition of the preponderating interest held by Russia and Japan in that territory. This is, of course, not to say that both Japan and Russia are anxious to bar out American capital and enterprise from Manchuria. It simply means that America must not ignore the peculiar position occupied by Russia and Japan, but must take it into consideration in launching any scheme which will seriously affect the political and economic status of Manchuria.

That principle was fairly well established when Japan and Russia opposed the neutralization of the Manchurian railways proposed by Secretary Knox, and when they combatted the Chino-American project to construct a railway of 700 miles between Chinchow and Aigun.

I have always maintained that Secretary Knox's proposals with regard to the Manchurian railways, unfortunate as they were, did not emanate from any sinister motive. His only fault was his failure to realize the singular political situation in Manchuria. To Japan, her railway holdings in Manchuria, though totalling only 700 miles, meant a loss of 100,000 lives and a cost of \$1,000,000,000. In the face of such an appalling sacrifice, it might well have been conceded that she had the right, as long as she conformed to

the principles of the open door, to operate the railways, so that proceeds from the traffic might assist, if ever so little, in lightening the financial burden entailed by the war.

As for the Chinchow-Aigun railway scheme conceived by Wall Street magnates and backed by Mr. Knox, Japan, in virtue of the Chino-Japanese protocol of 1905, had the right to veto it. She was, however, willing to waive the right and was ready to indorse the American enterprise on the condition that she be allowed to build a line to effect a junction between the South Manchuria system and the proposed Chino-American line. But Russia was uncompromising and was determined to put her foot upon any such scheme.

And so both the Chinchow-Aigun railway project and the proposal to neutralize the Manchurian railway bore no fruit. This unhappy incident dealt a serious blow to America's further enterprises in Manchuria. Had America realized more fully the singular position which Japan had attained in Manchuria through the ordeal of blood and fire, and shown herself more considerate in dealing with the Japanese, in the initial stage of her Manchurian diplomacy, American capital and enterprise might have been welcomed at least in that section of Manchuria which had come under Japanese influence.

When the new Russo-Japanese convention was made public both at Tokyo and at Petrograd, it was rumored that the new convention had attached

to it a set of agreements which the two Governments preferred to withhold from the public. As a matter of fact there is nothing secret about these separate agreements.

From the point of view of immediate material benefits, this so-called "secret treaty" is perhaps more valuable to Japan than the main convention. Its substance, as reported in the Japanese press, may be summarized as follows:

1. Russia cedes to Japan the Changchun-Taolais-hao section (about 70 miles) of the Changchun-Harbin branch of the Russian railway in Manchuria. For this Japan pays Russia about \$7,000,000 in war supplies.

2. Russia, with the consent of China, extends to Japan the privilege of navigating the Second Sungari River.

Of the two terms the first is the more important. It will be recalled that at the peace conference at Portsmouth Japan insisted upon securing the Russian railway from Port Arthur to Harbin, measuring some 376 miles. Russia, however, strenuously opposed the Japanese demand, and agreed to cede only 436 miles between Port Arthur and Changchun. Japan has ever since coveted the remaining 140 miles from Changchun to Harbin, the Russian metropolis of Manchuria, for that section of the line traverses the heart of a rich agricultural country producing enormous quantities of beans, Manchuria's chief product. Although much of the beans pro-

duced in that section have been transported to Dairen over Japan's South Manchuria system, no small quantity has been shipped north over the Changchun-Harbin line of the Russian system, ultimately to find an outlet at the Russian port of Vladivostok. With the acquisition by Japan of the southern half of the Changchun-Harbin line, at least two hundred thousand sacks of beans will be added to the traffic of the South Manchuria railway.

No less important is the privilege of navigating the Second Sungari River. In virtue of the Aigun treaty of 1858, Russia has hitherto enjoyed the exclusive right to navigate the Amur, the Sungari, and the Ussuri River, affording a great stimulus to Russian commerce and industry in Manchuria. Now the Second Sungari River, which is the largest tributary of the main Sungari, traverses the Japanese sphere of influence, and yet the Japanese have been denied the privilege of sharing with the Russians and Chinese in the benefits offered by that great artery of trade and communication. The Second Sungari originates in the Chang-Pai-Shan, the Eternal White Mountains, on the Korean border, and joins the main Sungari at a point about a hundred miles north of Petuna, a city of some 10,000 inhabitants, and about two hundred miles west of Harbin, Russia's political and commercial center in Manchuria. The river becomes navigable for vessels of shallow draught at the city of Kirin, the capital of Kirin Province, about four hundred miles

from the point of confluence. Kirin is fitly termed by the natives the "Inland Dockyard" of Manchuria, as it is the center of the shipbuilding industry, producing numerous junks to be used on the Sungari River.

The opening of the Second Sungari to Japanese enterprise will prove a valuable asset to the Japanese railway system, for the waterway joins the Japanese railway at Tao-lai-shao, which, in virtue of the new agreement with Russia, becomes the northern terminus of the main line of the South Manchuria system. At Kirin it also joins the Kirin-Changchun railway, a Chino-Japanese enterprise.

Important as the new privileges secured by Japan are, they are far from what she really desired. She desired to purchase the Russian line up to Harbin, seventy miles more than the mileage actually obtained, and to secure the right to utilize the main stream of the Sungari River as well as the Second Sungari. Nevertheless Japan has made a great stride in Manchuria. The concessions she has obtained will afford her easier access to Eastern Inner Mongolia.

I have described Russia's Far Eastern policy in the past, as well as Japan's misgiving engendered by that policy. Whether the democratic tide which has set in at Petrograd will materially influence her foreign policy with reference to Mongolia, Manchuria and China, we have yet to see.

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